European Aspirations And Realities
The elections are over. President Leonid Kuchma said this country’s foreign policy priorities remained the same, European integration and close cooperation with the United States and Russia. Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh said almost the same. To identical effect were the comments of Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives, starting with Minister Anatoly Zlenko, although official spokesman Ihor Dolhov pointed out there would be certain corrections in our foreign policy. Yet, he made it clear the point was not in the election results but in that these corrections were long overdue. Each of the parties that have already secured parliamentary seats favored in their program documents and campaign statements a more solid relationship with the European Union, a thing that even the Communist Party spoke about contrary to its earlier stand. Thus as a result of the parliamentary elections, Ukraine stands a chance in theory to exercise its European option, for in a normal country, first, the ruling coalition and the opposition do not usually differ in foreign policy issues; secondly, it will depend precisely on parliament how successful this “movement toward Europe” will be. The point is, in particular, that this movement requires passing and observing a host of laws in line with European community standards. But the main problem is awareness of what should be done and why.
Those who doubt that Ukraine has really elected a European parliament for European development might point out that Premier Kinakh has paid his first post-election visit not to Brussels, Paris, or Berlin, but to Almaty for the weekend Eurasian Economic Forum.
In any case, none of the analysts expects that the new foreign policy concept the new parliament should allegedly adopt on the basis of a government-moved bill will feature any radical changes of the course. On the contrary, the statements this country’s leadership made before the elections and is likely to make afterwards will call, again theoretically, for an all-out effort precisely in the so-called European direction.
ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN
President Kuchma said earlier this year that Ukraine should become a European Union associate member before 2004 and reach the criteria for full EU membership by 2011. What apparently caused the chief executive to say this is the fact that as of now all the thirteen prospective EU members enjoy associate membership. However, out of the thirteen candidates (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey) named by the EU 1999 Helsinki summit, Turkey has not yet held any membership negotiations, while Bulgaria and Rumania say bluntly they stand no chance to join the Union on the 2004 expansion wave. Meanwhile, negotiations with the ten should be completed by the end of the next year.
It is more or less clear why Ukraine mentions no other year but 2004. On the one hand, that year was pronounced, after fierce diplomatic battles and painstaking efforts, as the starting year of grandiose European Union expansion. Following this, the EU will never be the way it was, which frightens many. This will create a new situation that all parties must prepare for in Europe, to which Ukraine also belongs, at least geographically.
On the other hand, the 1994 agreement on partnership and cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union signed in Luxembourg, the basic document governing the relations between Kyiv and the EU, is valid for ten years. As it took the EU member states more than three years to ratify the agreement, the latter came into force only on March 1, 1998. This delay was reportedly caused by technical difficulties. Let it be so. Then it becomes clear that if Ukraine wants to get a new document that enshrines a qualitatively new relationship in 2008, it should be drawn up as soon as possible. The point is that EU enlargement will lengthen the time of ratification in national parliaments and of the duration of disputes.
Accordingly, Ukraine can realistically expect to have a qualitatively new relationship with a qualitatively new European Union approximately in 2007-2008, which Ukrainian diplomats in fact keep saying. The most frequently used word is “association,” although far from everyone knows what this means.
ASSOCIATIONS CAN BE DIFFERENT
Ukraine’s Vice Premier Vasyl Rohovy is the latest high official to have spoken about association at international forums. Addressing last March a Brussels conference on the relations between Ukraine and the EU after the next wave of expansion, he said he saw no alternative to association with the European Union. This creates an impression that the words association and integration are identical for the Ukrainian leadership, which is obviously not true.
The point is the European Union does or is going to maintain associate relationships with almost 70 countries – not only with the prospective EU members but also with Mediterranean countries (Israel, the Palestinian Autonomy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, et al.), former French and Belgian colonies in Africa (under the Lome and Yaunde Conventions), and the countries of Latin America. Turkey, by far the oldest associate member of what once was the European Economic Community, signed an agreement to this effect in 1963, but the stipulated customs union came into being only in 1996. All those agreements, including the European Accords signed with Central European candidate countries, pursue, above all, economic purposes, such as establishment of free trade areas, and suggest a political dialogue (which is also to be part of the future agreements between the EU and Ukraine), the only difference being in the extent. For example, the European Accords are supposed to help candidate countries reach the economic development criteria indispensable for full membership and free access to markets. But even those agreements imposed some restrictions, particularly on farm products and textiles.
Association with African countries is an entirely different thing: it aims to combat poverty. Associations with MERCOSUR countries and within the Mediterranean Dialogue framework are perhaps typical examples of simply good and friendly relations which will never exceed a certain limit (trade, cultural exchanges, etc.).
Also associated with the EU is, for example, Norway which fully meets the Copenhagen criteria of membership but whose population voted against this in a referendum. This is a totally different story, as is that of Switzerland.
Therefore, there is in reality a wide range of options for Ukraine and the EU to choose from in order to make a new model of relations to meet, at least on paper, the requirements of both sides. Moreover, this might not necessarily be in line with Ukraine’s wishes, at least those declared by its leadership. Analysts suggest, among other things, building an association which could combine the European Accords’ guidelines with the special features of Ukraine, thus giving the latter a chance for full membership in the future. It should be admitted, however, that this has so far been suggested by Ukrainian analysts only.
In any case, Kyiv, inspired by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s December statement that Ukraine could become a EU associate member, would hardly opt for African-style association. The more so that last year’s EU GЪteborg summit set a precedent that Kyiv likes to cite so much: the final document referred relations with Ukraine to the chapter “Future Europe” rather than the one on external relations.
Oleksandr Chaly, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has said more than once, defending Ukraine’s right to association, that association, unlike membership, envisages no clear criteria. But representatives of EU bodies and of some EU member states would often say that one must first meet certain criteria. Tellingly, no one has ever said what exactly criteria he meant, which suggests an idea that such criteria do not in fact exist and that, if the EU had showed political determination, its relations with Ukraine would have long been developing according to a different pattern.
At any rate, the EU still advises being guided by the existing (outdated from the moment of signature) agreement. Not rejecting the latter, Ukrainian diplomacy has only now admitted that it should be read attentively because it does have items to clear up with the partner.
The only thing left is to get an answer to the one outstanding question: why on earth does Ukraine need to be associated? If this is sort of a steppingstone to full membership in the future European space, by which time Ukraine will have made a qualitative breakthrough in its development, letting the Ukrainians feel they are part of what is going on in Europe, not to mention such trivia as the increased living standards and societal stability, then this is a good idea. But if this is just aimed at satisfying someone’s ambitions, then does it really matter who to associate with and according to what patterns?
THE AWESOME WORD, “READMISSION”
Despite all the objections of politicians, bureaucrats, and experts, it is obvious that Ukraine is isolated from Europe and the line of this isolation is almost clearly visible. Much responsibility for this lies with Ukraine itself, the behavior of its leadership, the quality of its laws, and the indicator by which a state can be considered law-governed. All this is part of the criteria to meet European standards which, as practice shows, are sometimes interpreted rather loosely.
Very soon the Ukrainians will face a visa curtain, which will not make them happier. Poland and Hungary, the last bastions, will have to impose visa requirements in the middle of next year. And, since they are in fact not prepared for this, there will be unavoidable problems. This will only increase the sensation of isolation which even the best association agreement will be unable to suppress. Association, in particular, does not provide for visa-free travel across borders. An easy, at least to some extent, access to labor markets will long remain a dream, although experts admit the demand exists even today.
A visa-free tourist exchange between the twelve candidate countries plus Croatia (Switzerland and Norway are not discussed here: they are a different story) and the Schengen countries became possible for two seemingly simple reasons: agreements on readmission (repatriation of illegal migrants) and strict border control.
We have also understood this. The Ukrainian delegation submitted a draft agreement on readmission to the European Commission during the latest session of the Ukraine-EU cooperation council. Simultaneously, we suggest starting a dialogue to liberalize visa requirements (the long-standing proposals to cancel visas for diplomats still remain unanswered). Moreover, in contrast to the case of Central European countries, the initiative came from the Ukrainian side. The answer has not yet been made public. The reason is clear: the EU obviously wants first to draw conclusions from the Ukrainian elections.
Whether or not it should be done will hardly be a moot point. Of course, it should if Ukraine wants to be struck off the blacklist of countries that cause or contribute to illegal migration in spite of any likely reaction, including that from Russia. The border must be controllable under any conditions, and law enforcement bodies must prove they can do their duty instead of promoting directly or indirectly the smuggling of human chattel from Asia. Both conditions first of all presuppose our leadership’s political will and awareness of the much spoken of national interests. Both of them should be the subject of very serious talks with EU and CIS countries, especially Russia. Polish experience shows that this creates tremendous difficulties even under favorable conditions and mutual desire. For the sake of visa-free travel, the Poles took a pledge to send back all those who have penetrated the West through their territory. This is indispensable. Indeed, these technical details are going to determine the true level of relations in the immediate future as well as the lines of further Ukrainian domestic development; they will show whether Ukraine will remain a donor of illegal migration (some sources claim about a million Ukrainians illegally work abroad).
This alone proves that it is not so easy to go “to Europe together with Russia.” There are some problems that only we can solve. It is urgent to bridge the development gap between us and Russia at least. All that is needed is understanding why this is being done. This is precisely the trump card in all discussions about association and integration (the EU so far prefers speaking about rapprochement) and an argument difficult to challenge. Politicians are urgently demanding that the parliament and government make difficult decisions. As to the insults, we can forget them.
