Perpetuating butchers?

The recent decision of the Odesa City Council to move three monuments, to Lenin, the Potemkin Mutineers, and Hlushko, from downtown to other city districts is indicative of the council members’ interest in economic problems as well as cultural and ideological questions. One cannot agree with those who insist that this burst of monument-moving activity is untimely and unnecessary. The concept of “monument” has the same lexical root as “historical memory,” which is part of the cultural and ideological sphere.

In 1990 the so-called postcommunist countries embarked on different paths of developing their culture, ideology, and attitude to the past. In the Baltic countries and Poland, imperialist and Soviet monuments were decisively torn down as symbols of those countries’ colonial dependence on Russia. After some hesitation, Russia honors both its imperialist and Soviet symbols, including monuments.

Ukraine has chosen the middle road, as usual. It has adopted a stand worthy of King Solomon, honoring heroes of Ukrainian history one after another, upholding the ambiguous “he’s-done-something-for-Ukraine criterion, without ascertaining who has done what and for what kind of Ukraine.

The absence of a clear-cut and consistent conception of Ukrainian national development often plays into the hands of anti-Ukrainian forces in the east and south. On this particular occasion Odesa’s nationally-conscious Ukrainians are concerned about the prospect of seeing a monument to Catherine II of Russia in place of the figures of the sailors who mutinied aboard the battleship Potemkin in 1905. Given the indulgent attitude of the Orange mayor of Odesa, Eduard Hurvits, the city council recently made the criminal decision to erect a monument to Catherine II in place of the Potemkin memorial (on which battleship Ukrainians constituted the absolute majority of the crew that rebelled against Russian tsarist autocracy).

Prior to this decision, Tetiana Fedirko, head of the city’s culture department (what department and what council is anyone’s guess), pushed through a recommendation during a meeting of the toponymy commission in May of this year, concerning the erection of a monument to Catherine II. It is highly unlikely that she did so without Hurvits’s knowledge and consent. Rumor has it that, just like in the early 1990s, this project is being prepared with big money supplied from Moscow and via lobbying by anti-Ukrainian forces in Odesa, which are trying to make this city look increasingly like Novorossiia, a part of the Russian empire.

The question is: how can we, Ukrainians, allow the construction of monuments dedicated to our oppressors and executioners? Whereas a lively debate emerged in Odesa with regard to a similar council decision in the mid-1990s, when Hurvits was also mayor, this time the Ukrainian community of Odesa and the Black Sea Cossacks have barely reacted to the criminal plans of the Odesa mayor’s office. The confusion, disillusionment, and apathy that have engulfed Ukrainians since the temporary defeat of the Orange revolution are starting to make their presence known.

The arguments offered by the supporters of the monument to Catherine II in Odesa boil down to three main positions: (1) the 1900-style monument to Catherine II has a more aesthetic appearance than the Potemkin one; (2) returning the monument to Catherine II to Potemkin Square will be an act of restoring historical justice that was violated by the Bolsheviks; (3) Catherine II founded Odesa because she issued an ukase on its founding (or rather one renaming the settlement of Khadzhibei that had existed for more than 400 years) and helped populate the Novorossiisk krai. Just like in 1990, today the bronze Catherine II is being lobbied for by openly pro-Russian and Ukrainophobic forces, like the Iedinoe Otechestvo (Sole Fatherland) and Soiuz pravoslavnykh grazhdan (Union of Orthodox Citizens).

Those “Orthodox citizens” do not seem at all perturbed by the fact that the German-born Catherine murdered her husband, Tsar Peter III, in order to seize the Russian throne and was known for her lechery, dragging hundreds of noblemen and even ordinary soldiers into her bed.

The deeds of Catherine II are lauded by Anatolii Vasserman, a well-known Odesa Ukrainophobe, pseudohistorian, and pseudo-political scientist, and “hero of Moscow’s Brain Ring” of long standing. At one time he called for “separating western Ukraine from eastern Ukraine by tanks and a high wall.” As always, the Moscow Patriarchate is at the head of all the processes that run counter to those that assert the Ukrainian state. Like in 1990, today it is important for local Russophile politicians to instill “New Russian” patriotism in the population, awareness that they are different from the rest of Ukraine.

A similar tactic was recently used by these forces during the pompous transferal of the remains of the Vorontsov couple. Their desire to perpetuate Catherine II is a sequel to their efforts to convince the residents of Odesa (65 percent of whom are ethnic Ukrainians) that they belong to “New Russia.” It is also worth mentioning the good services being offered to these forces by many regional historians of Odesa. For them, creating a pro-Russian history of Odesa is not only a demonstration of a sociopolitical stand, but also a lucrative business. Trying to communicate with the representatives of these forces, which feel no commonality with the interests of the Ukrainian nation and openly scorn it, is like communicating with blind deaf-mutes.

The two other arguments sound equally unconvincing. The concept of “historical justice” cannot be interpreted in a primitive and retrograde manner. The idea of restoring the names and monuments that existed before the revolution to the streets of Odesa utterly ignores the fact of the very existence of the Ukrainian state with its own values and laws. Within the boundaries of this state it is impossible to honor people who denied the very fact that the Ukrainian nation existed. Catherine II was, without a doubt, one of them. In addition to destroying the Zaporozhian Sich, the center of Ukrainian democracy and independence, she waged a consistent policy aimed at annihilating the historical distinctions between Ukraine and Russia.

Returning a monument to Catherine II to Odesa today would mean identifying ourselves with all her acts, with the “progressive nature” of the Russian empire vis-a-vis Ukraine, and demonstrating our Russian patriotism in principle. For in today’s Russia Catherine II is one of the most respected historical figures on a par with Peter I. A monument forms a solid image, so an argument, like “We honor Catherine II as the founder of Odesa and as a person who facilitated the development of southern Ukraine,” does not work because in fact she facilitated the foreign colonization of the southern region of Ukraine and the destruction of the Ukrainian population.

No significance should be attached to the third argument. The process of founding and developing a city cannot be reduced to the activities of a single individual and demiurge. Such an assumption is germane to antiquated thinking and an imperialistic ideology, according to which history is created by kings. Insightful studies by historians, like Kabuzan, Druzhynina, and others, whose works are based on materials about the history of southern Ukraine, have long demonstrated the narrowness of this approach.

The late historian Oleksandr Boldyrev’s Odesa Is 600 Years Old (recently reprinted) deserves special notice. The author offers weighty arguments against the unsubstantiated claim that Odesa’s history dates from 1794. The noted Ukrainian historian, writer, and journalist Bohdan Sushynsky also devoted considerable attention to refuting this claim.

How should one interpret the municipal authorities’ stubborn intention to mock the historical memory of the Ukrainian people? First of all, it is determined by the pro-Russian, pro-imperialistic political orientation of a certain part of Odesa’s population, people who believe that Catherine II, although she was a tormentor of the Ukrainian people, founded Odesa and did a lot of good things for the city (?!). These philistines still do not consider Odesa oblast as an inalienable component of Ukraine and are daydreaming about some kind of pro- Russian Novorossia.

The members of the Odesa City Council did not rise above these pro- imperialistic moods. Second, a number of Odesites uncritically share the opinion that one’s history must be respected no matter what. This is the same sort of argument used by the communists to preserve their idols, those sore spots on our city squares. This argument is profoundly immoral. No one in his right mind would hang a portrait in his apartment of the criminal who tortured to death one’s father, mother, or close friend. It is understandable why no monuments to Mussolini are built in Italy, to Genghis Khan in Russia, or to Hitler in Germany. They are all well- known historical figures, but they do not deserve a nation’s respect. Erecting a monument to Catherine II in Odesa or elsewhere in Ukraine is like unveiling a statue of Adolf Eichmann in Tel Aviv.

Neither Catherine II, Peter I, nor any Russian tsar or any one of their satraps, let alone the Bolshevik leaders, are worthy of having monuments erected in their honor - nor should their old monuments be left standing - in independent Ukraine, because they were all ruthless butchers of our people. For Russia, where imperial values are still upheld, Catherine II is the object of worship, but it is time we all realized that Ukraine is not Russia. Indeed, today’s neo-imperialist Russia is interested in having a monument to Catherine II in Odesa, designed to assert Russia’s “historical right” to this city. Our neighbor’s stand corresponds to his doctrine of imperial integration. Therefore, the decision of Odesa’s city council can be interpreted as a realization of Russia’s imperialistic plans in Ukraine.

Should the Potemkin memorial be removed? In their day the Bolsheviks completely falsified the revolution of 1905 by “privatizing” the heroism of its participants. That revolution was a popular one — bourgeois democratic — not Bolshevist. It had matured historically and was progressive in that its objective was the overthrow of the despotic tsarist regime and landlord ownership to pave the way for a free development of market relations and liberal capitalism.

The Potemkin mutiny (most of whose crew was Ukrainian) was a revolt against the officers’ brutality, and it became an exciting and heroic page in the history of the revolution. This page must be cleansed of Bolshevik scum, and historical truth must be restored. At the time of the mutiny the residents of Odesa sincerely welcomed the sailors who were rebelling against the tsarist regime. So would it be fair to remove a monument to the heroes of this popular revolution?

Today a move against the Potemkin memorial is an act of barbarism that can be perpetrated only by people afflicted with Russian chauvinism, by those for whom imperial symbols come first. We must not permit the removal of the monument to the heroes of the popular revolution and its replacement by a monument to Catherine II of Russia, that merciless butcher of the Ukrainian people.

Below are some facts illustrating Catherine II’s “merits” with regard to the Ukrainian nation.

1762-1763: Catherine II issues two manifestos on the foreign colonization of Rus’-Ukraine; Serbs, Bulgarians, Moldovans, and Germans from Prussia, Austria, and other countries are recruited. Every foreigner receives 65 desiatynas of land [1 desiatyna=2.7 acres] and is exempted from taxes. Ukrainians have to provide horse-driven carts to transport their future landlords free of charge.

1763: Catherine II signs an ukase banning instruction in Ukrainian at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

1764: Catherine II instructs Prince Viazemsky to Russify Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, Finland, and Smolensk gubernia.

1764: Catherine II abolishes the Ukrainian hetmanate and at the same time liquidates Ukrainian educational and cultural institutions; Ukrainian- speaking officials are dismissed.

1764: Abolition of the Ukrainian Hetman State.

1765: Catherine II liquidates the Cossack order in Slobidska Ukraine and closes Cossack schools.

1765: The Holy Synod orders the Kyivan Cave Monastery to print only books issued by the Moscow print shop and approved by the Synod.

1768: Muscovite troops suppress the anti-Polish rebellion in Right-Bank Rus’-Ukraine, led by Gonta and Zalizniak (this period is known as Koliivshchyna), after the two rebel leaders are treacherously captured by Muscovites, who were at war with Poland.

1769: The Synod orders Ukrainian church books replaced by Muscovite ones.

1769: The Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church forbids the Kyivan Cave Monastery to print primers in Ukrainian and orders the confiscation of books already distributed.

1775: Muscovite troops launch a perfidious attack on the Zaporozhian Sich and destroy it after Zaporozhian forces provided decisive reinforcements to the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. The Cossacks are robbed, their property is confiscated, and many are exiled to Siberia. Ukrainian schools at regimental chancelleries are closed. The last Koshovy Otaman Petro Kalnyshevsky is exiled to the Solovky Islands, where he is imprisoned for 25 years until his death in 1803 at the age of 112.

1777: Plans are made for the deportation of the Tatars from the Crimea and Ukrainians from Ukraine, the territories thus vacated to be populated by Muscovites from Russia. Implementing this plan, Aleksandr Suvorov deports 32,000 Ukrainian men from southern Ukraine within a few days.

1777: The persecuted brilliant Ukrainian composer and member of the Bologna Music Academy, Maksym Berezovsky (b. 1745 in Slukhove), dies in penury. After his death Catherine II’s government bans his compositions and destroys a number of his manuscripts.

1780: The library of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is burned down (its collection was amassed for more than 150 years and was one of the largest in Eastern Europe).

1781: The last vestiges of Cossack self-government on the Left Bank are destroyed, and the Russian administrative system is introduced in 1783.

1782: Catherine II sets up a commission to establish people’s schools in Russia with the aim of introducing a uniform school system with Russian as the only language of instruction in all schools throughout the empire.

1783: The peasants of Left-Bank Ukraine are transformed into serfs.

1784: As of 1747 there were 866 Ukrainian schools on the territory of seven hetman regiments, or one school per thousand residents. By the end of the century, the population had increased threefold, while the number of schools dropped by two times. There were no Ukrainian schools.

1784: The Synod orders Metropolitan Samuil of Kyiv and Halych to punish students and dismiss teachers at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in retaliation for straying from the Russian language.

1785: Catherine II orders all Divine Services to be celebrated in Russian in all the churches of the empire. Russian is the language of instruction in all schools in Ukraine.

1786: The Synod again orders the Metropolitan of Kyiv to control the activities of the Cave Monastery’s print shop to ensure that there are no differences between Kyiv — and Moscow-based publications, and to introduce the empire-wide school system at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

1789: The Comparative Dictionary of All Languages is published in St. Petersburg on Catherine II’s initiative. According to this dictionary, Ukrainian is a Polish-distorted version of the Russian language.

1793: Muscovite troops crush a revolt in the village of Turbai and severely punish the populace; over 20 villagers die after being tortured or are shot; the rest are flogged and exiled to Siberia or other gubernias.

The case of “Odesa’s Catherine” is vivid proof of how little has changed in Ukraine in the past decade, particularly in Odesa, in the sense of people’s attitude to their national identity. Today it is fashionable to talk about the Orange revolution, the formation of a civil society, the Ukrainian political nation, liberal ideas, and other nice things. However, concealed behind this opportunism is the key thing: the actual refusal by most political forces in Ukraine to conduct a policy that would satisfy the national needs of ethnic Ukrainians as the main carriers of the Ukrainian spirit.

Being Ukrainian does not mean having the appropriate box checked on a census list, but meeting the main criteria, such as Ukrainian-language usage, knowledge of history — and not on an “elder brother” basis. In other words, it means being aware of Ukraine as a value unto itself and an independent historical and modern entity, not as part of the Russian empire. This principle is being ignored in today’s Ukraine. Ukraine is regarded as a dormitory, where all people are equal regardless of what values they profess or what actions they take. Ukrainians in Odesa are generally viewed not as representatives of the titular nation, and not even as members of an ethnic minority, but as a foreign body that is interfering with the non-Ukrainian forces’ efforts to build a separate “Odesa civilization.” The latter is essentially and suspiciously reminiscent of Odesa during the Russian empire. Living in Odesa and remaining a Ukrainian-speaking and Ukrainian-minded individual is extremely difficult, even dangerous, but you are perfectly safe and welcome to ignore all things Ukrainian.

The latest actions perpetrated by Ukrainophobic forces (the seizure of the library at Agrarian University), and especially the authorities’ weak response, demonstrate that these forces are limited by nothing but their insolence. Thus, it would have been surprising if the image of the Russian empress had not reappeared in Odesa. It is obvious to every Ukrainian that the unveiling of such a monument in a Ukrainian city in the 16 th year of Ukraine’s independence is an insolent challenge to the dignity of the Ukrainian nation and its historic choice.

But the main problem lies elsewhere. Why the same old “Catherine’s rakes” again? Are our old enemies the only reason? We have another question: why haven’t any of the more than 15 Cossack organizations in Odesa done anything to prevent the plans to erect a monument to Catherine II? The impression is that they simply don’t know about the city council’s intentions. Instead, they show off their uniforms and rows of medals that they have conferred on themselves. There are practically no rank-and-file Cossacks, only lieutenants, captains, colonels, and otamans.

Why is it that people who talk so much about Ukrainian interests are often the very ones that betray them? The organizers of Catherine’s monument have carefully analyzed the situation. Any lawful acts on the part of the Ukrainian community, like sending letters, collecting signatures, etc., will be useless. Any more decisive efforts will scare the general public and make the Ukrainians look like radical nationalists. In the end, the Ukrainians will be shunted aside and prevented from making important decisions relating to national development.

The real response of the entire Ukrainian community of Odesa and every Ukrainian resident of the city to this Catherinomania must be to fight not the monument but the reasons that make its appearance possible. These reasons reside in us: in our weakness, sluggishness, inconsistency, hypocrisy, and our desire to foist responsibility on someone else. In their souls many of the opponents of the monument to Catherine are split half-Russian/half-Ukrainian individuals and are afraid to look “too Ukrainian.” People can see through this falseness and will not follow them.

We must start to work hard, constantly and insistently, for the sake of the Ukrainian cause by renewing and perfecting ourselves. They will unveil their monument, and we will raise our children and grandchildren in the Ukrainian national spirit. We will speak only Ukrainian at home, in the office, on the street, and in public places. We will show success in business, studies, and sports. Ukrainians must stop being marginal. They must be patriots, and well-educated and highly moral individuals. Then people will follow them and listen. The monuments to our enemies will be destroyed in our hearts, and none will be allowed on the squares of Ukrainian cities.

If the monument to Catherine II is unveiled in Odesa, it will be a great insult to the Ukrainian people and a slap in the face of the sluggish, helpless, and fragmented Cossack community.