The New Power

The start of 2005 coincided with the beginning of a new political period in Ukraine. Such coincidences offer an apt opportunity to sum up the past year and contemplate future prospects.

The term “new power” has been firmly ensconced in the political lexicon, and in the public consciousness, expectations of changes for the better, carefully nurtured by the leaders of the “Orange people,” who assure that the new government will be essentially different from the old one. These are very promising declarations and one wants to believe in them.

Meanwhile, the notion of new power remains subject to various assumptions and interpretations. To this end, it would be useful to try to ascertain exactly what this means, so that in the future there will be no disillusionment resulting from unrealized hopes or euphoria from imaginary successes.

MAIDAN: A COUP OR A REVOLUTION?

What caused the recent stormy events and imposed such exacting requirements on the new government?

There are two versions explaining the dramatic events of December, which can be conditionally categorized as “conspiratorial” and “public.”

The advocates of the first version maintain that the Maidan was the result of implementing Western campaign technologies aimed at destabilizing the former political regime and dragging Ukraine into the system of its geostrategic interests. Hence the “conspiratorial” version, which emphasizes that, apart from the openly declared objectives of fostering democracy, the West was pursuing certain obscure goals. To advocates of this version, the Maidan phenomenon, which refers not so much to the name of the square in Kyiv as to the manifestation of a spirit of rejection of the existing regime, is nothing but an “Orange coup” and the new government is thus illegitimate.

The “conspiratorial” version corresponds to mental stereotypes of the post- totalitarian society, whereby the roots of “velvet” revolutions should be sought in deceit on the part of the West, which implements its interests with the aid of special technologies. To corroborate this, reference is frequently made to Gene Sharp’s book From Dictatorship to Democracy, which claims to be a handbook of nonviolent resistance. Those who believe in the “public” version insist that the Maidan was the result of consolidation and self-organization by people who finally realized the need to defend their civil rights. They believe that the “Orange Revolution” testifies to the birth of a civil society and democracy in Ukraine. They say that the reasons for this revolution should be sought not in the West’s secret treachery but in the corruptness and ineffectiveness of the old regime, and that the falsification of the elections was only the catalyst for social protest.

Advocates of this version are convinced that Ukraine, by offering democratic resistance to the regime, has made a breakthrough in its social evolution. On this romantic persuasion rests the uncompromising nature of the Maidan leaders, who insist that Ukraine is on the threshold of forming a new government and entering a new spiral in its historical progress. From coup to public protest: such is the range of complex debates on the causes of the “Orange events.”

This black-and-white approach can hardly be instrumental in comprehending what has actually come to pass. Practice shows that such rigid interpretations of complex social phenomena are more often than not counterproductive, in that they facilitate the formation of inadequate perspectives of the political process.

Suppose we consider the hypothesis that the “Orange events” did not signify a coup and that there are also no grounds to state that this was a revolution. The Maidan phenomenon has certain elements pointing to “conspiratorial” technologies, yet reducing everything to these would mean consciously ignoring clearly apparent social and economic factors that brought it about. On the other hand, one must state that there was no revolution. What happened on the Maidan can be described as a revolution only inasmuch as those directly involved wish to regard it as one.

Let us now analyze the circumstances that compel us to arrive at this outwardly controversial conclusion.

Adepts of the “conspiratorial” version try to reduce what happened on the Maidan to a technological project largely because their train of thought is, to start with, aimed at finding an answer to the question, “Who is behind all this?” This mentality is typical of a post-totalitarian society that is mastering a market model of conduct where social relationships are evaluated in terms of purchase and sale. One is reminded of Gorbachev’s perestroika and how its failures were attributed to treacherous CIA operations. Applying this logic, the Maidan phenomenon took place because someone paid for it.

It is true that representatives of the so-called nonviolent resistance movement were actively operating in Ukraine and this fact supports the views of those believing in the “conspiratorial” version. Opinions voiced by the leadership of the Ukraine’s Pora and related organizations are rather extensively represented in the information space. It is also a fact that their technologies were stunningly successful.

Without denying the fact of the presence of carriers of nonviolent resistance technologies, however, the question whether it is possible to change a given society by using simple technologies remains open. Technologism’s claims to controlling social processes are generally known, but these claims are controversial in many respects. There are a number of political science studies that point to certain limitations of technologism. So what happened in Ukraine is not unique. To accept the “conspiratorial version” would mean to agree that someone did create the Maidan phenomenon. Yet everyone who was on the Maidan in those days feels sure that these allegations are groundless, regardless of who comes up with them.

The apparent confusion in the actions of the “Orange” leaders in a number of cases is further proof that what happened on the Maidan was not the result of conspiratorial technology.

Finally, one ought to remember that the Maidan phenomenon emerged in many ways as a response to specific technologies applied by Viktor Yanukovych’s campaigners, which were neither transparent nor morally correct.

In this sense the hypothesis that the Maidan phenomenon is inherent in any political crisis appears justifiable. I would hazard the opinion that organizing the Maidan did not require a perusal of Sharp’s book; it was enough merely to remember examples from early twentieth-century history. One can find countless technological, symbolic, and aesthetic parallels to what happened in October 1917. What the managers of the “Orange events” refer to as “horizontal communications” in their public appearances, the Bolsheviks called “propagandizing,” using an old-fashioned notion.

The “Orange” campaigners applied a “network organizing principle,” which was also used decades earlier — for example, to organize workers’ Marxist study groups. Orange ribbons became fashionable in Kyiv in 2004; red ones were sported by Bolshevik commissars in Petrograd in 1917. At the time a conflict was being waged between the “reds” and the “whites; in 2004, it was between the “Oranges” and “white-and-blues.” If one adds the colorful detail of people on the Maidan being served sandwiches from Mercedes 600 limos, you will also spot parallels. Look up Aleksey Tolstoy’s The Road to Calvary and Bulgakov’s The Days of the Turbins.

As we can see, the logic of history is a constant and only the forms change. Therefore, many Russian political scientists and politicians are casting aspersions on Kyiv and Tbilisi, fearing that such conspiratorial technologies of distemper will be exported to Russia. Lashing out at Western funds and US philanthropic billionaires, they obviously miss the target. All it takes to reach the conclusion that there is nothing new under the sun is to explore the October Revolution Museum from a somewhat different angle.

Thus, the allegation that what happened on the Maidan was the result of conspiratorial technologies is questionable.

However, the same is true of the assumption that the Maidan was a revolution. Why? Because a revolution requires an ideology and program to carry it out. Finally, revolution calls for parties and public movements as structurally organized carriers of its ideology.

None of this ever took place on the Maidan. The coalition Strength of the Nation is a symbiosis of various parties whose ideology is known perhaps to a narrow circle of political scientists. Also, few can distinguish between the campaign programs of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. The Maidan also greeted Oleksandr Moroz who, according to the strict tenets of political science, was an opponent of both candidates.

Further proof that the Maidan was, so to speak, nonrevolutionary, is the absence of political demands. The Maidan demanded justice and protection of constitutional rights, which can hardly be called political demands.

One can’t help but infer that what happened after November 21 was most likely a systemic political conflict that was resolved through a consolidated effort.

Skeptics who insist that no political nation, civil society, etc., was born on the Maidan appear to have a point. The term “revolution,” so beloved by “Orange” activists, sooner means a desire to assert new moral values in politics, a desire to distance oneself from the old authoritarian regime. Here indeed lies the Maidan’s creative strength.

WHAT IS “NEW”?

To answer this question, it is necessary to ascertain what was so negative about the old regime. This is easier said than done.

A system of administration and a certain style of political relationships were formed in the years of independence; objectively speaking, this system proved capable of mobilizing resources at critical points to neutralize the negative aftereffects of the Soviet Union’s collapse, particularly during the economic crisis in the mid-1990s and in time of economic growth. This system was in many respects asocial, based on oligarchic dominance, but it is also true that this system was not loath to apply certain democratic procedures, owing to the competition between the various oligarchic groups.

As time passed, this system was no longer able to meet the requirements of social progress, and this accelerated the processes of degradation of state and administrative relations. The old regime was actually no longer capable of implementing state policy. Countless enactments, programs, and concepts were adopted, but they existed only on paper; none of them were carried out because of red tape, and personal and institutional conflicts of interests among individual bureaucrats and financial-economic groups.

Gradually, the government focused on its own problems, and the tasks aimed at changing the state of affairs in such vital spheres as science, medicine, education, and economy were marginalized. Not surprisingly, political reform turned out to be the only large-scale project the regime took seriously, although it boiled down to an attempt to revise the constitution in terms of reallocating powers among the central agencies of power.

“Politics” itself also gradually degraded, its competence reduced to relationships between individual politicians and groups. Nor is it surprising that the Ukrainian media lack a taste for systemic problems. Most are eager to know who is backing up whom, who is on whose payroll, and the like. Under the circumstances, no one needs political or economic analysts because the readers want psychoanalysts, biographers, paparazzi, people who can plant eavesdropping devices under couches, etc.

People are expecting something special from the new administration precisely because of the degradation of public policy; here the emphasis is on the condemnation of past immoral practices.

Hence, the first requirement of the new political system: administrative relationships at the central and local level must be legally formalized and kept transparent. Governmental and political activities must no longer be conducted in secret or dominated by group interests. This will be the first step to overcoming corruption.

The next principal question facing the new government is how to deal with the administrative and governing heritage?

The winners have inherited a ramified administrative system, even if it is nonfunctional in terms of reaching targets of true national importance, which is quite convenient in serving corporate interests. This system is geared to benefit an individual or a group. Without a doubt, this system is prepared to demonstrate its loyalty to the new boss. The “Oranges” are generally convinced that the current situation calls for cardinal changes. But what should be changed: the system or the people who represent it? This is the most important question for the new Ukrainian decision-makers. In other words, should they use the institution of the presidency in its current form and defer the changes to the constitutional principles of its functioning, or set about building a parliamentary- presidential model to prevent a concentration of power? This is a tricky question, and it is safe to assume that it will cause heated debate and may well result in tensions within the victors’ camp. The first sign of conflict appeared when 61 members of parliament submitted an appeal to the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of Bill #4180 passed by the Verkhovna Rada in December and introducing amendments to the Fundamental Law.

Indeed, it is up to the winners to decide which model — president- or parliament-dominated — suits Ukrainian society best; it is a matter of the victors’ political responsibility. At the moment it is important to note that the winners lack unanimity, and that a “new power” is out of the question unless everyone feels sure that they have made the right choice in this key matter.

Therefore, from the political science angle “new power” is a metaphor, rather than a system of political-legal norms; it is actually an assortment of extremely favorable historical opportunities and subjective expectations harbored by the Maidan participants. What makes the situation worse is the fact that no one knows anything about the new government’s plans. Until now statements issued by newsmakers from the Strength of the Nation coalition and Viktor Yushchenko’s election platform have been part and parcel of the election campaign, and they have not explained how the new government will differ from the previous one.

The Maidan created conditions in which it became possible to establish a civil society and new power relationships. Whether these opportunities are put to the best use and whether the declarations of the “Orange leaders” are translated into life is a matter of their political responsibility.

The Maidan may provide the momentum to the evolution of the Ukrainian nation-state if the new government ensures better administration. If not, the result will be the exact opposite.