Ukrainian elections: a bottom view
I drew a very important conclusion from my school draftsmanship lessons: front and top views do not show the full picture of an object – a side view and, in some cases, rear and bottom views are also needed. You can see that the “drawing-related analysis” is true when you hear some judgments passed by representatives of different sides (the authorities, the opposition, various parties, and the grassroots in various regions). The impression is that all these people took part in entirely different elections. As a modest pensioner (who, besides, lives in the provinces, not in Kyiv), I can only take a bottom (and perhaps a side) view of the elections, but the election picture would be incomplete unless looked at from these angles.
AUTHORITIES
Some governmental measures really helped the Party of Regions (PoR) to keep its rating high. Among them are public utility subsidies for the poorest and a certain pension hike. However, this only embittered those who had their pensions raised by a mere 20 to 40 hryvnias.
In fact, never before had the administrative and financial resource worked so actively and variously in independent Ukraine: pre-election “gifts” (i.e., hidden bribery) to voters from central and local authorities, as well as from some rich MPs, the riot police that defended the interests of the pro-governmental MPs, the destruction and forging of and tampering with documentation – this is by no means the full list of violations during the election campaign. At the same time, the circles that wielded political power also resorted to some hitherto unheard-of tricks. For example, many voters did not suspect that the elections were timed to quite a specific date – The Day of Ukraine’s liberation from the Nazi German occupation. Clearly, for the Regionnaires and Communists, who speculate on the military and Soviet theme, this was an additional chance to influence the hesitating voters. The footage of Yanukovych laying a wreath on this day was in fact an example of hidden campaigning, which is banned on the eve of and during the elections.
The authorities clearly staked in these elections on the radicalization and polarization of society as well as on the escalation of contradictions. The liberal TVi channel disappeared from the cable network in many regions, whereas one could watch Lviv’s ZIK channel without any problems in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and other cities east of the Dnipro. Ms. Farion and other Freedom candidates looked rather convincing on the silver screen and could prompt some to vote for Freedom and others for the Communists, the most avowed enemies of “fascist Banderaites.” Unfortunately, ZIK, quite an interesting channel, has already begun to vanish from cable networks in the east. Connecting other regions’ TV channels to the cable network is a good idea by itself. If Ukraine’s residents could watch TV channels from regions other than their own, they would better understand one another.
The First National Channel beamed “committed Soviet” films every day, but it showed not a single positive program about the Ukrainian national democrats who had fought against the Communist regime. This Soviet, mostly wartime-related, theme was good ideological support for, above all, the Communist Party of Ukraine.
The TV news bulletins on the First and Inter TV channels presented (“by mere coincidence,” of course) such experts on the most difficult issues as Azarov, Symonenko, and Korolevska (the latter even mouthed some extremely “valuable” phrase about Ukrainian shipbuilding).
Obviously, the webcam idea was also a ruse because the main rigging began after the closure of polling stations.
It would take too long a time to list all the overt violations and covert schemes and tricks.
OPPOSITION
It should be noted for justice’ sake that when the current opposition was in power, it also tapped the administrative and financial resources in the elections, albeit in a way that differs from what the PoR did this time. Yet, even in its best times, the Orange opposition did not have as much money as the PoR has. Sometimes the Orangemen were just stingier. For example, when the Orange and White-Blue leaders once visited Simferopol, those participating in the Tymoshenko rally were paid almost a half of what was paid for taking part in the Yanukovych rally. A friend of mine cashed in on both candidates but, because of different cash reward sizes, she favored Yanukovych.
The main opposition parties conducted their election campaign in different ways. Fatherland mostly used the brand of Yulia Tymoshenko. Ms. Tymoshenko’s frequent reminders about herself from prison partially helped to hold back a certain part of her electorate, but many remained fed up and even irritated with their idol’s never-ending misfortunes, all the more so that the conditions in which she is serving her sentence are apparently far better than those of many other prisoners. This especially irks those whose life at liberty is hardly better than that of Tymoshenko in prison. Yet the Fatherland bloc managed to muster a sufficient number of loyalists who are ready to vote for this political force in the absence of its leader. The PoR clearly did not expect this.
Vitalii Klitschko had some specific difficulties. He faced the opposition – overt or covert – of almost all the main political forces because they saw him as a real contender for the presidency. In the Crimea, some of those I talked to angrily called him “Orangeman” and nationalist, while in the western regions he was suspected as a covert Regionnaire. Wishing to position himself as unifier of the country (a very difficult but still accomplishable task in today’s Ukraine), Klitschko himself also tried to play on the uncertainty of his position. UDAR must have suffered the heaviest losses of voters in the last three or four days, when the Internet was awash with the information that he would most likely cooperate with the PoR. This pushed some of the young people and those who draw information from the Internet from him. UDAR failed to repel this attack in good time.
The reputation of being PoR henchmen politically killed Korolevska and her company. Voters proved to be shrewd in this case.
The Party of Regions has been quietly playing up to Freedom all the time since it was elected. The two parties jointly carried out some publicity stunts, such as the notorious May 9 clashes in Lviv, but only the politically sophisticated people noticed this, while many others were under the influence of Freedom people’s loud patriotic phrases.
The far right mostly received votes from the people who were disappointed with “Orangemen” (on which the PoR counted). But the PoR never expected the Ukrainian nationalists to achieve such a success, so now it must be reflecting on its further tactics. Freedom may be successfully used before the future presidential elections to discredit Vitalii Klitschko or the United Opposition candidate unless the latter bloc breaks up again, as well as to curb the opposition’s energy by initiating fine-sounding but practically useless actions, such as the impeachment of Yanukovych or, say, the construction of a Chinese-type wall among the Ukrainian-Russian border. But Freedom may stay off the “prescribed” path and begin to closely cooperate with the other opposition forces. This represents a grave danger for the PoR.
The Party of Regions also made a partly successful experiment with the Communists. We could say that the job is done if the United Opposition had polled fewer than 20 percent (psychologically necessary level) – in that case Symonenko’s rating could have been raised to the desired level in the remaining period of time. But it is clear now that this trick may come unstuck, so the PoR is feverishly looking for other options. By all accounts, one of them is election of the president in parliament, in which case Yanukovych will be elected for sure. Another option can be further escalation of tension with an abrupt strong-arm transition to the Belarusian version of “people’s democracy.” Incidentally, in difficult situations, the Belarusian “father of the nation” usually threatens to ask the people to express their opinion directly.
Naturally, the PoR was hurt by harsh pre-election criticism on the part of the Communists, but lovers’ quarrels were soon mended. If necessary, they will make peace in one day’s time.
THOSE WHO KEPT SILENT
And, finally, about the most numerous political force that accounts for about 43 percent of the voters. It is those who stayed clear of the elections. This group consists of various subgroups. The problem is that a considerable part of young people are not only politically inert, but also politically lazy. Many young people who do have some political preferences failed to show up at polling stations just because they were unwilling to do so for some reason. Or they may have been sure that one vote will not be able to change anything. At the same time, pensioners went in droves to the polling stations. Among them were even those who could barely walk across the street (they were afraid that their votes would be stolen if they voted at home). In the eastern regions, most of these voters voted for Communists.
Among those who stayed away from ballot boxes were also the ones who are not interested at all in politics and the ones who are disappointed with our politicians. Some were busy with things other than the elections – they had to earn a daily living for themselves and their children, some other have fallen so low from the social ladder that, looking up, they cannot understand how politicians can do this mad fuss; they cannot understand why they – both the government and the opposition – do not want to look down and try to help those who have reached, or almost reached, the bottom. These people are silent so far. But silence is not always the sign of agreement or indifference. The bottom is gradually accumulating more and more of our compatriots who may once form a powerful force that may break loose in a totally unexpected direction and bring down the current social ladder. Our politicians – those in power and in opposition – ought to remember this.
