Verheugen’s Customs Warning
Instead of speaking about full or associate EU membership, concentrate on negotiations about signing the Action Plan next year. This was the leitmotif of the meetings European Commissioner for Enlargement Guenter Verheugen (in the photo) held with the Ukrainian leadership — President Leonid Kuchma, Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, and Economy Minister Valery Khoroshkovsky, as well of his speech at the Institute of International Relations. Mr. Verheugen expressed a hope that the SES (single economic space) option would not hinder Ukraine’s European integration. He was also reassured in the Crimea and Kyiv that Ukraine still followed a strategic course toward integration into Europe.
As Verkhovna Rada European Integration Committee Chairman Borys Tarasiuk noted, Mr. Verheugen also voiced, perhaps for the first time, Brussels’ official position on the planned signing of the SES agreement by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. He said if the SES concept leads to a customs union, this would seriously jeopardize the EU-Ukraine relations as well as the chances of Ukraine joining the World Trade Organization because the latter had established strict criteria on customs unions.
Commissioner Verheugen also repeatedly said during the visit that Ukraine has always been and would remain part of Europe, and its western border was not the eastern border of Europe. “An independent, politically stable and economically strong Ukraine is a condition for durable peace and stability in Europe. The EU fully recognizes your country’s strategic importance,” he told Institute of International Relations students and faculty, almost literally repeating what he had said to Pres. Kuchma. This kind of rhetoric is gradually becoming customary, as was the case a few years ago, when it was frequently said that the EU viewed Ukraine as an important partner.
It can only be said in general terms now what the Action Plan will look like. Coordinated with Ukraine, the plan will provide criteria for assessments, deadlines, and monitoring of decision fulfillment. Apparently, the plan will comprise nothing that points to its final objective (membership opportunities, the greatest possible involvement in existing and future mechanisms, a certain level of association, etc.). The Ukrainian version of the Action Plan, already sent to Brussels, provides for signing an association agreement after the document’s provisions have been met. Mr. Verheugen avoided answering questions in Kyiv, only saying that the neighborly policy concept does not close doors — quite the contrary, it “opens new doors.” This can be interpreted in more than one way. In particular, Verheugen and other high EU officials insist that “new neighborliness” is in no way related to the question of membership — instead, it should help establish a “friendly circle” of countries. Kyiv tends to interpret this as follows: membership is a different issue to be discussed in different negotiations. Roman Shpek, head of Ukraine’s mission at the EU, is convinced that it is possible to start these negotiations “even a year later” provided certain standards have been met.
The priorities of the “neighborly policy” are quite clear and take into account Ukraine’s interests. For example, one can only welcome an attempt to, as Verheugen said, “establish special relations” which can include gaining unlimited access to the EU domestic market. This could also mean the integration of transportation, electricity, and telecommunication networks. It is proposed to map out neighborly programs for 2004-2006 to be implemented by partners on both sides of the border and financed by various EU funds. A new instrument is being worked out to help the neighbor countries, which is expected to replace the TACIS program. This is a long-term process, however, and the new instrument is unlikely to come about before the end of 2006. High on the agenda is meeting the challenges of the twenty- first century through common effort.
Nothing was said about the prospects of, for example, radically moderating the current EU visa requirements for Ukraine. The European Commission admits that this subject is now higher on the agenda of talks with Russia than those with Ukraine and that it will take much time to discuss it. Still, such a prospect is quite feasible. Thus far, the EU offers a moderated visa treatment of frontier residents. This might be the first step.
Two more details stood out in Mr. Verheugen’s speech. First, he presented the following vision of Ukraine’s European integration: the ever closer relations with the EU, rather than full-fledged participation in absolutely all current European processes. European Commission President Romano Prodi has already mentioned the model “all things common except for internal EU institutions.” It is promised to take into account the “diverse levels of economic development and devotion to European values” and to use an individual approach with each of the neighbor countries (including Russia). This still requires, however, achieving the basic EU standards which are expected to become even more stringent as the Union is enlarged.
Secondly, it is clear that the EU has heeded Warsaw’s call to build the EU-Ukraine relations at the level of those between the EU and Russia. In any case, the current EU policy toward Russia is also being viewed through the prism of neighborliness.
Verheugen was perhaps the first top EU official to admit that the West underestimates Ukraine’s achievements and problems.
This visit can be characterized in various ways: for example, as the beginning of a continuous political dialog on a certain concrete basis and for a certain purpose. It is a sort of reconnaissance, for Brussels wants to know what exactly is going on in a neighboring country. This is also an unmistakable signal about what issues will not be seriously considered in the immediate future, at least until it is clear that the first big wave of EU enlargement has come off in a more or less satisfactory manner. It is also worth noting that the EU is now taking far less interest in Ukraine’s political situation than the US is, confining itself to insistence that democratic standards should be met.
What are we supposed to do? Attend to our own business, by all accounts. For example, nobody can say that Ukrainian producers do not need access to EU markets, that EU markets, in spite of being full and aggressive, are less interesting than the markets of Belarus or that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia can help develop Ukrainian industry on the basis of modern technologies.
Ukraine is not being regarded today as a prospective EU member through its own fault as well as by force of circumstances connected with psychological, historical and other stereotypes. We will only be able to overcome these if we have convincing trump cards.
As Verheugen’s visit shows, the very discussion of a possible formation of the CIS Four raises a suspicion that Kyiv is not sincere when it constantly declares its European and Euro-Atlantic choice. The time the new neighborliness concept gives (about ten years) could be spent for the benefit of Ukrainian individuals and state, in which the EU promises to render assistance. This is some progress, taking into account inertia of the Brussels bureaucracy.
Most probably, this will be again on the agenda in less than a month at the Ukraine-EU summit, at a major international conference in November, and then all next year — if some force-majeure circumstances, such as signing the SES agreement signed in Astana, do not intervene.
