Political reform: leaving anyone out of the process is not worthwhile
Several important positive trends have emerged in the social development of Ukraine, primarily in the socioeconomic and foreign policy domains. Simultaneously, these trends require appropriate political transformations to democratize Ukraine’s society and state in every way possible. A new cycle of political development took shape after the 2002 parliamentary elections. Among its positive aspects one ought to note the gradually increasing role being played by political forces, first of all political parties, within the framework of power and their growing awareness of their responsibility to society. The president’s August 2002 initiatives concerning a radical political reform and transition to a parliamentary-presidential system, gave impulse to that political cycle.
OUTPUT
In assessing recent events in conjunction with the political reform, one should proceed from the overall logic of the political process in its current cycle in Ukraine. This refers primarily to the new joint constitutional bill coordinating the stands taken by the leading political forces as well as the opposition, thus making it possible to guarantee the practical implementation of the political reform. The need to choose this option for implementing the political transformations is caused by the following circumstances:
First, upgrading the Ukrainian political system has become vitally important to the further advance of Ukraine’s society and state. Here the key issues ought to be the practical introduction of the mechanism of forming the government by a coalition of factions and groups of people’s deputies. This mechanism must guarantee the responsibility of the government and parliament to society for their actions or inaction.
Second, taking practical steps to introduce the political reform has encountered a number of significant obstacles and difficulties. The leading political forces failed to unite in Verkhovna Rada to prepare a single coordinated bill. As a result, the political reform is also threatened with failure. This threat is aggravated by the fact that there is less and less time left to introduce changes and amendments in the Constitution in the stages provided for by the fundamental law. At the beginning of September, only nine months were left, during which time a number of complicated political issues must be solved, of which securing a constitutional majority support of the said bill is the most pressing one.
Third, the need to achieve within the shortest possible time the political compromise necessary to reform the political system has brought forth an essentially new approach to the forms and mechanisms of coordination of the interests of the leading political forces so as to guarantee support of changes in and amendments to the Constitution. One should single out the most important aspect in the efforts of the head of state, namely, expanding as much as possible the limits of a possible compromise. This is precisely how one should regard the president’s public assent to adjustments to his political model, including even the introduction of a mechanism of presidential elections to be carried out by the parliament, in other words, introduction of a parliamentary system. Still, any concessions in terms of requirements to the legal and political quality of constitutional bills under study are out of the question. Unfortunately, the bill submitted to Verkhovna Rada and signed by over 250 people’s deputies reveals considerable editorial shortcomings as well as those relating to quality.
When working out measures to implement the political reform, it is necessary to consider the priorities, interests, and positions of the leading political forces in the current political cycle. The strategy and tactics of any responsible political party, bloc, and politicians of nationwide caliber should rely on a clearly defined approach to the following three key aspects of the political cycle: (a) political reform, (b) 2004 presidential, and (c) 2006 parliamentary elections. Adopting these priorities is a matter of principle. The logic of the political process in the 2002-06 cycle is such that its final results will become evident only after the 2006 parliamentary elections. The new Ukrainian parliament should implement the potentialities and attainments of the political reform and 2004 presidential campaign. This is how the transition to a new political model will be carried out. If the next Verkhovna Rada is unable to effectively establish its leading role in the new political system, the Ukrainian state will not only fail to reach a new stage of social progress, but might even enter a phase of instability with unpredictable consequences.
PARTIES
It has presently become quite clear that certain political forces consider achieving the needed results during the 2006 parliamentary elections as their strategic priorities. Accordingly, they regard the 2004 presidential campaign as a transition — albeit important — phase in the implementation of these priorities. This is primarily true of political parties with a stable sociopolitical basis and sufficiently strong organization and media infrastructure, in both Kyiv and regions. At the same time, the said political forces (e.g., CPU, SPU, SDPU{O}) do not seem to stand much of a chance in the 2004 campaign. Their common interests could cause them to cooperate further, and not only when warranted by a given situation.
The enlistment of leftist parties in solving key social problems shows certain significantly positive aspects. Thus, such parties and their leadership are stepping back from their destructive stand and activities, integrating into the system where important political decisions are made. Thus, it becomes possible to provide the preconditions for transforming post-Soviet parties into democratic ones of the European type.
Simultaneously, forming a left-centrist coalition and its functioning as the political basis of state power cannot so far be considered as acceptable enough. This is explained by the fact that the current stands of the CPU and SPU are not useful for solving a number of strategic problems relating to Ukraine’s social development. This refers mainly to the negative attitude of these political forces toward Euro-Atlantic integration and other foreign policy priorities, as well as concerning vitally important market transformations, particularly in the agrarian sector.
Among the political forces that see the parliamentary elections as their strategic priority, one ought to mention also the Party of the Regions. Its latest convention stressed that the party considers victory at the elections as its strategic task, since this would allow it to form the government and conduct a national policy aimed at implementing the party’s program. Similar stands are taken by several other parties with factions among the parliamentary majority, specifically the NDP, Agrarian Party, and Labor Ukraine.
Our Ukraine, by contrast, should be considered the only political force concentrating on the 2004 presidential campaign. Although OU dignitaries talk about the need to take steps to secure the bloc a convincing victory at the parliamentary elections, no practical steps are being taken — nothing is even being done in the program-ideological domain. In general, OU ought to be considered as a political project made exceptionally to accommodate Yushchenko’s presidential effort. The expectations and interests of the OU political forces come down to prospects of receiving financial and administrative dividends, if and when. This is precisely what determines OU’s manifestly negativistic, nonconstructive stand with regard to any restrictions on presidential powers and thus to the political reform as such. If unable to receive the said dividends and if losing the presidential campaign and with the president’s administrative resource getting substantially weaker, the OU political forces will have to look for new ways and means to implement their interest, and will not stop short of pulling out and forming new alliances.
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc’s priorities and interests appear different, compared to those of the other political forces. This political entity’s strategy is fully subordinated to the task of asserting Tymoshenko personally as an indisputable nationwide leader of the protest electorate. Thus her political efforts and the bloc’s assets are centered on short-term and less so on medium-term projects: first, staging mass actions of protest and then capitalizing on them as well as trying to unite the leading opposition forces during the presidential campaign. Thus, the political reform and even more so the 2006 parliamentary elections are left out of the Tymoshenko bloc’s key priorities.
DESTABILIZATION. OPTIONS
In determining concrete ways and means of introducing the political reform and prospects of development in the current political cycle, it is impossible to ignore possible destabilizing attempts that could arise in the immediate future — in particular, by utilizing a broad range of pressing social issues, especially considering that such attempts have been previously made. Among these issues is the freedom of expression, the press, and other media along with Ukraine’s involvement in the illicit arms trade. Efforts are being made to turn the Honcharov case into a full-fledged political scandal. This should be regarded as another attempt to revive the Gongadze case and the cassette scandal, starting a tidal wave of accusations made against the current regime in Ukraine and abroad. The same is true of publications appearing in the US press, accusing Ukraine of illicit arms trading, stressing that international terrorism is being supported in this way. So far such attempts have been made only by capitalizing on previous topics and issues. It is possible that, after making the most of these, new high-profile topics will be launched into political and media circulation.
Likewise, one could expect attempts to exploit various socioeconomic issues, primarily the situation in the food industry and in the agrarian sector in general. Here most scenarios are likely to start being played out by various political forces in the early fall and before winter comes. The parliament is likely to be used, so that the situation in the lawmaking audience will reach the boiling point, with deputies blocking the podium, etc. Mass actions of protest are likely to take place in the capital and the provinces.
Similar steps might be taken with regard to other pressing social problems, among them the military reform, personnel reductions, and possible incidents in conjunction with the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent in Iraq.
All this allows one to assume that, even though the sociopolitical process is sufficiently under control in Ukraine, one should not rule out the possibility of the situation being deliberately aggravated, using the 2000 fall scenario.
CONCLUSIONS
Summing up everything stated above, the following conclusions are possible:
First, achieving a political compromise with regard to the political reform has acquired central, even crucial importance for Ukraine’s democratic future. This makes it imperative that the said problem be solved first, however important other political issues might be. This further demands united and goal-oriented efforts by the political forces, as well as concentration of the needed resources.
Second, being pressed for time in introducing the constitutional reform means that no delay can be tolerated. The strategy and tactics of concerted action by each and every participant in the process, every single political force or even politician, must be adopted. This primarily refers to uniting the political forces constituting the parliamentary majority and constructive cooperation with leftist parties (the CPU and SPU), achieving mutually acceptable political compromises with Yushchenko’s OU and Tymoshenko’s bloc. To do so, the following main problems must be solved: Parliamentary majority forces must become the motive force of the constitutional reform, facilitating in every way possible constructive cooperation with other forces in the parliament to secure the necessary political support for the constitutional bill. Solving this task requires an active constructive stand from the leaders of all political forces that make up the parliamentary majority. When solving issues relating to cooperation with the CPU and SPU, one should proceed from the need to gradually and within the shortest possible period introduce the constitutional reform. To do so, it is necessary to attract these political forces and primarily their leaders Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Moroz, in order to quickly accomplish these tasks. It is also necessary to bear in mind Tymoshenko and Yushchenko’s attempts to revive the opposition G-4 to torpedo the political reform by 2006. Establishing constructive cooperation with OU should be regarded as a matter of fundamental importance. Here it is necessary to proceed from the marked heterogeneity of Viktor Yushchenko’s environment, the diversity of interests and aspirations of separate political forces, as well as of the leading OU politicians. Trying to completely isolate OU or severing all contacts with this bloc would critically reduce the political base for the political reform, causing excessive dependence on leftist political forces in the parliament, and in the final analysis jeopardize the reform. It would be unwise to overlook relationships with the Tymoshenko bloc, as she has become a most active figure in the new opposition alliance, directing it against the political reform and its implementation by 2006. In addition, Mrs. Tymoshenko and her bloc are very likely to stage new large-scale actions of protest soon, which neither the left (the CPU and SPU) nor Our Ukraine will be able to shrug off. Excluding Tymoshenko’s bloc from the compromise-making process could only cause that bloc’s further radicalization, thus inexcusably complicating the process of constitutional reform, and given certain conditions, aggravating the political situation in Ukraine.
Third, actually consolidating democracy should be regarded as the strategic objective of the current political cycle. This primarily implies the presence of alternative programs of development in Ukraine, relying on universal social values. Such programs should be represented by the pertinent political forces. Despite all the current complications in relations with Our Ukraine, it is necessary to realize that Yushchenko’s program and ideological postulates have much in common with those of other reformist forces. Maintaining today’s de facto confrontation for long could have an extremely negative effect on the prospects for political democracy in Ukraine.
Fourth, another fundamentally important task of the political reform must consist in generally lowering the level of confrontation within the political system, primarily in the relationships among the principal political forces. Today, for the first time in the past decade, one finds substantial preconditions and program principles for achieving a broad social consensus on the problem of upgrading the system of state power. Cooperation with the leftist forces has made it possible to achieve a compromise now that the constitutional bill generally answers their program interests. Therefore, the prerequisites exist for the integration of the leading leftist parties (the CPU and SPU) into the system where important political decisions are made. Such positive trends require further enhancement as one of the key factors in the building of a European-type political system.
Fifth, the said approach to the political reform is completely determined by our specific political situation. Later we will have to return to problems relating to the introduction of an effective system of checks and balances in the new political model. In part, this refers to the possibility of upgrading the distribution of power between the higher bodies of state authority, in the first place to secure a rather strong presidency along with the desirability of a bicameral parliament, improving the relationships between the central and local government authorities, etc. Most likely, these issues will be resolved after the 2004 presidential elections — or perhaps in the next political cycle that will follow the 2006 parliamentary campaign.
