Apropos of the “Sergian Heresy”

We recently learned about the contents of a document drawn up by the “pastoral council” of St. Michael’s Cathedral in Odesa (affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, ROCA). This document reflects the attitude of the local clergy headed by ROCA Bishop Agafangel of Tauria and Odesa, toward the negotiations underway between the Moscow Patriarchate and ROCA. These negotiations have been noticeably stepped up over the past couple of years. The above-mentioned minutes of the Odesa ROCA meeting is further proof that this church has a numerically strong and influential party with its own views on the terms and conditions of ROCA joining the “mother church” — i.e., the Moscow Patriarchate.
The document, drawn up in early 2005 and included on the duly registered Web sites of ROCA’s Odesa and Zaporizhia eparchies, and also available at www.portal-credo.ru , analyzes the various options of an accord between the two churches. Below is the slightly abridged text of this document; the individual in question is the head of the eparchy, Bishop Agafangel:
“In my view, the situation is such that we must immediately answer the main question, namely whether the ROCA should champion the principles upon which it was originally established and upon which it has existed for 80 years; or perhaps this issue has been exhausted in this historical period, so that we must somehow merge into the network of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Apparently the political situation in Russia has changed; the communist regime is no longer. But is this enough to say that any changes have occurred in the inner spiritual structure of the Moscow Patriarchate? I think that everyone will agree that a few years ago the spiritual structure wasn’t normal, that we were divided not because of the communist regime but because of what existed inside that church. Has anything changed since then? I believe that nothing has changed in principle, first of all, because the Moscow Patriarchate remains convinced that it can act independently of the government. At the same time, President Putin of the Russian Federation regards himself above all as the heir of the Soviet system (rather than the Orthodox empire). The only difference is that historical priorities dating from before the October revolution are being added to the Soviet ones. There is a hope that one day the government of Russia will return to its original set-up. But these are just hopes, not the realities.
After the fall of Orthodox secular regimes in a number of countries during the last century, all of so-called Universal Orthodoxy has been suffering from a profound crisis. In many respects this crisis is caused by the inability of the Orthodox world to adjust itself to an independent modus vivendi, without being aided directly and politically. The Moscow Patriarchate (unlike church confessors, such as Metropolitans Kirill, Agafangel, and Peter, who looked realistically at the state of the church in contemporary society and never acted against their moral dictates) has been trying to use the so-called “administrative resource,” even if this “administrative resource” is not an emperor crowned by God but any old government. In 1927 this resource allowed the Moscow Patriarchate to legally exist in the Soviet Union; since the 1990s it has been allowed to freely evolve under a different regime. The patriarchate isn’t truly independent even now; its future depends on what course that same administrative resource will take.
I believe that under the circumstances, all we can do is observe the course the Russian government takes, and afterwards, when the Russian government becomes truly and stably Orthodox, we can make such responsible decisions that place us in even the slightest way dependent on the Moscow Patriarchate and on this government. Another option would be to receive undeniable proof that the patriarchate is completely independent of the secular authorities, but this option appears less likely than the first one.
In Ukraine, an essentially new situation developed after the presidential election; it requires an altogether different approach that should be carefully considered and clearly defined. Here, among other things, the Moscow Patriarchate acted in support of that same administrative resource during the presidential campaign, with Patriarch Volodymyr’s blessings and the use of bribes (a fact that has been confirmed by documentary evidence), thus making a large number of people turn away from Orthodoxy.
To date the main result of our negotiations is the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate appears to have inferred that they can ignore us altogether. We are in a situation where ROCA says it is prepared to revise its historical pathway, with the Moscow Patriarchate adamantly refusing to make any such revisions. Hence, the only possible conclusion is that the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate remain bound by political commitments and are more engaged in politics than the search for the Truth.
And so, proceeding from the documents offered by the negotiating commissions, my conclusion is that all these documents currently fail to conform to the situation that has developed; therefore, their provisions should be recognized as unrealistic.” [End]
The necessity and relevance of everything stated above is underscored by recent publications glorifying and eulogizing Metropolitan Sergey [Sergius], with the Moscow Patriarch’s blessings and his own written foreword. Let’s not forget that a city square was named for him in Russia, as requested by the Nizhni Novgorod diocese, and that a statue will soon be unveiled in Arzamas. Meanwhile, a special commission should be set up to investigate his activities (particularly the letter that he sent to the NKVD in 1935, with a request to keep the legitimate hierarch Metropolitan Petro Krutytsky in prison).
Note: The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) is believed to have been founded in the early 1920s by Orthodox clergymen and adherents who found themselves outside Russia after the Bolshevik coup in November 1917. In the 1920s, after the Russian Orthodox Church made peace with the Bolshevik regime, all contacts between the ROC and ROCA were severed. ROCA still accuses the Moscow Patriarchate of Sergianism, ecumenism, and other major deviations from Eastern Orthodox canons. The most radical advocates of confrontation with the Moscow Patriarchate insist that the Russian people turned away from Orthodoxy and fell into heresy under Metropolitan Sergey. ROCA is not recognized by the Orthodox world; in turn it refuses to recognize almost all other Orthodox churches because they have violated church canons.