ELECTION

Question number one: How many like him and unlike him do we have in Kyiv? Question number two: What does the Ukrainian capital look like against the backdrop of the ideological counter-versions characteristic of this country? Both questions are made especially relevant by the coming presidential campaign and mayoral elections (the latter has to take place, sooner or later).

Casting their votes for 30 parties and blocs in March 1998, every region testified to its political preferences. A tangible part of the political forces on the ballots left the electorate cold. Thus, an adequate analysis had to be based on the turnouts received by 12 parties/blocs, each winning at least 2% of the votes, ranging from CPU (24.7%) to the National Front (2.7%). Multivariable mathematical modeling makes it possible to construct an integral profile of each such region, which is considerably more expressive than merely listing parties and turnouts. Apart from the votes received, another significant component of this profile lies in demographic characteristics, including the number of pensioners and birth rate, for each such index mirrors a number of economic and social the factors. The stability (inertia) of the demographic process adds to the overall portrayal, turning it into a mirror-like reflection of not only what took place in March 1998, but also what might happen in October 1999. Parties can change but people stay the same and these people will vote again.

THREE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

The analysis I propose allows us to ascertain the maximum number of integral electoral-demographic dimensions characterizing every region in sufficient detail. Mathematicians call these dimensions factors. Estimates point to three such factors.

(1) Political Polarization

This reflects an ideological confrontation along the west-east geographical axis. Its principal components are the number of votes cast for Rukh and the Agrarian Party (Right vector), and Communists along with Labor Ukraine (Left vector). Birth rates (higher in the west and lower in the east and south) are the demographic marker of this factor.

(2) Political Conservatism

This integrates the number of people of the older generation (pensioners) and that of the votes cast for the Socialist-Peasant bloc (the two indices are reciprocally drawn), as well as the Reforms & Order turnout (the latter being repelled by the former).

(3) Political Skepticism

Here the analyst relies primarily on the number of votes cast for the Greens. The party was formed shortly before the parliamentary elections and conducted its propaganda campaign counterpoising "specific deeds" to "fruitless political verbiage." This caused quite a response among the electorate: 1.5 million votes, showing skepticism toward the "politicking" of the other parties. However, the second component of this factor proved unexpected, being actively "repelled" by the former: the number of votes received by the National Front. Obviously emphasizing national problems received a skeptical response from part of the voters. Here there was no demographic marker, for this factor was made up of only 14% of Ukraine's total electorate (with political conservatism collecting 21% and political confrontation 23% of the votes). Put together, the three factors reflect 67% of the social, political, and demographic distinctions in the voter attitudes considered regionally. The remaining 33% was divided between Hromada, PSPU, SDPU(u), and NDP. The computer recognized neither of these parties as noteworthy when building a political portrait; the first three were counted out because of their sharp Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Transcarpathia coloration, and NDP because it neither attracted nor repelled other parties. In the voters' eyes NDP was politically isolated and further events showed that they were probably right.

Also, the political map of Ukraine I made proceeding from the results of the previous presidential campaign was also based on three factors essentially similar to those mentioned here.

ANTIPODES

Factorization makes it possible to characterize every region using three indices, each reflecting the level of political polarization (F1, the first column in the chart), conservatism, and skepticism (F2 and F3 columns, respectively). Suppose we consider political antipodes symbolizing the entire range of electoral sentiments. The first pair - Rivne and Donetsk oblasts - have predominant Right (Rivne) and Left (Donbas) coloration. The western electorate, indifferent to conservative trends (F2 close to nil), shows a degree of interest in Green pragmatism (F3). Those in the east are much more categorical, responding to both conservatism and pragmatism with a "Left march" ...

The next pair - Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts - has the largest number of pensioners (30%) and a great deal of confidence in "peasant socialism." The latter is rooted in the councils of people's deputies (that can be effective only under party dictatorship) and collective farms (which remain ineffective under all conditions). Still, one should not underestimate the role of ideological factors on older voters. Barely above the survival level, pensioners giver their votes to those promising them at least something. And the electoral technology is simple, really: let's vote the way our collective farm chairman told us, otherwise he won't give us any firewood. In Odesa oblast, electoral priorities are altogether different. Keeping at Ukraine's average polarization and conservatism level, these people know that party functionaries' promises are worthless (e.g., skepticism), just as they know that the Green program is not likely to accomplish anything for their benefit (e.g., pragmatism). Regardless of how well the candidates might keep their promises, the voters cast their ballots for slogans rather than deeds.

KYIV

The capital's electorate is very heterogeneous. Considering passport registration restrictions and the absence of a housing market throughout the Soviet decades, those who settled in Kyiv were mostly party protОgОs or students, servicemen, construction workers, and janitors - people in their twenties to forties. The result is Ukraine's smallest number of pensioners (17%). After moving to the capital people took their time changing their regional mentality, and often enough never changed it. There is progressive intellectual Kyiv, nomenklatura Kyiv, and that of workers, bazaar traders, criminals, and beggars. There is also business Kyiv. The electorate is sufficiently educated and "humanitarianized" to understand the ideals of national rebirth. It is also sufficiently "lumpenized" to assess these ideals based on food costs. Various strata of the capital's electorate embody Ukraine demographically and politically. The picture shows that Kyiv voters, despite the versatility of their social and political motivations, are the most constructive in this country. Evidence of this is found in (a) the balanced position of the Right and Left vectors in terms of polarization; (b) the apparent rejection of nomenklatura-collective-farm socialism; unambiguous revulsion toward politicking and inclination toward real serious work (as personified by the Greens during the parliamentary questions - whether or not deservedly is another matter). I would rather live in a country whose voters behaved like those of Kyiv.

By Volodymyr VOITENKO,
MD, Professor, State Ukrainian Prize laureate