Forward to Europe

The parliamentary elections in Ukraine have produced quite a predictable result but have in no way helped defuse the south east crisis. The Kremlin has said in the person of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that it accepts the outcome of the Verkhovna Rada elections, which does not matter at all either. Putin had repeatedly and publicly recognized Poroshenko as President of Ukraine, which in no way prevented the Russian army from invading the Donbas in August. Another aggression cannot be ruled out, especially after elections in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), which the Kremlin has also promised to recognize. It is no accident that a new Russian “humanitarian convoy” is heading for the Donbas – obviously, to provide the rebels and the Russians with ammunition before a likely attack. In these conditions, it is dangerous for Ukrainian politicians to drag out the coalition talks, for Ukraine will be particularly vulnerable to a military strike at this moment.

Following the example of Russian propaganda, the Poroshenko Bloc and Yatseniuk’s Popular Front have been dubbed “party of peace” and “party of war,” respectively. Yet it is absolutely unclear what should the third best finalist of the elections, Andrii Sadovy’s Samopomich (“Self-Help”) be called in this reference frame. To tell the truth, all the three parties, plus Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna, a likely fourth participant in the coalition, differ very little in terms of their ideology, if any. These are the parties of leaders, not ideas. By the European yardstick, all these formations would perhaps be considered center right. But none of them, even in case of entering the government, would favor an attack on Russia or even the resumption of   war in the Donbas. Differences between them are largely of a stylistic nature.

Poroshenko hopes (or pretends to hope) that it is still possible to reach a compromise with Putin. If the president of Ukraine only pretends to trust his Russian counterpart (which seems to be quite likely), this can be viewed as a diplomatic attempt to bide his time in order to strengthen the Ukrainian state and especially the Ukrainian army and to wrest some concessions on gas. But even in this case, the likelihood of Poroshenko managing to double-cross Putin remains open to question. But if Poroshenko sincerely believes that a compromise with Putin’s Russia is possible, it is really a dangerous mistake. What suits Putin is a fully-controlled Ukraine which recognizes the annexation of Crimea and has a semi-independent Donbas. And he sees neither Poroshenko nor the other leaders of a potential coalition at the head of a puppet Ukraine.

Unlike Poroshenko, the leaders of the Popular Front, Samopomich, and Batkivshchyna, who are not tied up with diplomatic conditionalities, allow themselves to use much harsher words against Russia and its president, which appeals to a considerable part of voters and ensured, to a large extent, the success of the Popular Front and Samopomich. But, in reality, the parties of Poroshenko, Yatseniuk, Sadovy, and Tymoshenko, as well as Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, are unanimous in the aspiration to keep this country’s territorial integrity intact, get back the occupied part of the Donbas and Crimea, and fight against the Russian aggression. They also wish Ukraine to become an EU and NATO member, which lays the good groundwork for a coalition agreement.

As for the domestic policy, differences boil down to the relationship with oligarchs. The Poroshenko Bloc, which represents oligarchic groups to a considerable extent, is prompting the state and the oligarchs, including those in the Donbas, to reach an acceptable compromise. Hence is their relative success in the elections. Ukraine’s president seems to hope that Akhmetov and his friends will eventually help him reestablish control over the occupied part of the Donbas. I think these hopes are illusory. Akhmetov, as well as the majority of Ukrainian oligarchs, would love to see Donetsk and Luhansk, where a lot of their assets still remain, placed under Ukrainian control again, forgetting that they funded separatists at the early stage. But it is no longer within their power, for those who rule the roost in the occupied part of the Donbas are not oligarchs or even separatists, but Putin and the Russian army.

The reputation of an “oligarchic democracy” quite tarnishes Ukraine’s image in the eyes of Western public opinion and has a negative effect on the level of foreign investments. As for relations with Russia, at least the Popular Front leadership harbors no illusions about the possibility of reaching a compromise with Russia as far as returning the occupied part of the Donbas and Crimea is concerned. What they are counting on is US and EU pressure on Moscow, a strengthened Ukrainian army, and, in the future, the achievement of economic independence from Russia – particularly from Russian energy resources.

However, differences about relations with the oligarchs and Russia (the two problems being closely intertwined) are unlikely to be critical for the formation of a coalition. What can be far more dangerous are personal ambitions of party leaders, a thing that has ruined more than one coalition in Ukraine’s contemporary history. And the Kremlin is now mainly staking in its Ukrainian policy on the growing contradictions and rifts between Poroshenko and Yatseniuk, which may eventually plunge Ukrainian politics into chaos. Putin hopes that the well-known scenario of a tough confrontation between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, which after all paved the way for Yanukovych to come to power, will be repeated. All we have to do is expect Poroshenko and Yatseniuk to remember the sad destiny of their predecessors and show a true ability to come to terms and restrain their own ambitions. They, as well as Samopomich and other parties that support the European choice, must stay united – at least until the end of a “hot stage” in the current conflict with Russia. As this stage may last for several years, it would be good if the newly-formed coalition existed until the end on the new Verkhovna Rada’s term. But this is an extremely difficult task.

The elections’ preliminary results show that Arsenii Yatseniuk should remain prime minister no matter what shape the coalition may assume – otherwise the government will not last more or less long. By all accounts, Poroshenko also banked on Yatseniuk as premier during the election campaign, intending to establish a broad-based democratic coalition in the new Verkhovna Rada. Obviously, the current premier could have only lost his office if the Popular Front gave a very poor performance in the elections. But, no matter how often party leaders may be saying that the main thing in a coalition is devotion to common values and the goal rather than distribution of portfolios in the government, it is this distribution that may become a stumbling block in the formation of a coalition. At present, the Popular Front and the Poroshenko Bloc can only expect a total 127 seats together in the multi-member constituency. With due account of winners in the first-past-the-post constituencies, Poroshenko and Yatseniuk will have 133 and 82 MPs, respectively, which is not sufficient for achieving the absolute majority to form a coalition. A coalition can only be formed in case of support from Samopomich which has already won 33 seats. Yet, to work effectively, the coalition needs to have a constitutional majority of 300 votes. More or     less radical reforms will perhaps require constitutional changes. Besides, the current Constitution does not say clearly about distribution of powers between the president and the premier in a number of cases, which always paves the way for conflicts between them. To remove the existing contradictions in this matter, one should also alter the Constitution. And, to form a constitutional majority, it will be necessary to induct into the coalition not only some of the 96  self-nominated first-past-the-post MPs, many of whom are the creatures of oligarchs, but also Batkivshchyna and perhaps the Radical Party. All this will reduce the coalition’s stability and effectiveness.

Should the Poroshenko Bloc – Popular Front coalition flop for some reason (much to the Kremlin’s joy), the presidential bloc will be able, in theory, to form a government with the help of Samopomich and some self-nominees. But the Lviv mayor is unlikely to opt for an alliance in which Poroshenko’s party will reign supreme. Another option is also quite possible, again in theory: the president’s bloc forms a majority, relying on self-nominees only. In this case, he will only be able to get some bills voted into law with the help of the Oppositional Bloc.

Let us hope that such exotic alliances will never occur. But still it is very dangerous to drag out the coalition talks. Russia may decide that political crisis is quite a good occasion for a full-scale military intervention under the flag of separatists. The formation of a coalition will show if the Maidan’s spirit is still alive or if Ukrainian politics is getting back to the customary condition of stupid endlessness.

Boris Sokolov is a Moscow-based historian and political writer