Arab “domino”

Apparently, the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, never expected his anti-aircraft defences and airfields to be attacked by Western countries, and even less that some Arab countries would join them. His assumptions are anyone’s guess. He may have overestimated European pacifism and underestimated the European capital cities’ concern over the influx of immigrants. After the attacks it became obvious that the dictator’s troops and mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa could fight only civilians or poorly armed insurgents.

Outwardly, the events in Libya are very different from what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. However, despite a number of failures suffered by Gaddafi’s opponents, social tensions are building in an increasing number of countries. Even if their regimes aren’t collapsing like houses of cards, the Arab world has doubtlessly changed.

In Bahrain, mass protests were suppressed with foreign bayonets. Interestingly, Ukraine’s opponents of the combat operations in Libya and their counterparts in Russia (led by Vladimir Putin), were silent about the deployment of Saudi troops in Manama. While accusing the West of practicing double standards, it is useful to look at yourself in a mirror once in a while. In fact, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin couldn’t help engaging in public polemics — something new in today’s Russia.

In Yemen, the situation will largely depend on the dynamics of events in Oman and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia is taking a dim view of the possibility of an armed confrontation in Yemen, for there is no way to suppress mass protests the way it was done in Bahrain: first, because of the traditionally strained relationships between Yemen and the Saudis, both on the government level and in terms of mentality; second, because keeping Yemen’s territory under control is easier said than done, considering its geography and complicated inner conditions, with the division between the north and south and sharp tribal differences.

Riyadh is keenly interested in achieving a compromise in Yemen, for a number of reasons. Hence its willingness to act as a go-between. To this end, a mission has been dispatched to Sanaa. It isn’t likely to succeed because of the irreconcilable stand taken by the parties concerned.

The leadership of the Mushtarak opposition has forwarded letters to the US embassy and those of a number of EU countries, making it perfectly clear that they will refuse all contact with President Saleh unless it has to do with his stepping down.

Most likely, the Saudi leadership is aware of all this, but they badly need to gain time to stabilize the situation in Bahrain and Oman. Considering the importance of the former, the West won’t expose the brutal way in which the opposition is being treated. The situation with Oman is more complicated. Diplomatic and intelligences sources of the United Arab Emirates report that Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said’s milieu includes powerful pro-Iranian figures, yet his neighbors have no cause for sending troops to Bahrain. Muscat has never requested this from them and isn’t likely to do so. Oman is also traditionally wary of, if not hostile to the Saudis. Whereas a number of top-level officials are strongly opposed to this, there is no ruling out the possibility of UAE leaders choosing the military option. Some sources point to an increasing number of Pakistanis hired to serve in the UAE armed forces.

There is a direct connection between the events in Yemen and Oman. At one time, the government of what was then independent South Yemen supported the separatist Dhofar Liberation Front, a leftist radical organization engaged in an armed struggle for the establishment of an independent [communist] state in the south of Oman. Subsequently, some of the insurgents received important administrative posts in Manama, but continue to have ties to the South Yemeni elite. This Yemeni-Omani interaction can undermine the status quo on the Arabian Peninsula. The problem is that social cataclysms remain unpredictable. Oman, Yemen, and Bahrain aren’t isolated, whereas events in other Arab countries may well aggravate the situation.

Syria’s regime is also experiencing mounting hardships. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad told The Wall Street Journal (Jan. 31, 2011): “…Syria is stable….” In actuality, there are serious differences between the political leadership (mostly made up of Alawis, a Shia sect) and the Sunni majority of the population. Add here some 10 percent of Christians. Syria has been in a state of emergency since 1963. Although it formally has a multiparty system, the Arab Socialist Baath [Resurrection] Party has maintained a predominant position.

Outwardly, the regime in Damascus looks solid, yet its walls has long been running cracks, with the rallies in Daraa evolving into a large-scale confrontation with law enforcement forces, with protesters setting fire to the Baath headquarters, burning down the Palace of Justice and two cell phone operator offices (one of them, Syriatel, belonged to President Assad’s first cousin). An eyewitness account has it that they burned down the symbols of oppression and corruption, but did no damage to the banks. The demonstrators demanded that the state of emergency be lifted. Rallies of protest reached as far as Jasim, a town 45 km north of Daraa. Interestingly, the Syrian government-run channels accuse certain agents provocateurs and Palestinian extremists of aggravating the situation. Gaddafi did the same, except that he blamed Al-Qaeda.

Events in these Arab countries are escalating, though there is no reason to refer to the domino theory. These countries are too different in terms of cause and consequence, and duration of events. However, some interim inferences are possible.

In all these countries the ruling elite will have to make tangible democratic and socioeconomic reforms. Regardless of social tensions and protesting moods, practically every Arab regime has proclaimed the beginning of restructuring of its political and economic models. Generally speaking, each such reform boils down to expanding the opposition’s presence in the political system (which will, of course, serve to enhance their role in key industries). Ditto its status in the spheres that are usually kept away from the public eye. The rate and effectiveness of these reforms will be determined by the conditions in any given country and external factors.

Bahrain serves as a case study. Manama will have to make a number of concessions for the benefit of the Shia majority, as you can rely on foreign troops for protection for only so long. This also contradicts the fundamental concept of the economic model of this country. It is aimed at creating and operating a world financial center on this island, so it can host various large-scale international conferences on regional security. Doing all this while in a state of emergency is impossible. There is another, external factor that demands reform and an end to social confrontation. Iran makes no secret of its desire to annex this island. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is resolved to prevent this.

Egypt’s example highlights a third factor. This leading Arab country is vividly demonstrating its desire to assert the latter-day democratic achievements. Some 80 percent of the Egyptians have voted for the amendments to their constitution, including a shorter presidential mandate of up to four years, and not more than two consecutive terms in office. Characteristically, a total of nine articles of the constitution were subject to public discussion, including electoral procedures to the legislative and executive posts. This paves the way for a parliamentary election in Egypt this June, and a presidential one in September. Abolishing the constitutional clause vesting the head of state with special authority in combating terrorism was another kibosh put on the presidential powers. Further amendments altered the procedures of instituting the state of emergency (one that has been effective in Egypt over the past 30 years). From now on, instituting the state of emergency will be the prerogative of the parliament, not the president.

Events that began as social unrest in these Arab countries are starting to look more like a revolution, considering that they are effecting so many walks of life, involving large numbers of the populace. And there is even more to them. Here is an example that countries on other continents find worth being emulated. The time of dictatorship and authoritarian regimes is running short. Too bad that a few rulers refuse to acknowledge the fact, just as they refuse to learn the Mubarak lesson.