"The European Union is not a club of Christian states"

It is difficult to have an exact idea of the shuttle trade turnover between Turkey and Ukraine. Previous reports indicate $4000-5000 dollars per trader. The number of Ukrainians who visited Turkey in 1996 and 1997 was 400,000 and 300,000 respectively. In the first half of 1998 this figure further dropped to 77,000. Account should also be taken of the increasing number of Ukrainians who visit Turkey for purposes of tourism only. So, whatever the figures are, this type of trade is shrinking while Turkey's trade deficit with Ukraine is growing.

If bilateral trade between the two countries is allowed to follow a normal course, i.e., if high Ukrainian tariffs are lowered and non-tariff barriers eliminated, then this unrecorded trade will further decline and even disappear in favor of normal trade relations.

Since last June the Ukrainian government has been adopting a new set of measures aimed at eliminating the shuttle trade. The Russian Federation, for instance, has a different attitude. The shrinking purchasing power of individuals brought about by the financial and economic crisis seems to have prompted the Russian authorities to ease the shuttle trade regime. It is thus important not to lose sight of the social functions of such kind of trade relations.

On the other hand one could also question whether it would have been possible to achieve the same result in terms of employment opportunities created if the money invested in shuttle trade were to be invested as fixed capital in the Ukrainian economy. In any case, I think the shuttle trade should be viewed as a characteristic feature of transition economies.

There is an opinion, according to which Turkey is trying to take over the role of regional hegemony. Ankara is considered one of the leading members of Black Sea economic cooperation. What strategic purposes has Turkey set for itself in the region?

After Vietnam, with the exception of the Falklands and southern Africa, Turkey, by her geographical location, has been in the vicinity of almost all important armed conflicts and political crises which have caused great concern in the world. Just remember the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya. Bosnia and Hercegovina, Albania, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. Moreover, Turkey has historical, ethnic, and cultural ties to the peoples of this region. Being simultaneously a Balkan, Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Mediterranean, and Black Sea country all at the same time Turkey is in direct or indirect contract with this crisis-ridden geography. Hence, it attaches great importance to its being a factor of stability and balance in this complex region.

And concerning Turkey's accession to the European Union?

This remains one of our foreign policy priorities. As early as 1963 our country together with Greece first applied for associate membership in the EU. In 1974 Greece applied for full membership, but we considered ourselves not ready at that time. This was a mistake. In 1987 we again applied for full membership and still await a positive answer. There are a number of obstacles on our road to the EU. One is the special position of Greece and another the view by some in Europe of the EU as a Christian club. And 65 million Moslem Turks could change the EU's ethnic map. The EU would like to see our country democratic. But our geopolitical situation is not at all like that of Switzerland. Meanwhile, we believe the issue will be decided, for Europe needs us no less than we need Europe.

Ukraine and Turkey are the parts of the Great Silk Road, which is now reviving. Both countries pay much attention to the projects of Caspian and Middle East oil transport to Western Europe. But, unfortunately, the project has gone only as far as preliminary negotiations. How do you evaluate the prospects of erecting a pipeline between Ceyhan and Samsun with its being sent on to Odesa by tanker. What new projects have recently been developed in this sphere?

 It was Ukraine's proposal to build a pipeline between Ceyhan and Samsun to transport oil from the Middle East to Ukraine. The agreement on this was signed in June 1997. The Turkish side completed its ratification process in August 1997 and Verkhovna Rada ratified the agreement in December 1997 but deleted a most important provision related to Ukraine's obligation to transport through this pipeline oil in no lesser volume than 25 million tons annually. In our view this guarantee clause is indispensable for undertaking such an important and costly project. As a result of your Parliament's opposition to the guarantee clause, we now have two different ratified texts. In spite of this situation, talk has recently been resumed between competent firms in both countries.

Regarding Caspian oil, Turkey, like Ukraine, takes the view that it is appropriate and even inevitable that not one but multiple pipelines should be used to transport this oil to world markets. However, it is a fact that, at the initial phase where it is not possible to fully exploit the Caspian oil reserves and also because of declining oil prices, it might not be easy to ensure more than one export pipeline system. But with time, as the Caspian oil output rises, a multiple pipeline system will be necessary to transport it to world markets. Shipping oil to Odesa by tanker and then on to Europe might well be one of those routes. As regards the main export route on which a decision will soon have to be made, Turkey has its own project: the Caspian-Mediterranean Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

Recently a number of anti-dumping cases have been opened against Ukrainian exporters of steel and cast iron. What are the precise accusations against Ukrainian metallurgy? Were there any attempts made to find the solution to the problem at the interstate level?

After an anti-dumping investigation carried out in accordance with the stipulations of the Turkish Law for the Prevention of Unfair Competition in Imports, which was adopted in conformity with international trade rules, it was ascertained that semifinished iron and non-alloy steel products from Ukraine were being exported to the Turkish market at prices in violation of anti-dumping regulations. Consequently, a decision was taking in 1995 to impose, for a period of 5 years, an anti-dumping tax to the effect of adding $17 US onto per ton on the Ukrainian products in question. Turkey supports free and fair trade and has the right to take necessary steps, within the bounds of international trade rules, in order to protect its own domestic industries.

Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties affecting the world as well as Turkish market for iron and steel, Turkey continues to be a major importer of Ukrainian metal products.