15 years ago
We recently celebrated 15 years of living in our own state. This is a considerable chunk of time, so the details of our life under Soviet rule have been well erased from our memory, and many adults do not know a different world from the one whirling around us today. In the next 15 years the events before 1991 will have become “historical” ones, although young people have no interest either in the reminiscences of the older generation or history.
Let’s take a look at 15 years ago and examine, if only superficially, Ukraine’s religious life as it was then and compare it to the current situation. Let’s start with the fact that religious life in Ukraine, as well as business, gained the most from the “tectonic” social and political shifts of the past 15 years. This is most vividly illustrated by a comparison of the number of different religions, churches, confessions, parishes, monasteries, seminars, etc. in Soviet Ukraine and today’s Ukraine, which just celebrated its Independence Day.
Today it is difficult to believe that in the postwar years only 10 religious currents were considered legal in Ukraine. All of them suffered equally from the state’s brutal repression, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens. Today the Ukrainian authorities report more than 100 religious groups and movements.
The same can be said of the total number of religious communities and churches. Postwar Soviet policy was aimed at cultivating atheism and completely eliminating the “opium of the people.” Church buildings were destroyed on a large scale. In 1960 the Kyivan Cave Monastery was closed; most of the other monasteries had been liquidated earlier. At that time more than 1,100 religious communities were deregistered. The Greek Catholics probably suffered worst of all — they were forcibly joined to Orthodoxy, all their church buildings were handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and professing “the Union” was treated as a political crime and punishable by imprisonment, loss of civil rights, exile etc.
Things started to improve during the thaw, especially after the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Pope John Paul II. But a key role was played by Ukrainian believers in western Ukraine, who without waiting for official permission, initiated efforts to have their historical property restored and to revive church life. As of late 1989 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) had 200 churches, while the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) boasted 600 parishes (today this church has nearly 3,500). Both Greek Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians became flag bearers of the faith and Ukrainian national self-identification.
When independence was proclaimed, there were about 13,000 communities and organizations of various religious denominations registered in Ukraine, chiefly in the western oblasts. Approximately 1,000 communities represented the ROC in Ukraine (out of a total of 3,000 on the territory of the USSR). Many confessions actively started to develop their infrastructure. In this period there were 450 Roman Catholic communities, 1,200 evangelical Christian Baptist communities, and many others. As of August 1991 there were 12,962 communities registered in Ukraine.
When the churches emerged from the “underground,” society’s respect for religion, church, and the clergy soared. In the postwar years people simply had no interest in the church, and priests figured mostly in anecdotes. Since the early 1990s and still to this day the church has become the most respected institution for Ukrainian citizens whose level of trust reaches 70 percent in surveys. Unfortunately, the ensuing years proved that this respect has not always been merited. Some skeptics even believe that the high level of public confidence in clergymen is closely linked to Ukrainians’ deep-rooted mistrust of all state officials and institutions.
After 15 years of religious freedom, Ukraine has 32,186 religious communities and organizations. Orthodoxy still claims the largest segment of religious life in Ukraine. Orthodox believers have 5,863 religious organizations (51.5 per cent). It should be mentioned that the Orthodox community of Ukraine outnumbers that of Russia both numerically and structurally. Only 12,665 communities are registered on Russia’s territory (excluding Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic countries, and Western Europe).
If we examine the events of the fateful year of 1991, we must pay tribute to the intuition of the first Ukrainian president. Despite his communist past, Leonid Kravchuk instantly understood the state-building capacities of national Orthodoxy as well as the threat that would arise from the Ukrainian church’s subordination to Moscow. He did much (we can only guess how much) to gain spiritual independence together with political independence.
Unfortunately, not everything went according to plans, even despite the fact that President Yeltsin, unlike Vladimir Putin, apparently underestimated the political capabilities of the Moscow church. The bitter fact that Ukraine is still leashed to Moscow is unquestionably due to the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, its historically imperialistic tradition (not to mention the support of the state security organs), and its immensely wise hierarchs. That is why what happened — happened. In addition to political tribulations, ecclesiastical problems tumbled on the Ukrainian nation in the form of schisms, disgraceful divisions of Christians into canonical and non-canonical, traditional and non-traditional; Moscow’s disrespect for other churches; physical altercations over ownership of temples; the distancing of some clergymen from their people, and so on. Does the faith of Christ’s disciples teach this?
Ukrainians’ piety is another problem — piety that elicits suspicions of insincerity, of being just a vogue and a desire to show off one’s devotion. For despite the nearly complete “churching” of the population, the quality of interpersonal relations has improved barely perceptibly, if at all. Sometimes it seems that for many Ukrainians, especially in the east, the church has replaced Communist Party meetings, demonstrations with posters, and idolization of leaders.
What will happen to us, the church, and Ukraine in the next 15 years? Will our Orthodoxy occupy a worthy place both in our society and among ecumenical churches? Let’s not lose hope, ladies and gentlemen.
