A Passion for the Coalition
Prior to the opening of the Verkhovna Rada’s sixth session, most experts and people’s deputies with a penchant for publicity predicted that the parliamentary campaign this fall would be marked by endless conflicts between pro-government and opposition forces. Another parliamentary crisis was looming in the political corridors.
A crisis did take place, but not between the warring camps, but within the parliamentary majority. The crisis was a sudden occurrence and, at the same time, something to be expected.
The public demarche staged by several members of the parliamentary majority was definitely a surprise. There didn’t seem to be any significant cause for it. The presidential campaign of the ruling coalition’s candidate was taking a rather confident course and proceeding without any visible hitches. Squabbling with allies at the peak of the campaign also meant complicating relations with the current president and his possible successor. Yet this is exactly what came to pass. The risky move was made by people’s deputies least expected to do so. Stepan Havrysh’s people were not generally known as frondeurs. And the agrarians, even when they are staging fights in parliament, acted rather circumspectly, without upsetting the usual parliamentary disposition.
Despite its being outwardly unexpected, the parliamentary majority’s crisis was a natural manifestation of internal problems that have been germane to the parliamentary-governmental coalition since its inception. Deep-reaching economic, political, and sometimes personal differences within the coalition were no secret to its members and onlookers. They were often public knowledge. Let’s not forget the boycott of cabinet’s Bill #4000-1 by several members of the parliamentary majority. At the time group and individual economic interests prevailed over “joint and several party liabilities” and in a number of other economic matters put to the vote. Majority controversies became especially apparent during the battle over political reform in the spring of 2004, when several majority deputies openly sabotaged their own bill on changes to the Constitution of Ukraine. The first harbinger of the parliamentary majority crisis was the emergence of a group of people’s deputies called the Center. Nor was the situation with nominating a single ruling coalition presidential candidate without setbacks. Finally, toward the end of the fifth Verkhovna Rada session, the NDP-PPPU-NAPU factions set up a miniature coalition within the majority. Incidentally, the agrarians voiced their dissatisfaction with the status of the parliamentary- government coalition early this summer. That political abscess had to burst, sooner or later.
However, one should not overdramatize the situation. No political and parliamentary coalition is immune to inner conflicts and crises. Such conflicts may break out in both ruling and opposition coalitions. What is important now is not so much the crisis gripping the parliamentary-governmental coalition as its possible consequences, as well as lessons to be learned from it. Ukrainian politics are becoming increasingly coalition-oriented. One must learn to create and preserve political coalitions — also by learning from mistakes.
Let us start by analyzing what can ensue from the parliamentary-governmental coalition crisis. This subject is being actively discussed, with a broad range of assessments offered — from the Verkhovna Rada being quickly and effectively reformatted to assurances that the parliamentary majority will remain inviolable.
Formally, the parliamentary-governmental coalition may be restored to the way it was before. After all, deputies representing the Democratic Initiatives and NAPU factions merely suspended their coalition membership and did not withdraw. Should their demands be taken into consideration, the coalition unity would be renewed as well, even if outwardly. It’s another question altogether whether the coalition can retain parliamentary majority status. Even if it numbers slightly more than 226 people’s deputies, any coordinated and disciplined actions can hardly be expected from the coalition membership.
Furthermore, no such actions had been in evidence previously. As a full-fledged and effective political entity, the parliamentary majority must have given up the ghost and could be revived (in the previous or new format) only after the presidential elections. Practice shows that in the current political format, only the president can be the leader and consolidator of the parliamentary majority.
Another matter to consider is if the constitutional reform is actually carried out, the parliamentary majority will be entitled to form the government. In that case, the premier would be the de facto and de jure leader of the parliamentary-governmental coalition. How ever, the majority crisis threatens the very possibility of constitutional reform prior to the presidential elections. On the other hand, the task of politically reforming the political system before electing the next head of state has by no means been deleted from the agenda. And so the fathers of the political reform will have an additional stimulus to overcome differences between the members of the parliamentary- governmental coalition as soon as possible.
In conjunction with the parliamentary majority crisis, certain commentators have started talking about the resignation of the cabinet. Here wishful thinking seems to be the case. There are no direct resignation prerequisites. Of course, if the government-parliamentary-majority interrelationships were legally sealed, raising the matter of cabinet’s resignation would be legally justified.
Another serious problem is the extent to which the majority crisis can affect the government’s effective legislative policy. Suppose we refer to electoral statistics as an objective criterium. The Verkhovna Rada’s fourth convocation would vote down on average every fifth bill (19% of all bills deliberated by parliament). During the previous session, parliament dismissed 13% of cabinet bills. However, 7 of 13 such bills were voted down during the first days of the sixth session — i.e., more than 50%. By way of comparison, parliament rejected only 19 cabinet bills during the previous session. Therefore, cabinet-parliament problems had already emerged. And there is the 2005 budget bill to be deliberated shortly. The budget-forming process has never been easy in parliament. Now it will be even more complicated and controversial, in view of both the presidential campaign and problems stemming from the parliamentary-governmental coalition.
Finally, with regard to the immediate consequences of the parliamentary majority crisis, it is also necessary to assess its impact on the presidential elections. Objectively speaking, the parliamentary-governmental coalition semidecay will not benefit Viktor Yanukovych. His prestige as coalition leader is thus brought into question. As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of the legislative policy of Yanukovych’s cabinet has been lessened. On the other hand, parliament’s frondeurs have not refused to support the premier in the presidential campaign. At least NAPU leader Volodymyr Lytvyn has declared that his party will continue to back the premier in the presidential race. The parliamentary majority crisis is not being transferred to the election campaign’s coalition supporting Viktor Yanukovych. The premier’s prestige may well increase if he succeeds in solving the “dissident” problem in Democratic Initiatives and NAPU. In addition, Yanukovych’s adherents who are loath to see limitations imposed on the presidential powers may take advantage of the current situation to torpedo constitutional reform. Also, the current squabbles in parliament are not likely to produce any tangible effect on the bulk of the electorate. Ordinary citizens have other problems to cope with; they care little about the goings-on among parliament’s leaders. The parliamentary majority crisis primarily affects the situation within the Verkhovna Rada. Its further course will largely depend on Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn’s stand. He will not benefit from a destabilized parliament. At the same time, he may enhance the quantitative and qualitative potential of his direct influence on the Verkhovna Rada’s people’s deputies. In that case, whoever wins the presidential race will have to “decide matters” jointly with the Speaker when setting up (or reviving) his parliamentary majority.
Finally, a word about the lessons one should learn from the parliamentary-governmental- coalition crisis. Lesson one: The very existence of a coalition, in conditions of minimum parliamentary democracy — even more so its effective performance — depends on how well coalition members trust and are willing to abide by the arrangements made. Lesson two: a coalition’s staunchness depends not only on the membership’s loyalty to the head of state or the coalition’s political leader, but also on the membership’s degree of unanimity of political interests and ideological affiliations. Lesson three: if a coalition lacks mechanism for coordinating interests when making and implementing political decisions (e.g., “political communications,” the absence of which was mentioned by the Democratic Initiatives’ dissenters) — or if these vehicles are no longer effective, then this coalition ceases to exist or turns into a figurehead to be used in back-room political games. Lesson four: business and the government ought to be separated, and not only at the legislative level. Here efforts should be made, starting at the executive level. Lesson five (the most important one): the interrelationship between the parliamentary majority (parliamentary majority coalition) and the cabinet accountable thereto must be legally sealed. This is the only way that the legal consequences of a parliamentary crisis can be considered. These lessons must be taken into account when forming a new parliamentary-governmental coalition, in the aftermath of both the presidential and parliamentary elections. Otherwise, past mistakes will inevitably be repeated.
