What is worse than the “phenomenon of Kochubei”?

Volodymyr Serhiichuk, a well-known Ukrainian historian, visited Den the other day and presented us with the two-volume publication Patriarch Josyf Slipyj in the Documents of Soviet State Security Bodies (1939-1987). Mr. Serhiichuk is also head of the international civic organization Eurasia Dialogue Platform. He immediately warned that it was not Dugin and that this organization was supposed to help people find mutual understanding and respect each other’s traditions, including those of religious nature. In his words, Chinghiz Aitmatov was the first to chair the platform and his [Serhiichuk’s] successor will be Mikhail Saakashvili’s mother. (Incidentally, the president of Georgia was once his student.) When we began to discuss the Ukrainians’ potential at the current stage, the historian wished he had brought another of his books, What Ukraine Has Given the World, on the contribution of the Ukrainians to the development of various fields of knowledge. He says this book has already been translated into English and Turkish – the Turks want to write the book What Turkey Has Given the World, so they launched the Ukrainian book’s Turkish edition in New York during the 2008 UN General Assembly session in the presence of Turkey’s president. The following interview with Volodymyr SERHIICHUK, Doctor of Sciences (History), a professor at Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University, is on what links history and the present day.

Mr. Serhiichuk, there was a time when peoples of the former Soviet Union were pinning great hopes on Ukraine as a potential No. 2 leader, but we then boggled down in our domestic problems and gradually slid off this platform. Do we have a chance to get back?

“We will have one if our national liberation movement leaders, who will come to real power, show a political will.”

…national liberation movement?

“Yes, for its program targets still remain unachieved.”

What is your attitude to the idea that Ukraine failed to carry out three revolutions to the end: the national liberation movement, anticommunist transformation, and the bourgeois democratic revolution?

“Back in the 17th century, when Ukrainian statehood was restored as the Hetmanate, it was also a national revolution, for there was a change in the governmental frame of references. Ukraine had in fact been a colony for centuries, and when Bohdan Khmelnytsky began to rule, albeit in three voivodeships only, it was a case of internationally recognized self-government – he signed a treaty with the Ottoman Empire in early 1649 on free navigation in the Black Sea.

“What is more, the hetman himself was aware of those radical changes, when he said to the Polish emissaries at Pereiaslav in February 1649: I am a prince in my own principality. This means Khmelnytsky was aware of his own participation in the formation of political power in Ukraine. It is also important that, when speaking to the Polish emissaries, he set the boundaries of a revived Ukrainian state: ‘I will drive the Poles beyond the Vistula, I will stand in the Vistula and say to the Poles: sit still and keep silent. And if you, so to speak, begin to buck, I am sure to find you. I will receive help from all our loyal grassroots as far as Lviv, Kholm, and Halych.’ From then on, the great hetman would always repeat this definition of the Ukrainian ethnic territory in his an aspiration to get back to the Vistula, the Kyivan Rus’ borderline.

“So that was a national revolution because the political power changed: our nation in fact regained the power it had lost after the fall of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia. For this reason, I consider it a completed mid-17th-century revolution. The trouble is that we, exhausted and drained of energy by a longtime war at the time, failed to reinforce the regained statehood because we found no support among our Orthodox brothers in faith who did and still do have a different goal – the concept of a Third Rome has not vanished and is assuming modern-day forms of revival or continuation. Moreover, some politicians, who enjoy the confidence of the Russian people, no longer confine themselves to the intention to reach the Vistula, seize the Black Sea straits and the Greek archipelago, which was part of the Third Rome concept, – Zhirinovsky is calling on Russian soldiers to wash their boots in the Indian Ocean (although this is regarded as a joke).

“This is why every Ukrainian politician, especially if it is a real nationally-conscious politician who is aware of his responsibility to history, his children and grandchildren, must understand that his political will can give an impetus to Ukraine’s future.”

There is an old saying: there was no hetman from Bohdan to Ivan…

“Yes, there is a saying like this. But I cannot accept it because we thus belittle the merits of at least two successors of Khmelnytsky – Ivan Vyhovsky and Petro Doroshenko – in state formation. Incidentally, Taras Shevchenko called the latter ‘the Ruin’s sun.’”

Bohdan was an educated person of his time and knew foreign languages. As is known, he learned Turkish in Turkish captivity. But there is another apocryphal story that belongs to that time. Frankly speaking, I do not know how it unfolded and to what extent it is apocryphal and true. It is about a dispute between Kryvonis and Bohun. When they were talking about the need to orientate to Muscovites as Orthodox brothers in faith, I think Bohun said it was better to lean to Turkey because its people had long been war-minded.”

“There was a conversation at the Pereiaslav Rada, but Bohun was absent, as were the other four colonels – of Vinnytsia, Bratslav, Uman, and Poltava.”

Why?

“At the moment, the Tatars were coming back from Zhvanets to the Crimea, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky did not want the repetition of a 1649 story, when the Tatars, who were returning from Zborow, began to take people into captivity. So we sent regiments to protect the frontier and prevent the Tatars from plundering Ukraine. But it is true that some people said at the Pereiaslav Rada that it was better to throw themselves at the Turkish sultan’s tender mercies. They also added: ‘Our choice will depend on what the envoys will be wearing and what gifts they will bring over. If the Muscovite envoys come with bast mats, we’ll be living on mats. If the Turks bring carpets, we’ll be sitting on carpets.’”

Today, this motivation, the image of a war-minded Orient, does not look so attractive, of course.

“Ivan Bohun was an avowed enemy of the Moscow tsar even during Ivan Vyhovsky’s hetmanship, when he saw that Alexei Mikhailovich was treacherously breaking his promise to respect the rights of the Ukrainian people, which he had made via his envoy Vasily Buturlin. Moreover, the tsar refused to take an oath to this effect and did not leave any written documents about these promises. After all, nobody signed any documents at Pereiaslav in January 1654.

“But I would like to get back to your question about the hetmans. Was Ivan Vyhovsky not an educated person? It is he who served as general chancellor under Bohdan Khmelnytsky, it is he who was in charge of international contacts. Incidentally, let us not forget that Vyhovsky was the only Ukrainian hetman who in fact signed not a single agreement with Moscow. In the fall of 1657 he even laid down his mace at a Cossack council meeting, refusing to accept the new tsarist conditions because he ‘did not want to be in captivity.’ And when he was reelected hetman for a third time in Pereiaslav, he promised to go to Moscow and sign a treaty there. But he never went to Moscow. So Ivan Vyhovsky was a worthy successor to Khmelnytsky, who, after all, fulfilled the latter’s testament. For who said that it was necessary to abandon the Moscow tsar? Bohdan Khmelnytsky did. He made this statement in October 1656 at Chyhyryn, when our envoys, who had just come back from Wilno, told the Cossack Rada that they had been kept out of the Polish-Muscovite negotiations which were in fact deciding on the destiny of Ukraine. The Muscovite and Polish envoys were dividing the Ukrainian lands for the first time, without asking our people for agreement, along the Western Buh, as proposed by the Moscow voivode. This was done even though the tsar’s envoy Vasily Kikin had visited Chyhyryn before to ask where a boundary should be drawn between the Ukrainians and the Poles and Khmelytsky replied in no uncertain terms: along the Vistula and the Hungarian border, as was the case in Ancient Rus’. In spite of this, Moscow, which believed that the Poles would hand over the royal crown to it at their own good will, proposed partitioning the Ukrainian lands along the Western Buh. This made Podlachia, the Kholm region, the Sian region, and the Lemko region a part of Poland. Those who did this never asked for the consent of the Ukrainian people.

“For this reason, when our envoys returned to Chyhyryn, Khmelnytsky convened a Cossack Rada. When the envoys said they had been debarred from the ‘ambassadorial house’ in Wilno, ‘as if they were dogs to be kept out of the church,’ Bohdan cried out at the top of his voice: ‘My children, do not be sad over this, I know what should be done – we must renounce the Orthodox tsar and submit even to an infidel one.’

“And Vyhovsky fulfilled this testament by signing the Treaty of Hadiach, when he saw that Poltava Colonel Martyn Pushkar and Zaporozhian Sich Kosh Otaman Yakiv Barabash were plotting a coup with support from Moscow Voivode Grigory Romodanovsky. So I would like to mention here what is known as ‘phenomenon of Pushkar’ in our history.”

Is it worse than the “phenomenon of Kochubei”?

“The phenomenon of Kochubei is typical of all nations. There are people in every nation, who want to win some preferences from the ruler by means of all kinds of denunciations.

“In my view, the phenomenon of Pushkar is terrible in that it means seeking personal gains by betraying national interests. This is the way Pushkar acted. He harbored a grudge over the fact that he was not elected hetman and Vyhovsky was put in the place of Yurko Khmelnytsky. It is no mere chance that Voivode Romodanovsky, who knew about this discontent, came to see him and hinted that, if Vyhovsky were removed from power, the tsar would give the mace to Pushkar. But Romodanovsky and the tsar’s inner circle must have estimated that Pushkar lacked forces, and Romodanovsky also went to the Sich, knowing that they were disgruntled with the election of Vyhovsky.

“Why was Vyhovsky elected in urbane Ukraine, not at the Sich? After Bohdan Khmelnytsky had formed a state in the shape of the Hetmanate, the Sich continued, for some reason, to consider itself the vanguard of the entire Ukrainian progress. The Sich did not understand that the true vanguard had already shifted to urban Ukraine, the source of people’s power, so it was necessary to coordinate all actions with the hetman. Yet the Sich wanted to remain the guiding and decisive force of our people, to be independent, and, in the long run, dictate Ukrainian policies.

“So Romodanovsky took advantage of this and promised Barabash the mace if Vyhosky was toppled. Barabash did not know that the mace had already been promised to Pushkar, while Pushkar was not warned that the mace would be given to Barabash. So both of them rushed to fight Vyhovsky for the mace, which was in fact draining Ukraine of energy but it was beneficial for the tsar because Vyhovsky turned to be pro-Western, to use a modern term: immediately after being elected, he renewed alliance with the Crimean Khanate and signed a treaty with the Swedish king.

“That was the beginning of the phenomenon of Pushkar. After wrecking Ukraine at the time, it resurfaced again in the 20th century as the phenomenon of Makhno. Who instructed Makhno to fight against Petliura, who awarded him the Order of the Red Banner? Lenin in the Kremlin did. This is the revival of the phenomenon of Pushkar in the 20th century. By all accounts, it has never vanished…”

Ukrainian society still has some time to revert to its own history. I think this is a very tough therapy.

“Naturally. It is sometimes even a shock therapy. We must take a true, sober appraisal of those who were hyped as heroes of our history. I oppose with might and main the glorification of Ivan Sirko. Why? Because Sirko was a swashbuckler who, in my assessment, stabbed Ukrainian statehood five times in the back. In the most critical moments of the formation of a Ukrainian Cossack state, Sirko was, so to speak, up and around, doing his utmost to make Ukraine lose. After the Battle of Konotop or when Doroshenko united the two Ukraines, Sirko suddenly marches on Chyhyryn to have a hetman elected to his liking.”

And what is the nature of this phenomenon?

“As a rule, it is about foreign influence. Why does Briukhovetsky go to the Black Rada, why does Left-Bank Ukraine suddenly wish to elect a hetman for itself? We ourselves tore Ukraine apart, prompted by Moscow voivodes. Why was it suddenly decided that Briukhovetsky, Kish Otaman of the Zaporozhian Sich, will be the hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine? The Sich had in fact nothing to do with urban Ukraine. But the tsar considered Briukhovetsy to be more reliable than the Left-Bank colonels who vied for this office. This is why he was sent to the Black Rada. He goes there, regularly reporting to the tsar on his march. Owing to the brute force of Zaporozhian Cossacks, he seizes power at the Black Rada… We ourselves tore Ukraine’s living body apart along the Dnipro.”

Many nations went through a period of feudal division which, in any case, was to finish one day. Why does it still continue in Ukraine?

“Speaking of this, one should take into account the particular mentality of the Ukrainian people. I think it is a very important point – the Ukrainian mentality differs from that of all our neighbors. Our mentality, character, customs and traditions are associated with crop farming, a non-nomadic way of material production. It is entirely different to fishery and hunting which was the occupation of, say, our northern neighbors. And cultivating the black earth had perhaps the greatest effect on the formation of Ukrainians. Natural and climatic conditions and, above all, the black earth, which no other nations have so much, played the central role in the shaping of our mentality. It is about the processes that occurred on our lands thousands of years ago.”

In other words, the black earth is our wealth and our problem?

“It is. Crop farming relaxes an individual by giving him or her a year of a more or less trouble-free life until the next harvest. Take the ancestors of our neighbors thousand of years ago – they were in motion all the time because they had to go fishing or hunting every day to keep themselves well-fed. The distant forefathers of the present-day Russians could not work the wonder that grows on our black earth: the fishers and hunters to the north of us did not know how to do something of the kind (the natural and climatic conditions did not allow this, either), they in fact made use of what loving nature produced.”

Now about the national democratic history. I can remember Yevhen Marchuk, the minister of defense at the time, saying that our helicopter people should be sent to Sierra Leone – that country placed a lucrative order and could provide an opportunity to train personnel. But the leader Yushchenko and his retinue said in reply: why on earth do we need this? We’d better go on lounging on the sofa and eating cakes. This mentality stays on today.

“Primitive as it may sound, this is true.”

Economic, military, and cultural expansion only adds up to what is inherent in people.

“It does.”

There are some problems that have emerged nowadays, but, of course, the point is not only in this. Every nation has gone through some periods, but what should come next is hard cultural work of all the ruling echelons. Look at the way the French state was being shaped in the Richelieu era. They used to say: one head, one king, and a guillotine for those who disagree. Rules were imposed at a certain stage, and that’s it. From then on, things kept going up and down. But it is dangerous to roll on the waves for a long time.

“They were busy making handicrafts. They began to build cities and develop trade earlier than we did. It is also a factor.”

Then a time came for us to convert to Orthodoxy.

“I agree with you.”

Russia and all the other oil-producing countries are having now the same, albeit differently looking, problems as the Ukrainians due to their big natural wealth. I agree to this. We should have learned to handle this wealth.

“I am writing a book titled The Ukrainian Black Earth. It is not about the chemical composition of the soil, it is about the geopolitical problems associated with the utilization and ownership of the fertile Ukrainian soil.”

But, on the other hand, if we make rational use of our riches, we can become a very powerful state.

“Then we can show our own dignity. I hope this will be the case thanks to the political will of true Ukrainian state-builders.”