Both here and there

All over the world, political forces are conventionally divided into those that are in the opposition and those that are pro-government. But in Ukraine, some daring politicians contrive to be in both camps at the same time. Like the proverbial monkey, they rush about between the intelligent and the beautiful. The Communists are an illustrious example of this.

Petro Symonenko has recently demonstrated exceptional prowess at walking the political tightrope. He contrives to be part of the coalition and use opposition-style rhetoric at the same time. Having helped his son Andrii to assume a governmental office as deputy chairman of the State Investment and Development Agency, he nevertheless criticizes the Azarov Cabinet for raising gas prices and public utility rates. He is also threatening capitalists with unlimited actions of popular protest.

The whole point is that this rhetoric has yet to trigger a reaction from the Party of Regions. “We are not going to get rid of the Communists,” the capitalists in the Party of Regions reassure.

This creates the impression that a secret deal was struck: the coalition is one thing and the elections another. In the view of Volodymyr Fesenko, director of the Horshenin Institute and esteemed Ukrainian political scientist, the Communists and the Lytvyn Bloc are given a certain “lag,” a certain freedom of political and ideological maneuvering.

“I cannot say that there are any official deals or political schemes,” the political scientist muses. “I just think that the two sides have agreed that there is a certain freedom to criticize somebody or something. Symonenko criticizes Tihipko and some ministers, but refrains from criticizing the president or the prime minister. I think they are aware of some kind of coalition discipline and limits of action and criticism. The criticism of Symonenko and Lytvyn Bloc members is, most likely, a pre-election tactic which does not break coalition agreements.”

Tihipko also tried to distance himself from the unsuccessful Tax Code.

“Tihipko is ideologically and politically dual. He is in a more difficult situation, as he belongs to the executive branch. His room for maneuvering is very limited. While the Communists and the Lytvyn Bloc can distance themselves from the government, Tihipko is deprived of this possibility. There is also a psychological factor: Tihipko is in charge of the economy and reforms. He bears the responsibility for many unpopular decisions, both as the IMF negotiator and a person who advances ideas for economic reforms. So he cannot oppose the gas price hike. From this angle, he is in a far more difficult situation.

“Generally speaking, Tipipko’s behavior often resembles that of an exemplary Young Communist League member. Do you remember the well-known slogan ‘The Party said: ‘You must,’ the Komsomol answered: ‘Yes.’ The president or the prime minister has made a decision, Tihipko says: ‘Yes!’

“As for the Tax Code, it illustrates his current status in the government. He does not have any real clout. The code was drawn up by the Tax Administration and the Ministry of Finance and is not quite in line with the ideology and political attitudes of Tihipko himself, so he is criticizing it. But, it is also becoming clear that he has no impact on this process. Kliuiev and Kolesnikov exert far more influence on drafting the code. And, by all accounts, it is they who will shape this document.

“Tihipko is trying to distance himself from this code because he depends on the support of the business community.”

How effective are criticisms of the government? Doesn’t the Communist electorate understand that Symonenko is actually making a deal with Kliuiev while pretending to stigmatize capitalists?

“I do not think most of Symonenko’s voters know or will ever know that he is making deals with Kliuiev or anyone else — except perhaps for those who are extremely interested in politics. I think the goal of the Communists and the Lytvyn Bloc is not so much to enlarge as to preserve their electorate. Both have suffered losses, especially the Lytvyn Bloc. Their voters have mainly sided with the Party of Regions. This is the paradox of entering into a coalition with the ‘regionals.’ The Socialists fell victim to this kind of coalition, and the Lytvyn Bloc and the Communists are reenacting their woeful fate. The Communists have a stauncher electorate, but they are still threatened. So they try to distance themselves, retain their voters and, if possible, win back some of those who defected to Yanukovych.”

Some believe that the socioeconomic situation and increased public utility rates may cause the Party of Regions to lose voters. Who will these voters go to?

“This is an open question. In all probability, they will ignore the elections altogether. Some may side with political forces that are close to the Party of Regions. It remains to be seen if they will manage to seize this chance. The Communists, the Lytvyn Bloc, and Strong Ukraine will all have some opportunities. A part of these voters may also side with the opposition. This is also possible.”

But the opposition is keeping a very low profile. Tymoshenko has not been seen for a long time.

“Tymoshenko is recovering, both literally and figuratively. I think we will see a militant Tymoshenko in September or even in late August, when she will call on people to stage protests, including a rally to be held in front of the Verkhovna Rada on September 7.”

Do you think it is a mistake to announce this kind of rally almost a month in advance?

“I also have some doubts. Firstly, the first announcement was made in the heat of a ‘dead season.’ Secondly, this announcement should be made again in late August or early September. This also requires serious organizational work. As far as I know, the BYuT headquarters is not working now. All are away on vacation, including Ms. Tymoshenko herself. Will they have enough time and strength to prepare this action? If it is to be haphazard, what is the sense? There is a real danger that it may be a false-start.

“One more problem: people are about to receive new utility bills, which may aggravate the subsidy problem in September. Perhaps the peak of this critical mood will occur in the middle, not the beginning, of the month.

“Much will depend on how the subsidy campaign and information will be organized.”

What can cause a greater discontent: utility bills or the infringement of freedoms?

“I am afraid the grassroots are far more concerned about higher pubic utility rates and a higher pension age than about the freedom of speech. Much more indeed! For entrepreneurs, the tax code problem is more topical. Freedom of speech is a concern for a minority — intellectuals and representatives of the liberal professions. Conversely, social policy worries far larger target groups. For this reason, the opposition will now be playing on social issues, which is right and natural. They need to make use of them. Whether they will succeed remains to be seen.”