Grisly Moscow hand

Russia’s occupation of Crimea and a part of Donbas didn’t happen overnight. For 20 years the Kremlin had been spreading its venomous propaganda and corruption tentacles, affecting Ukraine’s political chain of command, secret police (SBU), and law-enforcement agencies. April 6, 2014, marked a crucial point for Luhansk and Donbas when the regional SBU station was seized by militants. Almost simultaneously, terrorists broke into administrative buildings in Donetsk and Kharkiv. These events were a prologue to the seizure of Sloviansk, drawing most public and official attention to that city while Russian forces were finally taking most of the Donbas area under control.

Until this day the SBU and Interior Ministry brass have been arguing about who is to blame for the surrender of that sturdy SBU building, with the ministry insisting that the SBU men hadn’t timely apply for police protection and thus exposed the SWAT men to enemy fire. As it was, part of the rally protesters on the central square (all had been transported there as part of the plot) left the place and headed for the SBU station, bypassing the prosecutor’s office (as a tactical distraction). Before that the SBU building had been picketed every weekend. That day was special as gang leaders Kariakin, Relke and others had been arrested 24 hours earlier, found in possession of a sizable arsenal. The rally demanded their release (although many in the crowd didn’t even know who the men were). Some questions remain open: Why did the highway patrol allow a well organized convoy of buses to enter the city? Couldn’t the police deploy more than 70 officers to defend the SBU station and secure law and order on the streets of Luhansk, considering that the protesters were obviously following professional commands, that those who gave orders were apparently well protected, including on the part of law-enforcement agencies? Could the SBU station be defended with just the personnel on hand? Was the use of firearms justifiable?

At the time, three weeks remained until the Russian thugs would have Luhansk totally under control after seizing the key administrative buildings. Russia’s clandestine agencies would spend three weeks reconnoitering the site of the so-called referendum that would take place on May 11, rather than March 16, as planned earlier. Was what happened in April FSB’s false start? SBU believe it was.

There are many questions addressing the Interior Ministry and SBU that remain to be answered. Below is part of an interview with Oleksandr Petrulevych, the then head of the Luhansk SBU station, and his number one, Oleh Zhyvotov. Both were at work on April 6, 2014, and were taken hostage. The Interior Ministry officers who were in charge of the regional police force at the time are avoiding giving official comment.

“Our men guarded the premises as they were picketing the Luhansk Oblast State Administration. Before that we’d been bringing truckloads of sandbags to the SBU station for several weeks,” says an ex-officer of Luhansk’s police department (he is an eyewitness to the events on April 6 and agreed to a brief interview on condition of anonymity), “but on that particular date, April 6, there was no formal request for guarding the premises. When the crowd started advancing on the SBU building, the police followed, trying to catch up to secure law and order. Those were the officers who had been deployed on short notice that day. What’s more, the then head of the regional SBU station, Bolotskykh, is said to have asked Luhansk SBU chief Petrulevych to send reinforcements, but the man refused. This information has to be verified. As it was, 70 law-enforcement men lined up in front of the SBU station’s entrance and withstood several protesters’ attacks. Then [tear] gas was used – some sources say the canisters were hurled from the SBU premises – and our men had to retreat.”

These events should be subject to an in-depth analysis with far-reaching conclusions. Now is not the time to point the finger at each other, let alone find a scapegoat, considering that there are many complex reasons behind what has befallen Ukraine. These reasons date back months and years. It should be recalled that administrative buildings were seized by protesters before the events in Luhansk – in Kyiv (Maidan), Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and elsewhere. Of course, on those occasions the protesters had no intentions of ruining the country, but they set a dangerous precedent, something the Russian media and clandestine agencies craved and used to a 200 percent advantage.

A closer look at the events in Luhansk, events that marked a crucial point in the domestic political situation, shows that there were three major reasons behind the surrender of the SBU station and part of the Donbas area. To begin with, Moscow-minded people made up the lion’s share of the local police and administration, as evidenced by desertion, insubordination, even by openly siding with the enemy. Second, official Kyiv proved dramatically weak and confused under the circumstances. There was no initiative from “upstairs,” with Kyiv ignoring the alarming reports, requests for reinforcements, etc., streaming from the regional administration. It was as though Kyiv were too busy finding solutions to more important problems. Third and most important, what happened on April 6 in Luhansk could not have happened without Russia’s clandestine agencies being directly involved, and this involvement has been proven using documented evidence.

In fact, this war with Russia ought to have been waged by clandestine agencies, rather than troops, from day one. As it is, after two years, after losing thousands of human lives and sizeable territories, we’re still groping in the dark for the right legal formulas – whether what we have is an antiterrorist operation or war, whether to haggle over POW exchange or just let them go.

RUSSIAN SECRET AGENTS OPERATED IN UKRAINE LONG BEFORE APRIL 2014

There are two theories concerning the events that took place on April 6, 2014, in Luhansk. One theory belongs to the Interior Ministry and the other to SBU. Was it actually possible to clear the Luhansk SBU station of the militants using the personnel on hand?

Oleksandr PETRULEVYCH: “We then had 580 Luhansk SBU men on hand, out of the 650 on payroll. Of those 580 men comparatively few were field operatives, with the rest making up office and auxiliary personnel, including night watchmen, janitors, and paramedics. Those people had no combat training. There is also the problem of status assessment as rendered by media people, even by experts. I mean, how professional this assessment is. Those events ought to have been studied on a cause-and-effect basis in the first place. Second, one ought to remember that SBU had then their tasks and responsibilities, just as the Interior Ministry had theirs. I mean different jurisdictions. At the time the Interior Ministry tried to blame me for the surrender of the SBU building. Well, there is the law on SBU and one on the police [then called militia. – Ed.], also the pertinent articles of the Criminal Code. SBU can’t act as riot police, this is up the Interior Ministry’s alley.”

Oleh ZHYVOTOV: “The first signal came on March 9 when the militants first seized the oblast state administration. Note that there were lots of police officers and Berkut [Ukr. version of SWAT] men in front of the building. There is a video with a colonel talking on the [mobile] phone, giving an order whereupon the police start standing down and the crowd enters the administrative building.”

O.P.: “Let me remind you that the SBU building was blocked [by protesters] each weekend, so we asked the local police to help secure the premises. There is a special riot police procedure called Operation Khvylia [Sea Wave] and another one, Operation Fortetsia [Fortress], meant to protect administrative buildings.”

The Interior Ministry says the SBU station filed no request for the protection of the premises.

O.P.: “Let them show me one law that says we had to file such a request.”

O.Zh.: “All SBU bylaws read that, in the presence of a clear and present danger to SBU premises the SBU duty officer must notify the regional police department. We did just that and they sent 70 Interior Troops men. We told them this wasn’t enough as the protest rally was growing in size. I called Prosecutor Serhii Stos and asked him to put pressure on the local chief of police, telling him the man wasn’t responding to our requests. [The local police chief] Huslavsky had been aware of the possibility of public unrest. Our SBU officers had no riot police training, nor did we have any equipment to deal with a contingency like that.”

Talking about equipment, the SBU station had an armory. What happened to it?

O.P.: “There was an armory, but it hadn’t been upgraded since the Soviet period. One ought to understand who can use special riot police equipment. There is the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Militia’ and it doesn’t provide for the SBU to use this kind of equipment. We even had no right to use billy clubs or cheremkha [lit. bird cherry, police slang for phenacyl chloride, riot control agent designated CN]. All those counterintelligence agents running around, shooting their guns, are in the thrillers you read and watch.”

Before Yanukovych fled, there was an attempt to seize the SBU building in Khmelnytsky. Fires were shot at the crowd and a woman suffered.

O.Zh.: “Investigation into the case proved that no SBU man had fired at the crowd but above. No one knows who fired at the crowd. Remember the storming of the SBU building in Lviv? The building was then burned down. In Ivano-Frankivsk, an armory was seized along with secret files. The SBU station in Donetsk was seized three times. In all those cases no one fired at the crowd.”

O.P.: “It’s important to note that there were many ordinary people in those crowds, that the militants used them as shields. That was an operation well planned and professionally carried out, considering that there were young mothers with children and baby carriages in the park across the street. It was impossible [for us] to use firearms under the circumstances. Do you think I didn’t face the dilemma of using or not using them? Everything had to be done by the book, but a number of other factors had to be considered. Also, there was Russia looking forward to watch blood shed in Ukraine as an excuse for sending forth the combat units deployed along the border.”

O.Zh.: “Let me add that the separatist leaders hadn’t planned the storming of the SBU building on April 6, 2014. After Relke had called for an armed revolt, there was a phone call from the FSB headquarters, telling him there must be no revolt, period. They called it a ‘soft bath,’ considering that other regions weren’t prepared for such a turn of events.”

Intelligence reports say that Putin said he needed ten regions of Ukraine.

O.Zh.: “Right, all separatist leaders then received orders from Russia’s clandestine agencies, using three channels, to launch an organized march in downtown Luhansk, gather by the Shevchenko statue, then form a column and march on. But that was all. No storming of the SBU or other buildings. We decided to arrest the leaders because they had been supplying Russia with intelligence concerning our military units. They weren’t separatists but traitors who were collaborating with the enemy, the aggressor, knowing that Russia wanted to call its own a part of Ukrainian territory.”

Some sources point to April 13, 2014, as the date on which Russia’s GRU and other special forces invaded Ukraine. However, I vividly remember that among those who forced their way inside the SBU building in Luhansk were people with a distinct military bearing and who acted like pros.

O.P.: “Russia’s secret agents had been operating in Ukraine long before these events. On the other hand, SBU officers had to obey orders they received during Yanukovych’s presidency. And the same was true of the Interior Ministry. Then power changed hands and we found ourselves in a very embarrassing situation, with society regarding SBU officers as traitors. They weren’t and many had refused to obey orders under Yanukovych. Regrettably, the pro-Russian political forces and Russia’s clandestine agencies skillfully capitalized on the situation. All these aspects and circumstances should be studied and properly assessed. It happens that flag-waving patriots turn out to be even worse because they perfectly fit into the pattern of Russia’s provocations. Our task was to stabilize the situation. In 2005, I was appointed head of the SBU Directorate, Donetsk Oblast. That was shortly after the Orange Maidan. The situation was very complicated, considering the attempt to form the so-called Republic of Donetsk and Kryvy Rih. Well, we managed because those ‘upstairs’ were then listening to what we had to say.”

You mean no one would listen to you in 2014?

O.P.: “What happened in Ukraine in 2014 was a systemic catastrophe. Let me tell you that we sent reports to Kyiv, warning against what could come to pass. What then actually happened. At the time we needed official support and received none. This also relates to the period when I was appointed chief of antiterrorist staff and tasked with liberating the SBU building. The whole operation was clearly sabotaged, but that’s a separate long story.”