Social organization of the Eastern Slavs
Our Slavic forefathers are first mentioned in historical sources referring to the Volkerwanderung (Great Migration of Peoples) in Europe, with the Roman legions being forced to retreat from their defense lines along the Rhine and Danube under the onslaught of militant Germanic tribes, resulting in the emergence of nomadic empires in Pannonia and adjacent regions. First, it was Attila’s empire of the Huns that fell into decay after the battle against the united Roman-Goth host in the fields of Cataluna and then the nonetheless powerful Dacian Avars eventually crushed by Charlemagne.
In both cases the nomadic aggressor would recruit conquered Slavs, using them as cannon fodder. Slavs began to be mentioned (and described) by contemporary chroniclers. Greek historians referred to Antes and Sclavonians inhabiting the area between the Dnister and Dnipro. Later, their Arab colleagues would mention Ruthenians and Sakalibs. Sclavonians and Sakalibs were apparently the same entity which our chroniclers eventually agreed to refer to as the Slavs.
What kind of social order did those ancient Slavic peoples prefer? What was their mentality like? Works by Procopius of Caesarea, Jordanus, and Mauricius who wrote about our forefathers reveal first observations. The historians note that the Slavs had neither a strong state nor strong military organization, despite their being undeniably brave and skilled warriors who scoffed at death. Historians described their social organization as democratic, as every issue had to be resolved by a given community usually through a council of elders and popular assembly. In other words, rather than a real elite forcing its way to power, the Slavs had tribal chiefs; instead of political hotheads, people given to personal emotions rather than sound judgment, drawing society into a dynamic — that is, the historical — process, they practiced the viche popular assemblies. In modern terms the notion seems best described as a crowd where the final say often stays with a given tribal patriarch, gray-haired individual bent over with age, most likely slow due to senility, meaning they would be hard put to decide simple matters, let alone make fateful decisions.
Of course, in such social environs an individual, however bright and resourceful, would be forced to mind his own business and not get out of line. In other words, how can we speak of their showing true historical attainment.
THE PHENOMENON OF KYIV RUS’
One is bound to wonder, How could our Slavic forefathers have created the powerful polity known as Rus’ in the 9th-11th centuries? What made the Slavs inhabiting territories Dnipro Basin suddenly introduce a hierarchy in their thoroughly democratic habitat? Where would that elite come from and how could it gain strength?
One of the generally known ways to beget a state elite is its foreign origin. Hegel noted in his Philosophy of History that in Greece, states — poleis, city-states, to be precise — emerged largely due to the influx of foreigners, the latter setting up powerful centers, building castles, and establishing dynasties. David Hume was even more to the point, stating that almost every government still in existence or one that has gone down in history turns out to have been established either by usurping power or conquest, or both.
Many other historians were inclined to attribute the emergence of a state, meaning organized, even centralized political power, to such factors. Friedrich Nietszche wrote [in his Genealogy of Morals] that a pack of blond beasts, a race of conquerors and masters having a military organization of their own, would lay its heavy predator paws on a numerically superior populace; thus emerged the notion of the state. He thought that sentimentality attributing its origin to some kind of “agreement” was totally irrelevant and immaterial.
In fact, that influx of foreigners would in all such cases result a stratified society, causing the appearance of the original hierarchical structure; the conqueror would provide the elite and state structure, while the vanquished would provide the required masses. From this assumption follows the necessary tension, an impetus triggering off historical dynamism. It was thus only that a people would step into history.
Of course, the Slavs were no exception from the rule governing the emergence of states. Thus, in AD 670, in the Balkans, surfaced the Bulgarian Khan Asparukh with his well organized hierarchical horde. The Southern Slavs made a pact with him, forming an alliance, subsequently to give birth to the First Bulgarian Empire that would eventually threaten the Byzantine Empire. That hierarchical structure was initiated by all those newcomers and the state elite took shape using all those “elders” representing one hundred oldest Bulgarian families that came with Asparukh.
And what happened in Kyiv Rus’? We know from the chronicles that the Slavic tribes around the Dnipro were constantly threatened by the powerful Khazars, Magyars, and Pechenegs. Today, most historians agree that a strong Slavic state centered in Kyiv emerged from confrontation with the Khazars. Yet the unwillingness to pay tribute to the Khazars was apparently insufficient ground for a state to take shape. What about the elite? How did it come to be? From among local tribal chiefs? Unlikely. Those chiefs had authority but only within the bounds of their tribes. Was it due to newcomers, as in the case with the Southern Slavs?
We know from our annals that Kyiv was on the then popular merchant route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” and that merchants would hire guards, known as Vikings west of the Laba River marking the boundary line between the Slavic and Germanic worlds. East of the Laba they were known as Varangians. Often, these mercenaries would act on their own, for they knew every trick. Vain were all attempts to ascertain the Viking/Varangian ethnic origin; they were professionals in the first place, ready to serve whoever required their combat skill and paid good money.
Our Slavic forefathers preferred to hire Varangians because they saw them for what they were: outstanding warriors. The Varangians, for their part, were mostly interested in keeping the trade route safe. Researchers specializing in Slavic history assume the state of Rus’ emerged based on the mutual interests of local Slavs and northern Varangians.
Bypassing the very interesting and controversial issue of the parentage of the first Varangian princes Askold, Dir, Riurik, and Oleh, along with the origin of the Kyiv Rus’ elite, it seems worth concentrating on some key issues. First, the only way the state elite of Rus’ could have emerged and reached the required concentration and strength would have been by relying on Varangian (i.e., foreign) swords. Second, the fact that the Varangians belonged to the West caused our people to adopt their Western mentality. That way our people had a chance to become a body politic with its own ambitious and passionate elite. It was thus our forefathers created their Slavic state, one according to the Western standard, without the oriental despotism of Asia.
DEMOCRATIC SLAVIC VICHE
The viche, a popular truly democratic assembly, was one element somewhat impeding the concept of Slavic statehood in Varangian Rus’. Viche is still a favorite subject with many researchers and true devotees of our past. However, a closer look shows that the viche phenomenon was fraught with tragic consequences to be encountered in the future. Who knows what other functions could such an assembly of men in the viche square have had except one: legitimizing the local prince’s authority by a general vote (or by just shouting ayes, for no one would collect the votes at the time). After all, this was the lever by pulling which the masses could influence matters being decided on the state level, something like the Consistory practiced in ancient Rome, which the plebeians made the patricians bargain on. A phenomenon never experienced by Western Europe.
What was the viche all about? The prince, meaning the decision-making part of the elite, had to curry favor with the masses or look for a different way to assert his authority, like hiring a host of mercenaries, men skilled in the art of warfare, or maybe soliciting help from a powerful neighbor, even a former enemy. All such mercenaries would have a chance to effectively intervene in our domestic politics.
Naturally, one can object that the viche was evidence of democracy, an indicator of high public activity and consciousness. Circumventing the rather disputable matter of public consciousness during any kind of public gathering, this author wishes to stress that our people never passed through the phase of strong state power. In our people’s consciousness — maybe even subconscious — one can find no tradition of respect for one’s own state hierarchy as something divine, given by God Himself. Without doubt, this produced a negative effect on our people’s mentality.
The elite existing in Rus’ had its specifics, in conjunction primarily with the traditional succession to the throne offered by Prince Yaroslav the Wise, whereby the princely seat in Kyiv and elsewhere in Rus’ had to be inherited not by the current ruler’s son but by the genealogically eldest man of a given dynasty. Thus the ruling prince did not feel obligated to expand his domain by seizing additional territories; rather, he would want to ascend to a more prestigious throne. In this sense the princely leadership of Kyiv Rus’ is strongly reminiscent of the Soviet nomenklatura with its dreams about Kremlin posts.
Accordingly, wars among the Rus’ princes (generally described as internecine strife) had their distinctiveness. Rather than conquer new territories, our princely elite sought ways, means, and of course allies to ascend to the coveted throne. Yet the Eastern Slavic state emerged, contrary to all the specifics of our elite and plebeian mentality. Moreover, Kyiv Rus’ emerged in a form rightfully to be considered as a separate polyethnic civilization.
Rus’ reached its peak under Prince Volodymyr Sviatoslavovych, followed by decline, albeit interspersed by cultural progress under Prince Yaroslav the Wise. As a civilization, Kyiv Rus’ was on a downward curve, anyway. Sometime after Prince Danylo of Halych who tried to restore its past glory, Rus’ was but a shadow its previous powerful self. The term of functioning of this civilization is considerably less than a millennium, the life span Schopenhauer would determine for such civilizations. Yet all the hallmarks are still there: birth, progress, decline, fall, and a mentality born of it, including a specific perception of social hierarchy. The plebeians in Rus’ would never dream of acting against their rulers. Their ruler could be only from a princely family. The Halych- Volyn principality seems the only exception from the rule, for its princely rule was threatened not so much by the plebeians as by the boyars, the then nouveaux riches. Novgorod is another example, with its merchants forming something akin to the present-day Mafia, dictating their rules of the game.
The next stage, the Hetmanate, witnessed the greatest upsurge in Ukrainian state-building. Within the Cossack community, absolutely anyone could claim hetman’s mace. Theoretically, every such contender had free passage provided he was a good swordsman, had enough intellect, and was truly dedicated. What changes in mentality! Rus’ under Varangian princes was closer to the West and Cossack Orthodox Ukraine to the East.
