Kremlin Dreamers
When asked how his country views Moscow’s permanent backing for Jerusalem’s antiterrorist activities, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netaniahu said, “with profound appreciation.” But, still, it is wiser to judge by Moscow’s deeds, not words.
Russian politicians, however, have been slow to learn this formula. Less than a year since the extremists’ attack on the United States and Vladimir Putin’s assurances of immediate support we see the Russian chief executive hugging Kim Jong Il, learn of plans to annex Belarus, hear about a draft long-term program of cooperation with Iraq, observe warm contacts with Iran, and witness anonymous bombardments of Georgia, with Russian officials denying having anything to do with it in a way reminiscent of the most odious Soviet traditions. In the recent past such a foreign policy, if such an assortment of accidental and rash moves can be called a policy, would have been dubbed as irresponsible. Today such a policy looks audacious. Kim Jong Il is not a whimsical funny man who chose to travel to Moscow in an armored train. He is a tough dictator whose diplomats moonlight as drug traffickers and whose soldiers raid South Korea, let alone Pyongyang’s readiness to provide ideological backing for extremist groups and wipe out domestic opposition using time-tested methods of suppression. Belarus, whoever rules it now, is a sovereign state, and the plan to slice it up into regions in order to add them to Russia is evidence of a glaring disregard for international law. Much the same goes for Georgia: there may be no love lost any longer between the Kremlin and Shevardnadze, or the Georgian leader’s opposition follow Russia’s example and launch a bloody war on its territory, might not sit well with Moscow, but it is hardly acceptable to punish a neighbor for this by using bombers. Iran has by no means agreed to ease its confrontation with the US, and Russia is in no hurry to scrap the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr despite all the arguments repeatedly voiced by Washington and Jerusalem showing how dangerous such cooperation could become. Moreover, the signing of a long-term and multibillion dollar program of cooperation with Baghdad against the backdrop of a likely military operation by the United States to topple Saddam’s regime is just more evidence of Moscow’s intentions to legitimize this regime and show that Russia is ready for lengthy involvement with it.
Does Vladimir Putin know all this? If so, then why was he so quick to call George Bush on hearing about the September 11 terrorist attack? These are only rhetorical questions. First were the words, then came the deeds. The deeds can serve well as an answer to the West for its reluctance to soften the rules of the game for Russia. Apparently, for all its words of support, Moscow expected easier accession to the WTO, be recognized as a master on the post-Soviet turf with all the Belaruses, Georgias, and Ukraines thrown in, be given the right to veto NATO’s decisions, retain the no-visa regime for its Kaliningrad enclave, let alone a host of other claims and dreams. But nothing of the sort has happened, primarily due to the West’s conviction (and I remember quite well the rejoicing in the NATO headquarters and Western embassies in Moscow) that after September 11 and Putin’s gesture the West is dealing with an intelligent partner who now understands the basics and, most importantly, has finally realized that the proposed rules of the game are the only possible, logical, and necessary primarily to foster changes in Russia.
Alas, the diplomats were mistaken. The world has changed, but not the people in the Kremlin: their deeds do not match their words; rather, they demand when pursuing their own interests and act quite irresponsibly when treating the interests of their own country and the world. What can one do? They are very old-fashioned people.
