Far-Reaching Consequences of a Brilliant War

Such a reconsideration of the world order has a certain objective logic. Only those mechanisms based on the real laws of mechanics are viable. Disputes can be settled only within the framework of a world order that takes into consideration the real weight of the players. And this weight is gradually changing.

THE PLAYERS

The United States did not only win every war of worldwide scope in the twentieth century. From the two World Wars it emerged substantially strengthened and more influential in the world. This also happened after the end of the Cold War. What we see today is not only the consolidation of the results of America's winning the Cold War but in a sense the summation of all three US victories. The United States is now getting used to its role as the world's undisputed leader. Unfortunately, this role has outstripped its role as leader of the democratic world courageously fighting the evil empire. When the great evil empire fell, it has to immediately turn to smaller ones. Here we see the tradition of American politicians to affirm themselves with sword (or more precisely, with Tomahawk) in hand.

The United States is attempting to create a new order, by eliminating any institutions which could place obstacles to such "effective" order on a world scale. G-7 is gradually supplanting the UN Security Council. NATO is pushing aside the OSCE, because the US is trying to give the alliance an absolutely different character. State Secretary Made line Albright's message to the recent conference of NATO foreign ministers was quite symptomatic, containing the idea of preemptive nuclear strikes, acts outside NATO's area of responsibility, and the use of force without UN Security Council authorization.

Great Britain is not merely a bridge between the European Union and the US nor just an old reliable American ally. Recently London has found itself involved in an increasing number of events affecting Old World interests, and the Iraq crisis is no exception. One can cite several other developments that made headlines worldwide: regulating the Kosovo problem, the Anglo-French defense treaty, Pinochet trial, and even last year's Nobel Peace Prize awarded for actions to regulate the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Russia obtained an enormous legacy from the former Soviet Union, but the Federation's current capabilities cannot be remotely compared to those of the USSR, and they continue to decline. Russia reacts nervously to any attempt to ignore it in games on the international arena, the more so that for several centuries European countries (obviously much more than other adversaries) dealt heavy blows to Russia's prestige, and each time it took the empire much effort to recover and become even stronger. But every Narva defeat would be followed by a Poltava victory, something we Ukrainians remember all too well. Its UN Security Council veto is of critical importance to Russia now that its international prestige has been seriously undermined by economic problems. This is virtually its only in weapon allowing Moscow to protect its allies like Belgrade or Baghdad.

China has indisputably outgrown its role as a regional leader. Its economic presence is noticeable the world over, on the markets of both developing and most developed nations. Some analysts believe that it was only China's refusal to devalue the yuan which saved the Japanese economy from total catastrophe. The US President's visit to China, especially his participation in the ceremony in Beijing's Tian'an Men Square, showed that for Washington (as well as for many other leading countries) cooperation with China is of such critical importance, that Washington is prepared to close its eyes to serious differences on a number of political issues. China showed a sharply negative reaction to the Iraq air strike without UN Security Council sanction.

France has played in a number of political games where its interests did not exactly tally with those of the United States. Paris has always adhered to its own position and showed little affection for Washington's desire for hegemony. The French opposed the Iraq strikes.

Any attempt to connect the leading countries' attitude toward the bombing of Iraq and their attitude toward the UN Security Council would be an oversimplification. There are also other political and economic motives. Still, the reactions by Germany and Japan are quite significant. Both are openly dissatisfied with how the Security Council permanent members are determined according to the member's nuclear status. They approved the use of force without Security Council authorization. But perhaps this was mere coincidence?

MOTIVES

Oil is said to be the lifeblood of geopolitics. This is undoubtedly true of the game being played in the Middle East. Iraq was able to become of vital interest to certain permanent Security Council members. France, for example, controls 15-16% of exchanges under the Oil for Food Program (In 1995 the UN voted to allow Iraq to export unlimited quantities of oil to purchase food and medicine - Ed.). Arab interests are also taken into account, and Russian and Chinese participation in the program is increasing. China does not extract oil on any sizable scale, is interested in Iraq's output, and is wary of oil cost increase which an attack on that country could provoke. Russia expects Iraq to repay its debt of $6-7 billion worth of armaments for its half-defeated army. Big Russian companies like Lukoil have an interest in developing Iraq's promising oil fields.

The United States and Great Britain are on the other side of the barricade. Starting in the early 1990s, Iraq has been constantly present in US foreign policy, so everything spoken and written about this country and Saddam Hussein reminds one of Cato's aphorism, "Carthage must be destroyed." Most international analysts link the latest attack on Iraq to the beginning of impeachment proceedings in the US. They believe that Bill Clinton's attempt to strengthen his position by means of a quick peacemaking mission to the Middle East was a failure and that the only alternative remaining was a blitzkrieg in Iraq.

The British position, apart from obvious political interests and allied commitments, is attributed to London's resolve to prevent any further fall of oil prices. The cost of UK oil extraction is such that its profitability is questionable even now. A blow to Iraq could stop the steady world oil price decline.

Unlike Great Britain, Saudi Arabia is interested in oil costs being on a downward curve, so its leadership, despite their traditional loyalty to the US, unexpectedly condemned the bombing. This was another proof that oil dictates politics and that such politics depends not only on political affiliations but also on the market situation. In other words, no one can expect unquestioning loyalty from countries rich in oil.

It should be noted that the attack on Iraq, lightning though it was, had been planned long in advance with all the economic pros and cons carefully weighed. The port of Umm Qasr oil terminals near Basra were destroyed, further complicating oil export by the southern sea route and its being smuggling out of Iraq through Iran. However, this is not likely to damage the interests of the countries involved in the Oil for Food Program. As previously oil can be pumped through pipelines to Turkish Mediterranean ports, which will benefit Turkey as a US ally, although Istanbul greeted the air strikes without enthusiasm.

The diplomatic preparations were also quite thorough. Iraq never received the kind of support it had counted on even in the Arab world. In other words, the US operation was a tactical success, although it failed to postpone the impeachment proceedings. But strategically Operation Desert Fox can be questioned in many respects.

RESULTS

The results of the US air strikes are still open to question. The bombing made Iraq an even more attractive business partner. Oil remains its greatest asset. The country has been seriously demilitarized, which means that any further military intrusion is becoming less justifiable. The Security Council sanction is likely to be lifted soon due to growing opposition within the international community.

Iraq offers quite a range of opportunities for construction firms and is badly in need of consumer goods, medications, etc.

At the start of the operation discovery of new "effective" means to solve international problems was discussed - by bombing "wrong" regimes. I think that the US air attacks on Iraq will convince Washington that such actions hold little promise. Although neither the United States nor Great Britain was formally isolated internationally because of their actions in Iraq, the support they did receive was basically formal. It is interesting that President Clinton ended his December 16, 1998 message on the attack with "And may God bless America," while the Vatican described the US operation as an act of aggression. If responses to the strikes when they began were mixed, their end was welcomed by all.

There were heavy clouds over Iraq, followed by a thunderstorm, and now beginning another operation will be anything but easy. The predictions turned out to be unfounded. Nothing happened to Hussein or his regime. Today he needs only enough military potential to deal with the opposition, and the Iraqi dictator has it. Otherwise he seems content with the political dividends. And possibly with the economic ones, knowing that putting off the cancellation of sanctions will become still more difficult.

Much has been written recently that the attack on Iraq without the Kremlin's knowledge and consent signifies the twilight of Moscow's might. Less has been said about Moscow getting a tactical but nonetheless powerful trump. Now the Kremlin can pressure the IMF by threatening to withdraw from anti-Iraqi sanctions if the fund does not provide what Russia needs. And there is nothing anyone will be able to do about it. Formally, the US and UK were the first to ignore the Security Council's status. The Russians will block any comprehensive UN sanctions with its Security Council veto. And the West will gain nothing by acting unilaterally, because (a) the West is not likely to be unanimous on any such moves and (b) real Russian-Western cooperation is limited these days, Western assistance is insignificant, trade is paralyzed after the August crisis, and no understanding has been reached with creditors.

As for China, France, and the Arab states, Russia's withdrawal from the sanctions against Iraq would be an excellent example to immediately follow lest they lose their own positions in Iraq.

MORAL

The powerful world's position is more or less clear, and Iraq's destiny will be subject to long and complicated bargaining. Still, what has happened has created a precedent which in one way or another affects the interests of countries uninvolved in the conflict. This precedent will prove very important. It seems possible that by relying on military force one can ignore the opinion of most permanent Security Council members! In other words, a green light has been given to reallocating spheres of influence using force across the world, illegal as this is in terms of international law.

Is there any incentive for second echelon countries to join the disarmament movement? Definitely not. If you want to be respected you must not disarm; you must arm yourself well or join a powerful defense alliance. There is another way, less expensive but more gruesome: supporting terrorism, that is, to be prepared to repay instantly any diktat by force. Such logic does not make our world a safer place to live in. How is one to regard all this campaigning against "international terrorism," knowing that there is "state terrorism" which, although hushed up, is practiced on a far larger scale, costing human lives, and commited with impunity?

I want to emphasize the danger of not only using force, but also of any actions bypassing the existing system of political and legal containment and counterbalance, sidestepping the UN Security Council and norms of international law. Some may take a dim view of vetoes being cast by Russia, France, or China, but this is a perfectly democratic norm. If the United States and its allies stand for democracy and domestic political pluralism they must take a similar stand in the international arena. It would be wrong to consider international institutions like the Security Council as an obsolete computer unable to cope with the problems of the year 2000. It is just that a more effective vehicle to tackle the existing and hypothetical problems has not yet been developed. The modern world is built on competition, and the eternal conflict of interests. It is difficult to please everybody, so deals have to be made.

The act also has de facto incapacitated the very mechanism of international multilateral guarantees. Who can be sure now that the world's remaining superpower will not use force again contrary to the existing accords? There are no longer any restraining legal factors. Military factors? This would be a prologue to World War III. What real guarantees can Ukraine have under the circumstances? Suppose any new NATO member suddenly remembers about its "national interests" and claims part of Ukraine's territory? Who can guarantee that the United States will not come out in support of such claims the way Poland wholeheartedly supported the US attack on Iraq?

Another alarming fact is the scope of restrictions imposed on Iraqi sovereignty and lack of adequate response by the United Nations. I think that today's powerful integrationist trends have started questioning the notion of sovereignty prematurely. We should not forget neutral countries, which are not members of powerful military-political and economic-regional alliances. Could neighboring states or world leaders try to impose their will on them? What happens if, for example, the world's high and mighty present Ukraine with an ultimatum demanding closure of the Chornobyl station in 2000 without offering any aid? In other words, contrary to Ukraine's interests and actual capabilities? Would not Ukraine then find itself in a position similar to that of Iraq or Yugoslavia? Ukraine gave up the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and got practically nothing in return. It would seem that in general international structures should keep their interference within reasonable limits.

Major emphasis is still on how well the international community understands the vital economic interests of "all those other countries." It took Moses less time to guide the Hebrews to the Promised Land than it does the industrialized countries with their economic imperatives to get Black Africa out of the economic wilderness. In fact, other countries are included in that number, as evidenced by the world financial crisis. After all, Moses did lead his people out of the wilderness, so what possible conclusions can Ukraine arrive at, considering the situation?

Modern Western European researchers admit that even Marx in his teaching about the development of capitalism in Europe practiced a differentiated approach: Prussia and France went their own way, different from that of Great Britain, although all showed similar results. "How could one expect countries and regions with varying economic conditions, traditions, degrees of susceptibility to modernization to show identical results when adhering to the same scheme?" asks Serge Halimi in Le Monde Diplomatique (October 1998).

The United States has exported the Anglo-Saxon economic model all over the globe. Bill Clinton assures one and all that where there is trade there can be no war. The IMF, on the other hand, admits that the spread of capitalism as economic engineering securing other nations' culture and politics almost always leads to confrontation. Which of these statements is true?

The Ukrainian leadership may well find itself in an extremely unpleasant situation. On the one hand, in accordance with the investor's right to protection against disorder (submitted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in line with the Multilateral Investment Treaty), this government will be responsible for whatever happens to an investor, including civilian officials' conduct, protest actions, boycotts, anything that might hurt his business. On the other hand, it will be held answerable by the people for infringements on civil liberties.

Finally, what is to prevent Ukraine from being held hostage in the struggle of powerful countries for regional influence? What about the new hotbeds of Russian-US tensions in the Caucasus and Central Asia? Back in August 1997 the Russian President protested against the Caucasus being proclaimed an area of US national interests: "The Americans are beginning to penetrate this area and are not ashamed to say out loud that it is an area of their national interest." Boris Yeltsin stressed that settling the situation in the Caucasus must correspond to Russian national security interests. In the summer of 1998, President of the US Eurasian Foundation Mason pointed out that certain US experts are discussing the need to dispatch troops to the Caspian area to secure oil extraction. So where are the limits to such interventionism? How can this limit be set by a country striving to achieve a global hegemony, Mr. Mason wonders. Indeed, and what about Ukraine's economic interests, how are they considered in both cases, in view of the fact that both the areas mentioned happen to be this country's major energy suppliers?

Thus, Ukraine must not remain silent upon hearing such Cato-like slogans from the great powers or throw itself in the arms of its Eastern or Western neighbors, as proposed by certain Ukrainian lawmakers. Ukraine must state its stand loud and clear, lest it find itself in Carthage's place.