“Programmed” Test

The governmental program (popularly known as Reforms for Well-Being) drawn up on the bases of presidential address to parliament will be handed over to Parliament this week. The following program priorities have been announced: increasing the economic freedom of individuals, economic entities, and regions; democratic manner of decision-making; and effective social policies.

According to Economy Minister Serhiy Tyhypko, the fulfillment of this program should result in Ukraine’s admission to the World Trade Organization before the end of 2000, creation of conditions for associate membership in the European Union, reduction of Ukraine’s foreign debt, and payment of all wage, salary, pension, and other social benefit arrears. He simultaneously believes certain obstacles could emerge to the fulfillment of the program, such as the absence of public support for the government, the refusal of creditors to restructure debts, and the collapse of constructive cooperation with Parliament.

He thinks rejection of the government program by Verkhovna Rada would be tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and will lead to the resignation of the latter. In addition, the Minister of the Economy singled out as a serious risk the opposition to reforms by “certain economic agents who profit from our economic and legal chaos, and those who have received various privileges and licenses and on whose interests we are treading today.”

According to Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ivan Pliushch, Parliament can consider this document as early as this month. He also pointed out that the agreement on joint responsibility between Parliament and the government for the fulfillment of this program can only be signed after it is adopted.

Commenting on Mr. Tyhypko’s words, First Deputy Speaker Viktor Medvedchuk noted that Verkhovna Rada had not done anything to cause a situation unfavorable for government decisions, Interfax-Ukraine reports. “It is the Cabinet’s open and totally unmotivated flouting of its commitments to Parliament that is more likely to present a real risk, to paraphrase the Economy Minister,” Mr. Medvedchuk said, noting that “This is precisely the way we can assess the fact that the premier has already presented the blueprints of his program to foreign ambassadors without first coordinating these with the People’s Deputies.” The unusually abrupt tone of Mr. Medvedchuk’s statement calls into question the trouble-free passage of the government program by lawmakers.

Moreover, People’s Deputy Borys Bezpaly, commenting on the situation to

The Day, noted, “The government’s program should be considered in the context of the political situation. Obviously, it saw the light of day a bit awkwardly: this is what Mr. Medvedchuk meant. In my opinion, this awkwardness was done on purpose, for a part of the war party in the President’s entourage is not interested in effective cooperation between the government and Parliament. These are the forces that initiated the referendum and support a course toward the dissolution of Parliament. The program was submitted to Parliament in such a way as to touch influential forces in Verkhovna Rada and provoke a conflict on the grounds of personal interests. These are totally political maneuvers that have nothing to do with the program’s economic content.”

Meanwhile, in case of a face-off with Parliament, the government’s only visible (and short-lived) resource of strength is the credit of trust Mr. Yushchenko has gained. This government’s real basis of support lies in small and medium business, but the Cabinet has so far done nothing to strengthen its position in this sector society. Given the absence of influential allies in the regions and genuine media support of its own factions in Verkhovna Rada, the government may well come unstuck in spite of the declared presidential backing.

TOPICAL COMMENT

Volodymyr POLOKHALO, political scientist:

“The strong points in Viktor Yushchenko’s cabinet are, first, its reformist image — this applies, above all, to Mr. Yushchenko himself — and, secondly, a stereotype, widespread among the politically-conscious strata of the population, about the not so close ties between the Yushchenko government and Ukrainian oligarchs. But such ties undoubtedly exist. Thirdly, the still existing, if diminishing, credit of trust on the part of population. Fourth, a certain independence of the government in carrying out the administrative reform and in cadre policy. The external positive factor lies in certain support rendered by international elements and a positive image in the West.

“Among the Cabinet’s weak points are objective and subjective factors, i.e., the ones the government inherited and those it acquired through the mistakes it has made while in office. The main weakness is that it has to work within the framework of reactive policies, that is, to react to the current systemic condition of the socioeconomic and political degradation of Ukraine. This greatly reduces the scope of the strategic directions of activity. In this sense, the Yushchenko government is in much worse condition than were the governments of Poland and other countries which took up the thankless right to take unpopular steps.

“What also greatly weakens the Cabinet positions is the absence in society of a social base of reform, i.e., the critical mass required for supporting the Ukrainian reforms. Today the average Ukrainian is indifferent to reforms. In this context, the government’s problem is that it knows its society poorly and expects more than it is currently capable of.

“The third weakness is the presence of real levers to influence and control the government on the part of powerful financial and political groups, for the goals spelled out by the government contradict, in a way, their business interests. Also one sees the government’s weak connection with and influence on the regional political and business elites, which evokes implicit irritation and disloyalty of the local elites over the budget policy.

“Fifth: a certain lack of independence and self- sufficiency in the formation of the main trends in the strategy and tactics of transformations. This found its expression, particularly, in the government’s failure to influence the preparation of the President’s address to Verkhovna Rada, which was in fact drafted under the supervision of the Presidential Administration’s chairman.

“Sixth: the total dependence of Ukraine on the West and East, the role of Ukraine as a buffer in current geopolitical combinations and recombinations.

“Also a weak spot for the government is its having to deal in parallel with a whole series of absolutely different things: the administrative reform, the spring sowing, and the fuel crisis. All this is beyond the power of not only the Yushchenko government but of any other one in the postsocialist world.

“In addition, speaking of some political figures in the Cabinet, who wield real levers of influence, it seems to me Mr. Yushchenko has surrounded himself with by no means like-minded people. And, for example, the actions of Yuliya Tymoshenko testify that Ukraine faces a serious problem of understanding national, state, and corporate interests. And often the latter are presented as the former.

“Thus this government has no clear backing from either the political class or society where, objectively, there is no social basis for such support and where one of the basic motives of political behavior is the principle of let it only not get worse. For this reason the objective logic of the political process suggests a short period of existence for Mr. Yushchenko’s Cabinet. Its emergence and current inconsistency of actions are, to a large extent, the factor of political opportunism and a specific political situation rather than the result of the readiness of society and political elites to undergo political reform. In all probability, the Yushchenko government is being used as the required international legitimization of Ukraine as a state that declares democratic values.”