Petro Bolbochan, colonel of the “Zaporozhians”

The revolutionary camp that opposed Hetman Skoropadsky’s regime turned out to be politically heterogeneous. There were radical revolutionaries as well as moderate elements. Without a doubt, Colonel Petro Bolbochan belonged to the latter group, as evidenced by a number of facts. For example, this military leader convinced the government of the Directory to allow him to keep intact the Hetmanate’s administrative apparatus in areas where his units were deployed. Although most of the socialist functionaries in the Directory viewed their army only as a force consisting of “workers and peasants,” Colonel Bolbochan was by no means opposed to the idea of reinforcing the UNR army with well-to-do peasants and even landlords.

Bolbochan was openly hostile toward the left-wing revolutionaries, and his attitude was shared by the absolute majority of his comrades in arms. They were known as the Zaporozhtsi (Zaporozhian Cossacks) and, unlike other units under Petliura’s command, they never wore red revolutionary armbands and refused to respond when they were addressed as tovarysh (comrade).

Meanwhile, there was a new enemy closing in on Ukraine from the north and the east: the Bolshevik Red Army. In terms of military organization, the Red Army was far superior to the Hetman’s troops. Symon Petliura, the commander in chief of the UNR Army, did his best to organize a defense. He appointed Bolbochan commander of the Left-Bank Front, the most important field of operations at the time. This former colonel of the Hetmanate government was raised to the rank of general and placed in command of a large army, which in early 1919 numbered over 40,000 soldiers and officers.

The Ukrainian National Republic’s defense against the red aggressors seemed secure, but the very first clashes showed that there were no guarantees of security. The Red Army was nearly two times larger, and the commander of the Left-Bank Front quickly realized that his forces could not protect Ukraine from the Bolsheviks. In his telegrams to Petliura, Bolbochan begged for more troops and for military alliances with France and the White Guards. (He was fixated on the arrival of three French divisions to reinforce his front against the Bolsheviks.)

Bolbochan’s hopes for reinforcements never came to fruition. Whatever effective alliances the UNR made with the anti-Bolshevik forces never materialized, and the reinforcements that Bolbochan ultimately obtained were poorly trained and equipped. Before long the situation on the front worsened dramatically, and the Ukrainian army had to retreat from Kharkiv and Poltava. On Jan. 10, 1919, Bolbochan sent a telegram to Petliura, informing him about the disastrous situation on the Left-Bank Front.

At this time the valorous military leader did not know that, apart from the Bolshevik onslaught, he would have to suffer a heavy blow from his own side. On Jan. 22, 1919, a group of UNR officers of the 3rd Haidamaky Regiment, deployed in the vicinity of Kremenchuk, arrested Commander Bolbochan on the orders of another Petliurite military leader, Omelian Volokh, the commander of the 3rd Haidamaky Regiment. Some of the Zaporozhtsi rushed to free their beloved military leader and dealt a series of heavy blows to Volokh’s troops.

However, Bolbochan ordered his men not to offer any resistance for he knew only too well that any strife within the UNR army would play into the Bolsheviks’ hands. Before long the arrested colonel was on his way to Kyiv, escorted by a mixed group of his own and Volokh’s soldiers. He was almost certain that the Directory and the Chief Otaman would quickly restore justice. Once again his expectations did not come true, and Bolbochan was officially indicted on Jan. 25, 1919.

What were the charges against the former commander of the Left-Bank Front? The charges against Bolbochan were serious and could even result in his execution. Among other things, he was accused of allowing the enemy to enter Poltava and Kharkiv “without valid reasons,” deliberately (by means of harsh repressions) inciting workers and peasants to revolt against the Directory, nurturing plans to side with Denikin’s Volunteer Army, and even of embezzlement. In essence, the Directory viewed Bolbochan as a secret and dangerous enemy, who had constantly acted to the detriment of the Ukrainian National Republic.

Were the charges against this military leader valid? Bolbochan’s enemies claimed that his Left-Bank Front troops had retreated from Kharkiv and Poltava “without valid reasons.” These allegations were far from the truth. His reasons were valid. As mentioned earlier, the Red Army was numerically superior to Petliura’s forces. In addition, Bolbochan was threatened in the rear lines by numerous German detachments whose commanding officers had announced that they would attack unless Bolbochan’s troops immediately withdrew from Kharkiv and Poltava. Fighting two powerful enemies meant quick and total defeat. It did not take a military expert to realize that under these circumstances the commander had to accept the Germans’ ultimatum. Bolbochan’s decision allowed him at least to save a number of officers and men for the further struggle.

It is true that Bolbochan’s subordinates resorted to repressions against workers and peasants when they were dispersing workers and peasants’ congresses. Yet these were not provocative acts on Bolbochan’s part but what would be described today as a response to a harsh challenge. Ukraine’s left-wing radicals, who were resisting the Directory in the rear lines, were actually playing into the Red Army’s hands. Under the circumstances Bolbochan had no alternative but to suppress the internal enemy by armed means. As for his White Guardist orientation, there is no factual evidence to support this accusation. With regard to his alleged embezzlement, it later transpired that Bolbochan had given all the money to another military commander, Colonel Yevhen Konovalets.

The actual reason behind the distinguished military leader’s arrest was not his imaginary crimes against the UNR but the power play that was taking place between Ukraine’s left- and right-wing elements. Today there is documented evidence indicating that Otaman Omelian Volokh, who ordered Bolbochan’s arrest, was actually a supporter of Soviet power in Ukraine, and that by issuing the arrest order he wanted to head the Zaporozhian Corps and eventually use it in a rebellion against the “bourgeois” Directory. Volokh’s attempted coup proved futile.

Aware of his innocence, Bolbochan demanded that the UNR leaders hold a public trial, which he hoped to win easily. Petliura, however, ordered the military commander to be brought to Stanyslaviv, a city in the UNR-allied Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR). Its leadership would have assigned Bolbochan an important military post had they not feared complications in their relations with their allies.

The disgraced military leader, whose status remained ambiguous, dreamed of returning to the ranks of the UNR army and his beloved Zaporozhian Corps. Some of his supporters, who were well aware of his desire, arranged a meeting in May 1919 between Bolbochan and Petliura. All that Petliura could offer Bolbochan was a post that made him responsible for the mobilization of Ukrainians in Italy for the UNR army. Although this post did not correspond to Bolbochan’s capabilities, he was happy enough to accept it because he wanted to help Ukraine. Freed from arrest, the military leader began preparing for his departure to Italy, but the plan fell through. On May 31, 1919, the UNR’s socialist government vetoed the “Ukrainian reactionary’s” trip abroad.

ACCOMPLICE TO AN UNKNOWN PLOT

For a long time this period in Otaman Bolbochan’s life was a mystery to historians. It is an established fact that Petliura ordered Bolbochan’s arrest on June 9, 1919, and the distinguished commander was court-martialed and shot on June 28, 1919. Why such a tragic end to the life of this relatively young military leader?

Historians and politicians of various periods and orientations have attempted coup d’etat: he was allegedly planning to overthrow the UNR government and then unlawfully reinstate himself as commander of the Zaporozhian Corps. The other theory states that Bolbochan did engineer an attempt to head his beloved Zaporozhian Corps, but he had nothing to do with any coup. What actually happened?

The facts show that the retired colonel never suffered from lack of company while he was in Stanyslaviv. His apartment was frequented by the leaders of various political movements (members of the parties Independent Socialists and Peasant Democrats), who had long been in opposition to the UNR’s socialist government. Most often Bolbochan and his visitors discussed the inability of the Ukrainian socialists to win the Ukrainian cause and the need to replace them with an effective government. It should be stressed that Bolbochan was a 100-percent supporter of the opposition. Gradually, a conspiracy against the Ukrainian government arose among the members of his circle. The conspirators planned to achieve their goal with the aid of a strong military unit. For their purposes the Zaporozhian Corps was the best for this, and there were plans for Bolbochan to head it once again.

At a certain stage the plotters were joined by Colonel Mykola Havryshko, the military inspector of the Zaporozhian Corps, who in an emergency situation had the authority to replace any corps officer, including the commander (Colonel Volodymyr Salsky). On June 7, 1919, Havryshko issued a written directive replacing Otaman Salsky by Otaman Bolbochan as head of the corps. This was the first step toward the coup d’etat. On June 9, 1919, Havryshko and Bolbochan made their appearance at the corps. Bolbochan did not conceal the purpose of his visit from Salsky, stressing that the UNR government was made up of “Marxist traitors” to whom Lenin and Rakovsky were more important than genuine Ukrainian patriots. The current government had to be replaced, and the sooner the better, Bolbochan declared. He then advised Salsky to voluntarily hand over the Zaporozhian Corps to him.

Otaman Salsky, however, steadfastly refused to cooperate, declaring that he did not care about his rank as corps commander and would surrender his post to Bolbochan only if he received an order from the Chief Otaman. In the ensuing heated debate with his comrade in arms Bolbochan was not helped by Havryshko, who said he had a document stating that Corps Commander Salsky was to be removed. In the end, the conspirators allowed Salsky to make a telephone call to Petliura. This was a fatal error. The corps commander informed Petliura about the attempt to carry out a coup d’etat where his troops were deployed.

Some time later, Bolbochan was arrested by a unit of the Doroshenko Regiment, which had remained loyal to the government. The next day, June 19, the rebellious Colonel Bolbochan was court-martialed and sentenced to death. Bolbochan wrote a letter to General Osetsky, the Acting Otaman of the UNR Army, asking him to commute his death sentence and send him to the front, “even as a rank and file Cossack.” The letter did not help, nor did the attempts of some of Bolbochan’s associates to pressure the UNR government into reviewing his case. Some of his associates even planned to help him escape from prison. On June 28, 1919, facing the firing squad, Bolbochan called out the names of his wife and daughter.