Public conscience emancipated at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
To average Ukrainians in both the Russian and Soviet empires, the events of 1654 in Pereyaslav, where a treaty “reunited” Ukraine and Russia, was something highly symbolic, even sacral. Several Ukrainian generations were required to know that this agreement between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Tsar of Muscovy, single-handedly had spared the Ukrainian people destruction by Polish aristocrats. Moreover, it had protected them from Turkish and Tatars raids, guiding them to the “correct” road of lasting unity with brotherly Russian people.
Plenty of myths, stereotypes, and quasi-historical generalizations have mushroomed on that “reunion” and surrounding events. A thick layer of allegations makes learning the truth an extremely difficult task. Today, pro-Russian political forces who seem to be close to the powers that be are trying to score a propagandistic coup from the commemoration of the 350th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, known in Ukrainian history as the Council of Pereyaslav, to be marked in January 2004.
Many agree that there is a need for a scholarly, document-based, unbiased analysis of what happened 349 years ago. On January 30, a round table discussion at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (K-MA) addressed this topic. Entitled, “The Treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654: Problems of Interpretation,” it was part of the Academy’s “Days of Science and Research.” Two leading researchers of the History Department, Professors Natalia Yakovenko and Yuri Mytsyk, along with noted historians Vitaly Shcherbak, Viktor Horobets, Taras Chukhlib, and Serhiy Lepiavko, launched an interesting and very topical discussion of a Khmelnytsky’s political problems, focusing on his neighbors: Muscovy, Rzeczpospolita (Poland), and Turkey. The round table also hosted experts from the National University, a number of other leading universities and colleges, and K-MA students.
The first batch of issues revolved around Natalia Yakovenko’s query: “Was the Treaty of Pereyaslav an element of Khmelnytsky’s political scheming or an inevitable move?” In other words, were there any practical alternatives and if so, what were they? Prof. Yakovenko noted that reducing the Pereyaslav Treaty’s role to that of one of many possible diplomatic moves would be a considerable understatement. She felt sure that “the event was inevitable, beginning in 1651” and that one ought to pay special attention to the role of Eastern patriarchs exerting a great deal of influence on Khmelnytsky at the time.
Another issue causing lively debate was the idea put forth by Taras Chukhlib. He described a “multivassal policy,” when a single ruler such as Khmelnytsky could have patrons in the East, West, and South. It would be interesting, those at the round table pointed out, to add this policy, which some jokingly called the “multi-vectoral 17th century” to the broad Pereyaslav context. To Vitaly Scherbak, one thing was obvious. “The very domestic political situation of Cossack Ukraine made Khmelnytsky turn to Moscow for an alliance.”
The round table also examined the Treaty of Pereyaslav from the view of conformity to Cossacks’ traditions. They had always demanded three compulsory conditions with every agreement. First, the agreement must be transparent, with no secret conditions. Second, both parties are equals who will agree to compromise. Third, the treaty contains clearly defined methods of implementation. When the Cossacks demanded the tsar’s representative to swear to perform the requirements of the agreement, the envoy, Boyar Buturlin, told them, “The tsar never swears allegiance to his subjects in Muscovy. This has never happened, and nor shall it ever happen.” This act calls into question the legitimacy of the Pereyaslav Treaty, considering the Cossack historical and cultural tradition. Chukhlib said such a question ought to be discussed. Finally, Viktor Horobets pointed out that three councils were actually held that day.
Ukrainians badly need a new interpretation of actions such as the Treaty of Pereyaslav which played such a crucial role in our history. Such new ideas can help “emancipate” our archaic public consciousness. It can help us reach conclusions. For example, finding foreign allies is not always best, that we ought to proceed after examining our own domestic political problems.
