Who will Offer a Positive Scenario?

SEVEN: LUCKY NUMBER FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT

Apart from campaigning sorcery and sociological frills, much as they are required by any election campaign, the secret of the political trade consists in the development and professional application of interconnected but not interchangeable factors determining a given candidate’s efficiency during the campaign. As a rule, each presidential candidate must have seven principal tools in his kit: (1) the so-called administrative resource; (2) finance sources; (3) intellectual backup; (5) cadre/personnel; (6) information facilities; (7) domestic and international communications/contacts.

Naturally, the importance, scope, and degree of the said resources vary from one campaign to the next, yet their availability is as necessary for attracting votes, and as permanent as the force of gravity. A number of candidates and their chiefs of campaign staff are intuitively aware that the degree of mastery in using each of the above-mentioned tools cause the difference in ratings and chances of winning the race.

Much has been written about some of these resources (e.g., administrative, financial, party ideological) and those having them in Ukraine. However, an analysis of major Ukrainian political figures within the context of interaction of other less frequently mentioned factors, such as intellectual, cadre, communications, and information, seems even more interesting.

LITTLE REGIONAL SECRETS OF THE LARGEST FACTION

Without doubt, the Donetsk “picnic” of Our Ukraine’s leader and a group of people’s deputies, along with subsequent developments, make the most important domestic political event of the past several weeks. Recalling their regional campaign tour, it seems worth pointing out that there are certain basic principles determining the success of political projects such as trips made by political leaders in the province, namely (a) intellectual and organizational efforts to select the route, (b) knowledge of regional specifics, and (c) an adequate program.

In view of these political ABCs, analysts continue to wonder about the illogical choice of the Donbas for holding the Our Ukraine convention. There are considerably more open questions than rational answers. The stated objective of the tour eastward was the bloc’s party convention. Proceeding from the traditional concept of a party convention, it is meant primarily to demonstrate unity between a given party and the people, conveying the party ideology, building a positive attractive political image in a most party-friendly environment. In this sense, Donetsk, as the Ukrainian coal miners’ capital, offered an environment that was anything but friendly, specifically:

1. Our Ukraine has practically no deputies from that region in general and Donetsk in particular.

2. Support of Our Ukraine in Donetsk is less than moderate (suffice it to say that Our Ukraine collected more votes in Solomianka, a residential district of Kyiv, than in all of Donetsk).

3. To say that Our Ukraine maintains organizational contacts in that region would be a gross overstatement.

4. That territory has traditionally strong resources Our Ukraine obviously lacks: Red ideology and administrative resource working hand in glove.

Another important albeit concealed aspect. The Communists keep meaningfully silent. This attitude is hard to imagine unless arrangements were previously made; they would have never missed the opportunity to add to their image in the Donbas, their home turf. In view of this, it is safe to assume that Viktor Yushchenko, as a key contestant in the presidential race, tried to shift the political game from the left-right to the government-opposition field. This assumption is corroborated by subsequent events at Verkhovna Rada. The four opposition blocs — Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko’s Bloc, the Socialists, and the Communists — take a remarkably united stand in demanding a special committee of inquiry to investigate into the Donetsk conflict. Whether or not these potential allies agree on a single presidential candidate will be a strength test. If they go that far, the main candidates will be likely to essentially revise their stands, and chances for victory will undergo matching transformations.

OPPOSITION TEA RECIPE

One can judge the professional level of each side in the presidential campaign by its skill of turning shortcomings into advantages. Americans call this the art of serving tea with life-grown sour lemon. Campaign architects call this limited-resource performance. Any opposition candidate is subject to tangible limitations (not to be mistaken for their complete absence) with regard to certain major resources (e.g., administrative, finance, and information). Access to what is known here as information space is as acute for the opposition as it is problematic. In order to make an occurrence in the opposition camp receive media coverage, it has to be something akin to blockbuster. For such is the media’s universal rule. And so the opposition relies on a method whereby the press must be kept busy; let them write whatever they wish, so long as they keep the names spelled right. Thus, the Ukrainian television audiences are not likely to forget watching one of the Ukrainian oligarchs with stone in hand (the proverbial weapon of the proletariat), using it to smash the lock on a chain to open a gate.

Hidden meaning: In view of the need to replenish the dramatically quickly dwindling media resource, Our Ukraine’s adventure in Donetsk looks anything but senseless, even though it turned out an ill-staged political show. As it is, Ukrainian media will work for the opposition, practically free of charge, until exhausting the subject.

VICTIMS AND DIVIDENDS

If one were to assess the Donetsk Syndrome in terms of yet another campaign resource, communications, one would have to recall previous political developments. Not so long ago, Premier Viktor Yanukovych did his best to score points in the US political field where Viktor Yushchenko’s monopoly had never been challenged. In view of this, why shouldn’t the Our Ukraine leader try to give a “symmetrical” answer?

The presence of diplomats from leading Western countries on that eastern regional square, which is obviously problematic for Yushchenko, deserves special notice. If one were to regard his trip as a means of promoting his democratic image outside Ukraine, there are reasons to assume that we were witness to a symbolic exchange. That exchange boiled down to sacrificing part of the territory within the Ukrainian space in exchange for success along the lines of international vectors.

Hidden meaning: Previous electoral experiences in the post-Soviet space show that two regime-opposition scenarios are possible, depending on the elections outcome, namely, succession/continuity of the powers that be (e.g., Azerbaijan scenario) and regime-opposition confrontation complete with societal instability elements (e.g., post-Soviet Georgia scenario). There are alarming indications that the Ukrainian opposition, after exchanging blows with the powers that be, will adopt the latter scenario.

ENOUGH MUSCLE, FRIGHTFUL SHORTAGE OF BRAIN

It is hard to assess the Donetsk conflict without studying authenticated campaign poll turnouts first. However, even at this stage certain consequences of the Yanukovych-Yushchenko regime-opposition duel of ratings are undeniably clear, namely:

1. Both candidates’ images dropping from the national to the regional (e.g., Halychyna- and eastern-electorate-supported) level.

2. Broadcasting Our Ukraine leader Yushchenko’s image as the leader of something akin to a frenzied neo-Nazi fraternity, while replacing the strong premier’s image with that of an aggressive politician.

3. Making it clear that both presidential hopefuls’ teams lack cadre and intellectual campaign resources.

4. Showing that [the Ukrainian version of] Hawks has reigned triumphant on both sides, this being a strongly disheartening sign, not so much for the leader and his team as for all of Ukraine serving as a trial ground to test mostly forceful scenarios.

5. Tensions in the relationships between the two potentially [most] effective presidential candidates beget serious risks in the parliamentary space.

6. Adding fuel to the opposition-majority fire, threatening drastic changes in the parliamentary majority format and the retirement of the Yanukovych Cabinet.

Hidden meaning: In view of all the above-mentioned consequences, the traditional question is, Who will win the game? There is little doubt that politicians steering clear of the conflict — those in the presidential camp (with analysts pointing to the United Social Democrats in the first place) and from among the opposition forces — will turn up on the winning side.

OPEN QUESTIONS

The above assumptions, concerning hidden meanings and various dimensions at the initial stage of the presidential campaign, should be regarded at their face value. We know from a classic writer that life is more versatile and complicated than we would ever imagine. This, however, does not rule out posing questions and trying to answer them. What happened in Donetsk poses at least three pressing questions addressing current politicians:

1. Why should Verkhovna Rada resolve to discuss the Donetsk conflict behind closed doors? After all, the first act of the Donetsk political show was held in public; why should the second act be staged for a small handpicked audience including power structure functionaries?

2. In Donetsk, the regime and opposition forces tried to get even, using the East-West political stereotype. Meanwhile, there are problems having special importance for the third player in the Ukrainian electoral game — ordinary voters, all those men and women in the street. Here questions are posed and answers expected, concerning bread, gas, municipal costs, unemployment rate, pensions, and labor protection. Also, how would a given candidate handle the inflation, if and when elected President of Ukraine.

3. Which of the existing political forcers and their leaders would offer the Ukrainian nation a positive scenario addressing the presidential campaign and further Ukrainian national development strategies?