Imperial machine at work

Russia’s annexation of “Splendid Tavrida,” as the Crimean Peninsula was called in the 18th century, was one of the most perfidious, large- scale, and meticulously designed military, political, and diplomatic special operations of that age. The word “annexation” is not quite accurate here. Aleksandr Chatsky, the main character in Griboedov’s play, Woe from Wit, shows a keen understanding of the Crimean events, when he speaks about “the Ochakiv times and the subjugation of the Crimea.”

The subject of this article is the subjugation of the Crimea, which was an officially independent country, recognized as such by the main European states, including Russia. I would first like to emphasize that whereas for Chatsky “the times of the Crimea’s subjugation” served as a synonym of the ancient past, for us, contemporary Ukrainians, and especially for our compatriots who live in the Crimea, this story is of vital and topical interest.

The events of the 1780s, which resulted in Catherine’s manifesto of April 8, 1783, on the incorporation of the Crimea, Taman region, and the Kuban territory into the Russian state, vividly demonstrate all the “charm” of the imperial machine at work. Every method was used — military force or its threat, bribery, blackmail, diplomatic ways, and hypocrisy. As the reader will soon see, both the design and operation of that machine have not markedly changed in the last 220 years.

WAR

The first step toward the conquest of the Crimea for Empress Catherine was the famous Kuchuk-Kainarji peace treaty signed on July 10, 1774, which concluded the First Russo- Turkish war of 1768-1774 with very advantageous terms for Russia. According to the treaty, the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire restored to Russia all the lands that had been conquered by Peter I. All the territories north of the Black Sea, inhabited by the Tatars (including the Crimean Khanate) were proclaimed independent from Turkey, although the sultan, as the “highest caliph,” retained religious power, the right to confirm elected Crimean khans, to mint his image on Crimean coins, and, finally the honorary right to be the subject of prayers said in mosques. In addition, Russia obtained Kerch and the fortress of Yenikale. Turkey paid Catherine 4.5 million rubles in contributions, and Russian merchant vessels were allowed to sail on the Black Sea along with English and French ships.

The empress was consistent in implementing her program known as the “gathering of lands,” the official doctrine of the Russian tsars. She knew that Peter I had spoken about the vital importance of the Crimea for the state that was being built (and to the imperialist mentality “state necessity” excludes “ethical doubts”). She also knew that the Crimean khanate, headed by the unpredictable and weak-willed Sahib-Girey, who one day followed the European political fashion and the next day pretended to be the most righteous of Muslims, was clearly experiencing a rough period (like the rest of the Ottoman Empire).

Catherine was well aware of the weakness of Turkey and its assorted vassals, including the Crimea. In September 1782, on the eve of conquering the Crimea, in a memorandum to Austrian Emperor Josef II, Catherine claimed that defeating weakened Turkey, which had lost the war, would not be difficult. According to the empress, internal chaos, various pashas striving for independence, constant discord between them and the sultan, the presence of a large number of Christians in the Turkish empire, lack of discipline in the army, greed and corruption of Turkish statesmen, and poverty made Turkey, let alone the Crimea, its former satellite, easy prey.

I cannot avoid mentioning such an important factor as the permanent stationing of Russian troops in the Crimea since the autumn of 1770. At that time, during the first Russian-Turkish war, the 2nd Army of Prince Vasilii Dolgoruky occupied the Crimea. This military presence became an “irresistible” argument in Russia’s plans to annex the Crimea. The army’s combat capabilities enabled Catherine II to afford to ignore the advice of Prussia’s King Friedrich II, who, after the war victories won by Petr Rumiantsev’s army in 1770, insisted that Catherine be reasonable, fair, and amenable to compromise. He even expressed the wish that Catherine abandon her intention to “obtain the Crimea”(?). On the contrary, he asked the Russian empress not to assail the Crimean Tatars’ independence.

In connection with this, Catherine wrote to her minister of foreign affairs, Nikita Panin, declaring that letter “shows great displeasure, petty jealousy, and threats; but when they see that they will not win anything through threats, the rest will arrange itself. Stand firm and do not retreat: everything will turn to our benefit. And if they see that we are in pursuit of peace, we will get a bad peace.” One cannot deny cruelty and pragmatism of this crafty, self-confident, and able ruler.

However the future of the Crimea remained vague. Different versions were possible, and much depended on the result of the internal political struggle between the members of the khan’s court in Bakhchisarai.

INTRIGUES

Conflicts between Turkey’s supporters and the “Russian party”-advocates of a rapprochement with Russia — intensified within the ruling elite of the Crimea. It should be emphasized that this “Russian party” enjoyed political and financial support from St. Petersburg. Moreover, its very formation had been inspired by Catherine. The imperialist “land gatherers” had used this tactic numerous times, and let’s face it — it is still being exploited today, here in Ukraine.

In March 1775 the unfortunate khan Sahib-Girey, against whom some influential murzas had revolted, was ousted with the help of Turkish emissaries. That summer a Turkish force escorting Devlet-Girey, the Turkish-supported candidate to the khanate, landed in Alushta. Then the “Russian factor” emerged. The 2nd Army deployed on the peninsula blocked the movements of the land force. Field marshal Rumiantsev advised Catherine to bet on Shahin-Girey, Devlet-Girey’s brother, long known for his pro- Russian attitude. Shahin-Girey was brought to the Crimea from Abkhazia, where he led detachments of the Nogai Horde, and with the support of General Borzov’s corps was elected the Crimean khan.

Catherine continued her policy of “divide and rule.” The Crimea, formally independent of Istanbul but transformed into a marionette of the Russian government best suited her plans. Shahin-Girey, surrounded by Russian bayonets (Lieutenant-General Suvorov had accepted the post of commander of the Crimean Corps in 1777), was behaving arrogantly and ignoring national values and customs. He felt 100 percent “European,” rode around in a coach, dined at a table sitting on a comfortable chair, and employed a cook from Europe. The pro-Russian khan’s expenses soared, and the treasury was empty.

Catherine’s representative, Andrei Konstantinov, despite being an experienced courtier, could not help correct the situation. Shahin-Girey’s subjects were outraged by the sharp increase in taxes and the granting of special privileges to Russian merchants in the Crimea. The average Tatar began to realize that Shahin-Girey was no more than a traitor of the state and the faith, directly appointed by the “Russian party” whose only support was Suvorov’s corps.

Suvorov, who was not yet a Generalissimus but already a distinguished military leader, demonstrated outstanding diplomatic skill in his defense of Russian imperial interests in Tavrida. He managed to repulse the Turkish fleet from the strategically important port of Akhtiar, avoiding direct combat. On this spot later appeared “the eternal city of Russian glory” — Sevastopol. Suvorov had prepared generous gifts for the Crimean statesmen, who were “accustomed to all sorts of evil” (his words), which came in very handy. Here we have another vivid example of the old truth — when corruption and embezzlement of the state treasury exceeds a certain limit, this indicates that a state is in agony.

In October 1777 the Crimean Tatars launched an uprising, also supported in the Kuban region, against khan Shahin-Girey. Selim-Girey, Shahin’s brother, was proclaimed the ruler of the Crimea. The ousted khan deserted to the Russian camp. The insurrection was drowned in blood, and it was then that Suvorov changed from a diplomat to a chastiser, who had drawn from the scabbard “the sword of war.” By spring 1778 Shahin-Girey’s rule was restored.

I would not like readers to gain a simplistic impression of Shahin-Girey. He had been educated in the European style and had a fluent command of Greek, French, Arabic, and, of course, Russian. He wrote poems and was a direct descendant of Chinghis Khan. But Shahin-Girey neither knew nor understood his people, which doomed his political career. The khan had not drawn the proper conclusions from the dramatic events of the past. Like before, the course of forcibly implementing unprepared European-style reforms was followed. In 1778 Shahin-Girey granted the Crimean Christians (Greeks and Armenians, whose population was estimated at about 15 percent of the total population) equal rights with the Muslims, which was not welcomed in the least. He ordered the return of prisoners of war to Russia and began minting gold and silver coins without the sultan’s formal permission.

The Crimean Christians’ fate changed dramatically in the summer of 1778. Prince Grigorii Potemkin, Catherine’s omnipotent favorite and the governor of Novorossiia, Azov, and Tahanrih — in fact, the unlimited ruler of the southern imperial lands, broached the idea of resettling those people to the territory of Russia. The empress supported his idea. Suvorov was appointed to head this operation, which was prepared in the utmost secrecy. The Christians’ “evacuation” was executed rapidly and efficiently. The khan lost a very important financial source because the Crimean Christians were hard-working farmers, craftsmen, and merchants, who contributed considerable sums to the treasury. The khan, realizing the utter weakness of his authority, was “exhausted with anger” (Suvorov’s words), and sent message after message to St. Petersburg. But he was forced to reconcile himself to the situation. Incidentally, those Crimean Greeks were resettled on the coast of the Sea of Azov, in the area of today’s cities of Berdiansk and Mariupil, where a considerable number of their descendants still live.

ANNEXATION

Catherine II, who was used to “conducting herself discreetly, acting cautiously, and always dreaming of her own majesty” (her self-assessment) related the following about herself: “I took the firm decision not to stop before any obstacle, to overcome them all, and use all possible means to achieve the desired goals.” This empress knew how to wait patiently. But in the summer of 1783, after gaining the Austrian emperor’s support on the “Crimean issue,” Catherine decided that the “fruit” had ripened, and the time for action had come.

By this time Shahin-Girey’s power had taken on an “imaginary dimension.” In March 1779, in return for Turkey’s confirmation of the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji’s, the Russian government withdrew its troops from the peninsula. Seeing the weakness of the shah’s rule, the Crimean clergy launched another uprising against Shahin in early 1782. The khan responded by hanging a mufti and two respected murzas, which only angered the people. Shahin-Girey fled under Russia’s wing, and his elder brother Batyr-Girey, an ally of Turkey, was proclaimed khan.

Once again military force went into action. A mighty Russian corps commanded by General De Balmen assembled in Nykopil and on the avenues of approach to Perekop. In September 1782 Shahin-Girey joined the force, whose task was to return the throne to him. In October troops led by Count Samoilov (Potemkin’s nephew), seized the Perekop line of defense. The way to the Crimea for the “Russian party’s” marionette was open. Batyr-Girey fled.

In early 1783, after several weeks of confidential talks with Samoilov, who was now Russia’s representative in the Crimea, Shahin-Girey (not without reasonable material stimulus!) declared his unwillingness to rule such an ungrateful nation as the Crimeans and abdicated. Catherine’s hands were untied. On April 8, 1783, she issued a manifesto on the incorporation of the Crimea, the Kuban land, and the Taman region into the Russian Empire. Who could have predicted then that this event contained the kernels of all the future tragedies of the Crimean Tatars, a nation that had lost its statehood?

One cannot help noting the fact that Ukrainian history during this period was closely connected with the process of consolidating (by all means!) and unifying the empire, which was characteristic of Catherine’s policy. Let us not forget an important fact: in 1783, the year when the Crimea was annexed, the empress turned the free Ukrainian peasants into serfs. This was no coincidence.