On Russia’s objectives in its war against Ukraine

We are in war with Russia, even if the state of war has not been officially declared and legally established yet. This ambiguity is in line with customs of our time, and is part of the definition of the so-called hybrid war. People turn therefore to using substitutes, like “conflict,” “crisis,” etc. However, the aggressor’s troops have actually invaded our country, and it is necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions.

I covered the military and diplomatic components before, so will need to pay attention to other components now.

As an armed conflict and the continuation of politics by other means, any war should have a strategic goal, like the seizure of foreign territory, the acquisition of some advantages in trade, etc. An example of the latter is the so-called Opium Wars, waged by European powers on China. With a few exceptions, no Chinese territory was seized, but the Chinese government was forced to comply with imposed trade agreements that gave huge trade preferences to European countries, primarily the UK.

What were the objectives pursued by Vladimir Putin as he started the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has transformed into a virtually open intervention by now? The answer is not as simple as it seems at first glance.

In a show on the Moscow-based Dozhd TV, political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky said that Putin’s thinking was one of tactician, not strategist. Having taken some steps in the domestic and international politics and depending on their outcome, he goes on to following steps, often in the opposite direction. Putin’s phrase that the annexation of Crimea was carried out literally impromptu is an indirect confirmation of this characterization. They tried to destabilize the situation on the peninsula, succeeded in it, and, facing a weak reaction of the unsteady Ukrainian authorities and the world taking too much time to grasp such impudence, Putin decided to quickly steal a part of another nation, like a real international gangster. At first glance, it turned out well, and so they decided to act in a similar way in the Donbas. It was a typical knee-jerk policy without a clearly defined objective, aside from one, but it was all-important: indefinitely long preservation of autocratic regime. Mathematically, it is a so-called non-constructive theorem. It features a correct proof that something exists, but offers no way to make it exist. This is where Putin’s problems start.

Objectively, the Kremlin has no good reason to engage in a conflict with Ukraine and worse still, invade it. Ukraine’s European direction of foreign policy, to be supplemented with Euro-Atlantic (that is, NATO) aspirations after a while, poses no threat to the economy, finance, and especially security of Russia. After all, the Baltic countries and Poland are members of the EU and NATO, border Russia near St. Petersburg, and the Russian state is not harmed by it in the slightest. NATO itself is in fact a purely defensive alliance, unwilling to fight Russia and lacking compelling reasons for it.

It would seem that truths of such simplicity have to be perfectly understandable for the Kremlin. However, the opposite is true.

Domestically, Putin’s regime is decaying. The country’s energy resource leverage is weakening. Oil output is not growing, and, in fact, will start dropping next year. The gas situation is equally bleak, especially since Western sanctions have blocked the delivery of equipment and parts for it. Additionally, rapid wearing out and frequent replacement of a large part of the active equipment in oil and gas wells occurs due to technological factors that cannot be changed so far. Hence, the falling output will bring a reduction in the Russian budget revenues and the resulting problems.

Psychologically, Putin and his entourage are dead set against reforming the country. They are frightened by the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev’s insubstantial changes in the Soviet system were enough to collapse it. Putin does not want and fears a replay of these events, so the country’s conservative tendencies prevail, supported by a large part of the military, the secret police, the bureaucracy and the Russian Orthodox church.

However, such policies do nothing to increase budget revenues. The poorly implemented militarization of the country, the inevitable increase in energy extraction costs and export marketing expenses all require a set of very specific measures to consolidate the regime and its neighborhood. Like other authoritarian rulers, these have turned to foreign politics.

In view of the fact that Ukraine had seen the Euromaidan and overthrow of the Yanukovych regime, it seemed the preferable target for aggressive actions. At the same time, other border countries such as Kazakhstan also took note that they had no immunity against such aggressive action.

In contrast to Crimea, the Kremlin does not need the Donbas in any shape, even as another Transnistria. Should Russia act along these lines, it will need to supply the region with everything while it cannot even digest Crimea, and its financiers are horrified by the thought of this financial black hole.

There are two variants of the possible actions for the Kremlin.

Firstly. Boris Nemtsov wrote in New Times that Putin seeks a partition of Ukraine. “There are people asking what Putin seeks in fighting with Ukraine? He said it all himself: ‘We need to start negotiations on the political organization of society and the statehood forms in the south-east of Ukraine.’ So, Putin sought dismemberment of Ukraine and the establishment in the east of the puppet state of Novorossia which would be under full economic and political control of the Kremlin. For this purpose, he sends troops, including paratroopers and Kadyrovites, delivers weapons and military equipment to eastern Ukraine, and made isolation and sanctions against Russia inevitable. For this paranoiac purpose, Russians and Ukrainians are dying... But there is another explanation.

“Putin’s bloody actions in fomenting a fratricidal war help him to achieve the main objective, which is to keep the personal power and money at any cost. Ukraine gave an example of the anti-crime revolution which overthrew a thieving president. Oh, you dared go out and overthrow your president? Ukraine should be punished for it, so that, God forbid, Russians harbored no thought of doing a revolution.”

Secondly, Marat Gelman quoted (also in New Times) Vladimir Lukin, who promoted the human rights in Russia once upon the time. “Forget about the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The objective is to explain Poroshenko that he cannot win. Our invasion is still very low in numbers, but the numbers will grow until Poroshenko realizes this and comes to the table of negotiations with Putin’s designated interlocutors, who completely obey him. These same people will create a political wing of the separatists in Kyiv today (they may have already created it for all that I know).” According to Lukin, Donetsk, Luhansk, and other cities will remain a part of Ukraine as a guarantee of its inability to join NATO. The federalization demands’ objective is to make the country’s accession to any alliance dependent on the results of referendums held separately for each region, so that any of them has powers to block the entire country from joining.

A similar opinion is held by director of the Institute of Ukrainian Politics Kostiantyn Bondarenko. In his article for Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he noted that “they create conditions that the Kremlin can use to force Ukraine into negotiations. The negotiations may have two primary conditions: the preservation of Ukraine’s non-aligned status, that is, staying away from NATO, and the federalization of the country.”

Both options are by and large in agreement with each other and reflect the lack of a clear Kremlin plan in respect of Ukraine. If the Donbas’s secession happens, albeit in the form of a large Transnistria-like “state,” it will open new opportunities. The key is to destabilize Ukraine, reducing its territory and establishing overland connection with Crimea. Russian troops are to act as guarantors of the creating and consolidation of the situation, requiring them to be disguised, for example, as peacekeepers. There will be no international mandate, but the Kremlin will disregard it at this stage. If the Ukrainian army goes on offensive, it will have to shoot at the so-called peacekeepers, replaying the circumstances existing before the Georgian War of 2008. Russia will “need” to protect these troops, and it will be Russia’s explanation for its own population why body bags keep coming from Ukraine. After all, there is no way to keep Russia’s invasion secret for long.

If for some reason this aggressive plan will not work, Russia will blackmail Ukraine by threatening a war of attrition. Russian troops in the Donbas will increase in numbers, and hostilities will engulf most of eastern and central Ukraine. Do you oppose the war? Agree, then, to the conditions put forward by the Kremlin.

None of these plans will be implemented in its pure form. Rather, we are dealing with a combination of them. The role and weight of components will vary depending on the circumstances. Much will depend on the internal situation in Russia. How quickly will chauvinistic haze, now intoxicating much of the population, go away under the influence of a variety of circumstances, including some soldiers’ reluctance to fight in Ukraine? Some of them, according to the information available, would prefer to resign from the army, and the shortage of manpower in the Russian divisions looks like a very good reason to de-escalate the conflict.

How should the Ukrainian government act?

Firstly, it is very clear that there has been no strategic plan for Ukraine, and tactics change due to specific circumstances. The Kremlin’s declaration is nothing more than outright blackmail and an attempt to put psychological pressure and engage in all kinds of provocations. If so, the military component of the war will come to the fore. Ukraine’s military success depends on the government’s ability to fundamentally change its approach to the war.

Secondly, talks in Minsk, as well as any other, should be conducted solely on technical issues, such as the release of the hostages and the exchange of prisoners. Everything else is our internal affair which we may not discuss with the aggressor.

Thirdly, rejection of non-aligned status should immediately become a law, as should recognition of Euro-Atlantic integration as the nation’s long-term goal. We should listen to what our European partners have to say, but to act based on our interests.

All of this in combination with the pure military strength factor would be the best answer to all the aggressive plans of Putin.

If the master of the Kremlin wants war, he will get it, and we will see then who will blink first.