Eternal Neighborhood and the Reasons for It

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Union the week before last on the level of foreign ministers recommendations were adopted on activating EU relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The matter concerns the “new neighborhood” initiative brought forward this spring by Great Britain and Sweden, which, while still lacking specific content, clearly demonstrates what will be the EU countries’ starting point in defining their policy toward Ukraine.

In the recommendations adopted by the EU Council it is mentioned that the relations are to be based on separate political and economic values. In the near future the EU is to work out its long-term and complex approach to each of the three countries, which might mean that the EU policy toward them would be built on the same basis, simultaneously being “tailored.” The document also notes that the development of the new initiative will depend on how these countries implement reforms, to what extent they are prepared to observe their international obligations, and how much they are devoted to overall democratic values, the rule of the law, human rights, and freedom of the press.

Perhaps the principal point of the EU decision is that it defines Russia as the key partner in the East Europe region. The document does not specify directly that the whole EU policy toward Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova will be viewed through the Russian prism; however, the expression, key partner, can hardly be empty words.

The decision also envisages holding consultations between the EU member countries and candidate member-states to work out detailed proposals, which are to be presented by EU Council Secretary General Javier Solana.

It was reported earlier that the European Union was preparing to make public its reasons regarding its relations with Ukraine by September 30, which was later postponed. The only conclusion one can draw is that the EU countries categorically reject viewing Ukraine as a self-sufficient object for their policy. There is no mention of any “European prospects” for Ukraine in the EU Council’s decision. However, nobody ever mentioned it before either. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry tends to take this document calmly, considering it an “intermediate formulation” of some not yet elaborated general approach.

Cautious comments from high- ranking Ukrainian diplomats on this subject indicate in part that in Ukraine’s current situation it can hardly be proposed anything else.

At first sight there is nothing odd in the fact that Ukraine is grouped with Moldova and Belarus. The European Union had always proceeded from the “regional Europe” position, and its approach in policy had always been regional as well. Moreover, “We are pleased to feel like leaders in this group,” a high Ukrainian diplomat told The Day commenting on the EU approach and stressing that the document also proclaims the principle of differentiation. On the other hand, in his words, it is important that [EU] policy toward Russia is separated from that on Ukraine.

The decision, among other things, says that cooperation with international organizations like the OSCE and the Council of Europe is to become an important element of the new initiative. Problems in the relations between OSCE and Belarus are public knowledge. It is also known that, using these problems as an excuse, the EU countries announced Belarus President Aliaksandr Lukashenka persona non grata in their territories. It would seem that so far Ukraine has been viewed differently, if for no other reason than for this situation the EU recommendation to elaborate an, in fact, common policy towards Minsk and Kyiv raises many questions.

The ides of “neighborhood” relationship, as well as implementing, in fact, the same policy for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, taking into consideration Russia being the key partner in the region, has already evoked Kyiv’s restrained attitude, which seemed to have been ignored in the decision-making centers in Brussels. “We cannot impose our point of view,” The Day was told at Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“We have determined our view on our relations with the European Union, while the EU itself hasn’t done so yet,” State Secretary of Ukraine’ Foreign Ministry Oleksandr Chaly said at the recent parliamentary hearings on the state of Ukraine-EU relations. He named three reasons for this: first, the EU itself is in a stage of unprecedented expansion, and because of various problems connected with this time for considering the “Ukrainian question” has not yet arrived; second, the Russian factor: the EU determining Russia as its key partner has a cautious attitude toward Ukraine’s striving for European integration; and the third reason is “we ourselves.” The slow pace of political, economic, and legal reforms along with the lack of a broad pro-European majority in Verkhovna Rada. Secretary Chaly also mentioned two possible scenarios for the relationship’s further development: the Euro- skeptic one, where these relations will not reach the integration level, and an optimistic one envisioning that a new agreement with the EU would be signed in the immediate future (Ukraine would like it to be an agreement on associative membership). In this case a dialog will start with the EU presupposing taking joint decisions.

Judging by the EU Council’s decisions, so far one can speak of implementing the pessimistic scenario from the EU side. The European Union structures significantly avoid using the term integration in connection with Ukraine. It has not yet been conferred the title of a market economy country (diplomats believe that such decision could be taken in the first half of 2003). In the words of Norbert Justen, head of the European commission delegation to Ukraine, “We are thoroughly studying proposals on establishing closer relations, but not everything is going smoothly.”

Ministry officials and experts often note that only 4% of Ukraine’s legislation is harmonized with EU requirements, only drafts submitted by the cabinet are examined, and that tax reform should not be dragged out any longer, being a roadblock on Ukraine’s path to WTO and negotiations on free economic zones with the EU. There is also a lack of financing the work on harmonizing legislation and other necessary measures. All this can be characterized as homework that should be done anyway for Ukraine’s own development.

There also exists the refusal to perceive Ukraine as EU potential member, which sounded in the notorious statements by Hunther Verheugen, commissar of the European Commission on Expansion, head of the European Convent Valery Giscard d’Estaing, and president of the European Commission Romano Prodi.

Thus far, the Verkhovna Rada hearings demonstrated that too many things still remain at a declarative level. Too few deputies take seriously European integration as the state’s strategic course — otherwise at least half of the session hall would be packed. Simultaneously, the lion’s share of the homework that could serve as an argument for diplomats depends precisely on the parliament. On the other hand, the presence of students at the hearings indicates that perhaps the younger generation has more understanding of both strategy and problems. They represent the potential which, in the opinion of Club of Rome member Bohdan Havrylyshyn, might make it possible to “make a leap forward.”