Psychological Dimension of Disarmament
What has been so much and long talked about (and with so much enthusiasm) may finally seem to be taking a tangible shape. Two weeks ago it was disclosed (at a closed-door briefing, though, with a permitted information leak) that the United States administration had decided to radically reduce its nuclear arsenal, with accent to be placed on developing powerful high-precision weaponry. There is, however, one but: it is planned not to destroy warheads, but to move them to storage facilities where they could be available in necessity.
The idea of such “incomplete” nuclear arms reduction could not help but be bombarded with criticism. It was criticized both in the United States and, of course, in Moscow. The Russian leadership insists that disarmament really ought to mean destroying warheads, not just taking them off combat standby.
If the two nuclear leaders, the USA and Russia, cut their nuclear arsenals, this could produce an impressive effect. Only if the reduction were really radical, simultaneous and complete, open and honest. Then it would be quite reasonable to talk about the unacceptability of proliferating nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It would bring about a serious change of the very climate of international relations, of their basic principles. Before announcing the United States’ withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, its representatives stressed, and not without reason, that the treaty itself was a relic of the Cold War. It would also be as reasonable to stress that the very concept of nuclear deterrence is already a Cold War anachronism. After all, blasphemous as it may sound, the United States’ readiness to beat off a nuclear attack failed to prevent the tragedy of September 11, a tragedy which, in fact, turned a new page in human history.
Whether the sides, the USA and Russia, want it or not, they will obviously have to step over their habitual mistrust and attempts to figure out their own benefits. The United States needs effective allies, and Russia is quite capable of becoming one. The Russian economy will hardly be able to survive a long confrontation as long as those warheads are kept in storage. The potential possibility of a nuclear attack on the United States by North Korea, Iraq, or any other country looks far too hypothetical today. Yet, it’s not the warheads stockpiled in storage facilities that can prevent such a potential hazard. Apparently, none of the world leaders would wish a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And apparently, the times when the equilibrium hinged on a single unwary move that could annihilate everything are passing, although not without problems, the more so that the psychology of the era of mutual assured destruction will not be helpful at all in fighting terrorism.
