Does the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church Need to be Protected?
A recent Verkhovna Rada session heard People’s Deputy Liliya Hryhorovych announced the establishment of the Give Ukraine Its Local Orthodox Church parliamentary association. The new association comprises most — 232 — of the parliament members. The deputies intend to promote unification of the now divided Orthodoxy and establishment of a unitary autocephalous church, as well as to have this church recognized by Ecumenical Orthodoxy.
Many took quite a skeptical view of this parliamentary initiative. First of all, this was because the Constitution deprives deputies of the formal instruments of influencing the internal church affairs. Secondly, the division of Ukrainian Orthodoxy into several warring factions makes it quite difficult, if not impossible, to hold any negotiations. Many an Alexander the Great have been trying to cut this Gordian knot over the past few years with no apparent success. Unfortunately, the reputation of Verkhovna Rada as a body capable of solving really difficult problems leaves too little room for optimism.
Nor is it all so simple with hypothetical recognition of the Ukrainian Church by the world’s other Orthodox churches. As history shows, this is a very long and complicated affair — at least because the Orthodox world does not have a clearly-written procedure of a church’s separation or canonical recognition, while the Ecumenical Patriarch’s supremacy is in name only. Everything depends on religious and political expediency, on the relationship between individual churches of the Orthodox Community, on who supports whom and why. As a rule, the “mother church” (from which a new church breaks away) is the last to give its consent, sometimes even many decades after worldwide recognition. It is difficult to imagine that our people’s deputies can affect in any way this East Orthodox Byzantine-style phenomenon, a true thing-in-itself. Yet, the tsarist and Soviet governments managed to exert leverage on autocephalous Slavic Orthodox churches by means of substantial military and financial aid.
On the other hand, the patriotism of the deputies who formed the association is all too obvious. For the Orthodox situation in this country has not only failed to improve or normalize but even seemed to deteriorate in the past few years: the unification movement has given way to active processes of disintegration. For example, after the death of Patriarch Dimitry the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in fact ceased to exist as an integral church mechanism, with its bishops apparently being content with the role of independent rulers of their own fiefdoms. By all accounts, they are little perturbed over nationwide church interests.
Perhaps to turn a historical drama into a burlesque, our Orthodox arena has just shown another contender for the star church roles: the so-called “Metropolitan Moisei of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine, head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox United Church, recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarch” and prepared to immediately gather all the world’s Orthodox Ukrainians into a single church. He is Oleh Kulyk, former clergyman of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Although nobody has until now treated him seriously, the existing situation already makes it difficult for our Orthodox clergy to resist the eternal temptation of making a choice. For in case of a serious conflict with the hierarchy, our priests and even bishops can and sometimes do switch sides.
One of the signs of a worsened Orthodox situation is also the complete cessation of any discussions between the Ukrainian Orthodox churches, which still went on just a few years ago. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), is becoming more and more self-confident, implacable, categorical, and untouchable. Its public attitudes are totally devoid of even a trace of diplomatic or elementary flexibility.
This can be explained to some extent by the fact that a considerable part of the political establishment, big-time entrepreneurs, and bankers resolutely support precisely the UOC MP, as the canonical church. Now too in spite of changes in their ranks, our top officials do not forget about canonical Orthodoxy. On being confirmed in the office of Prime Minister of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych paid a visit to Metropolitan Volodymyr, UOC MP head, to secure his blessings for serving the Ukrainian state. Many perhaps do not know that Mr. Yanukovych has been awarded three church orders — two by the UOC MP and one by the Russian Orthodox Church. I wonder why the people who have gained so much power and capital today are so fond of canonicity. The point seems to be not only in pro-Russian policies.
And if we recall the friendly and totally disinterested shoulder-rubbing of the recent Communist-Socialist parliamentary majority with the UOC MP, especially on the eve of the elections, it becomes clear that the formation of the Give Ukraine Its Local Orthodox Church parliamentary association is a timely and necessary step. Let us hope the association will somewhat counterbalance the existing governmental tendency to back a church staunchly supported by the Russian establishment.
The Moscow Patriarchate’s attitude toward the independence of the Ukrainian church is absolutely clear to everyone: the separation of the Ukrainian church would mean many — perhaps too many — losses. Consider the figures, perhaps unknown to some. Today, there are 11,000 Russian Orthodox Church parishes on the territory of Russia, while the total number of Orthodox parishes in Ukraine is 15,000, i.e., more than in Russia or, incidentally, in any other Orthodox country of the world. Out of these 15,000 parishes, more than 10,000 are part of the UOC MP. In other words, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church MP accounts for almost half of all the Moscow Patriarchate patrimony (excluding some small foreign Russian churches and parishes). Consider also that about 60% of today’s Russians have been baptized and 2% actually practice Orthodoxy. According to a well-known French Orthodox theologian Olivier Clement, “Russia is now a more secularized country than France.”
This is why the Moscow Partiarchate is trying so hard and desperately, with no holds barred (the end justifies the means), to retain its “Ukrainian Orthodox colony.” For when (if?) Ukrainian Orthodoxy stands unites and gains independence, this could shake Moscow’s historically coveted status as the Third Rome, for its quantitative Orthodox advantage will no longer be so unambiguous. It will be recalled that the idea of the Third Rome idea has been Russia’s leading religious (and lay) policy since the fifteenth century. The emergence on the world stage of such a large denomination as a Ukrainian Local Church is likely to upset the balance of forces, shift the accents and links in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, and undoubtedly be of considerable foreign political importance to Ukraine.
That Ukraine badly needs an independent unitary Orthodox church of its own is beyond doubt. It has every — historical, political and canonical — right to this, no matter how hard we are being charmed with the words canonical and uncanonical. It is common and old knowledge that it took almost all (except the four so-called historic partiarchates) Orthodox churches decades and sometimes even centuries of non-recognition, i.e., noncanonicity, to attain autocephalous status. Thus we should not hope that the Orthodox world will recognize the Ukrainian Local Church quickly and unanimously. It cannot be ruled out that this recognition will be celebrated by our remote descendants. But this is a different issue. Our duty is to form such a church.
