Coming Elections Worsening East-West Confrontation in Ukraine
This author has repeatedly stressed that the technologies of conflict being applied by the principal presidential candidates are dangerous. Their direct result is political tension that is mounting daily, and which has long passed the permissible point. The most alarming sign is the reviving threat of a split between Ukraine’s east and west, one of the most dangerous problems in our society. I do not regard it as an engineered one. Statements to this effect on the part of certain politicians are most likely explained by their political shortsightedness and by a desire to avoid — ostrich-like — the most complicated aspect of the state- building process. Regrettably, we have taken this stand throughout the years of independence, and this eventually had to surface in the political process.
CULTURAL POLARIZATION
The east-west problem did not crop up yesterday. Ukraine is one of those countries marked by a divided civilization. It is actually on the crossroads of two worlds, two cultures, two mentalities, two different vectors of civilization, all of which has determined the objective complexity of social consolidation here. The noted American researcher Samuel P. Huntington writes that countries in the category of civilizational breakdown are least viable — and he includes Ukraine and Belarus in that number.
A number of leading Ukrainian researchers agree with this categorization. In his classical Letter to Brother Tillers (1926), Viacheslav Lypynsky analyzes the reasons for Ukraine’s age-old lack of statehood, stressing that “this lack is a disease that is not caused by external factors; it is not a trauma, rather an affliction stemming from bondage caused by internal factors; without eliminating them, no external factors, however favorable, no allies, however faithful, no foreign political situations, however promising, will be of help.” Lypynsky believed that a national split and cultural polarization were among those morbid internal factors; he further believed that Ukrainian national-liberation specifics could be considered by the same token, as that movement appeared “mentally retarded,” showing signs of split personality, unable to become consolidated in the most dramatic phases of national history. Another noted Ukrainian scholar, Prof. Volodymyr Yaniv, the rector of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, echoes his words. He has written “cultural polarization is the most negative factor in the Ukrainian state-building process. Without being aware of it, there is no way to understand the Ukrainian mentality — just as there is no way to discuss an educational ideal capable of counteracting this cultural ruination, caused as it is by that cultural polarization.”
I do not think that any of today’s politicians will argue that the above- mentioned admonitions refer to our past only, or that these generic Ukrainian characteristics have been essentially altered over the years of independence. I am convinced that this problem is paramount among the incredible complexities of forming a consolidated Ukrainian political nation.
Suppose we take a closer look at poll returns. The Institute for Political Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine carried out one such poll as part of the project “Ukrainian Society in 1994-2003,” according to which only 41.1% of respondents consider themselves citizens of Ukraine in the first place; 32.3% believe that regional affiliation comes first (e.g., being residents of Donetsk oblast, living in Halychyna, etc.). The Ukrainian population is divided almost fifty-fifty between people preferring, respectively, “eastern” and “western integration.” Another poll by Lviv National University’s social studies laboratory in late December 2002, which was commissioned by the Urban Development Institute, shows that over 34% of Lviv residents would fight for an independent state of Halychyna if Ukraine joined the Russia-Belarus alliance; 11% would demand Halychyna’s autonomy from Kyiv; 26% would take a passive stand, and 5% would welcome the alliance. These results tally with the attempt to revive a “separate Halychyna identity.” Of course, I am not one to overstate such results, but we must not underestimate them either.
ECONOMIC REALITIES
We must fully realize what makes the east-west issue so acute these days. Election campaigns are not the only reason, except that they serve to emphasize its topicality. This is an important point to make. I think there is a purely psychological factor involved, namely the population’s economic and social expectations that have not been met in the first place, and all those disparities that have not been corrected. Ukraine inherited considerable interregional disparities from the Soviet Union. Over the years of national independence, these imbalances have not been corrected; on the contrary, they have been largely exacerbated. In 1996-2001 the interregional per capita gross value-added tax variation ratio increased by 2.17 and 5.93 times, respectively. Experts believe that the current interregional ratio (5.9) is definitely past the critical point. The Ukrainian president made this clear in his annual message to parliament in 2003.
In 2001 the president signed an edict approving the National Regional Policy Concept, introducing the notion of depressed regions (mostly in the west of Ukraine), but no practical steps were made in that direction. In fact, statistics prove the contrary — that these imbalances were being cultivated even during periods of economic growth. We all know that employment, labor migration, substantial differences in employment costs, etc., remain a most pressing issue in the western regions.
APROPOS OF NATIONALISM
Reconciliation and consolidation of the Ukrainian people is another pressing domestic political issue. I have repeatedly broached the subject in our media, specifically on The Day’s pages. Here the main point is to restore political and historical justice with regard to the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the officers and men of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), people who fought for a free, united, sovereign, and independent Ukraine. Let us try to figure out why the Verkhovna Rada has been unable to pass a constructive resolution to help settle this issue. We all know that such a resolution would have to acknowledge the existence of a national-liberation movement in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Is this fact not worth being deliberated by the Ukrainian parliament, considering the responsibilities it is supposed to have assumed toward Ukrainian society? Objectively, one must take into consideration the fact that the Soviets were responsible for actually unleashing a civil war in Ukraine. Several years ago, the president of Ukraine ordered the creation of a state commission to investigate OUN and UPA activities, in view of the fact that Stalin had ordered tens of thousands of people massacred in 1939-41 and 1944-52. In those years, the territories of western Ukraine were turned into a horrible meat grinder, with people being murdered in practically every village home because of their national persuasions, patriotism, and love of Ukraine.
In view of all this, attempts by certain presidential candidates to play the nationalist card when campaigning in certain regions pose a special threat to the national consolidation process. This is not only the campaign HQ staff’s utter intellectual insufficiency but also elementary political shortsightedness, which is evident to one and all, and its inability to understand that a nation that has spent more than three hundred years in bondage, which knows first-hand about genocide from its own history, is historically entitled to have its own national visage, hegemony over its national idea — even a rational degree of nationalism. Instead, we must reckon with the exact opposite — national nihilism, lack of national identity and dignity, overcoming the Untermenschen world outlook — notions that represent a substantial deficit in our mentality, as well as in our state-building process. Lesia Ukrayinka wrote bitterly, “Yes, we are slaves, there are no worse in the world.” This shortcoming, which is so very manifest these days, must be overcome. Our friends abroad understand this. Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in an interview that Ukraine faces a major problem: lack of a deep-rooted national awareness of civic responsibility. I couldn’t agree more.
Another point that one must bear in mind is that Ukrainian nationalism has never been an ideology proclaiming Ukrainian supremacy over any other ethnic groups inhabiting this multiethnic country. Let me refer once more to Lypynsky. In his Letters he wrote that the notions of nation and state were identical in his book; when he referred to Ukrainian nationalists, he meant people, including himself, seeking to establish a Ukrainian state that would embrace all classes, languages, religions, and tribes inhabiting the land of Ukraine. This author believes that the above reference can serve as an exhaustive response to the admonition.
It is also important to bear in mind that Lypynsky’s thesis fully conformed to European traditions and mentalities. Jean Jacques Rousseau, the acknowledged prophet of the French Revolution, stressed that national sovereignty and national character would be the cornerstone of the state-building process. He believed that a nation’s supreme body of authority had to reflect the will of the nation — in his case, all the inhabitants of France — and that being a national meant being a French citizen. People representing the national-liberation movement of Ukraine have never come up with different interpretations. Are such notions hard to understand?
CAMPAIGN ADVANTAGES
There are other problems. At the turn of the 1990s the territories in the west of Ukraine — primarily Lviv oblast — ranked among the strongest generators of the national state-building idea, especially in terms of ideology. The following period, however, showed that these territories were on a progressively downward curve, economically and especially politically, compared to the rest of Ukraine. The passage of the proportional election bill gave an impetus to this process. National Strategic Studies Institute experts believe that the proportion of MPs in parliament from the western territories may drop by 2-2.5 times. This will, of course, affect the central executive and judiciary authorities’ cadre potential.
In fact, these and other factors serve to inculcate a persistent psychological complex of lost hopes and opportunities among broad public circles in the western regions — primarily among the local elite — and this will, of course, affect the electorate. In other words, such constituencies are not like to vote for candidates representing ruling political parties. This phenomenon was clearly evident during the parliamentary elections in 2002. Experts from our institute say that only two political forces, Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko’s Bloc, overcame the four-percent eligibility qualification in Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. Of the 21 winners elected by one-seat constituencies, 21 people’s deputies joined the Our Ukraine faction, one from Tymoshenko’s bloc, and one from the SDPU (U). By way of comparison, in 1998 seven political parties in Lviv oblast, five in Ternopil oblast, and six in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast overcame this 4% barrier. This situation might be regarded as normal only if Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko’s bloc were genuine champions of the western electorates’ political interests. They are not. I cannot think of a single political initiative originating from these blocs that would refute such a conclusion. Here another factor is most likely at play, the good old myth concerning Viktor Yushchenko’s mission. The same is true of the current presidential race. Consider what Yushchenko called his “Ten Steps.” The result: the de facto problem being analyzed is being pushed further down a blind alley. It is increasingly clear that it will not be solved in any comprehensive manner, not even if Viktor Yushchenko wins the race. Most likely, he — as well as Viktor Yanukovych, if and when — is not fully aware of the increasingly painful east-west issue, meaning that neither of these candidates fully understands the problem of Ukraine as an independent and united polity. This may cause further disillusionment. Alexander Kwasniewski, after winning the presidential campaign with the left’s support, actually became the leader of the entire nation. This is one of the major factors leading to the consolidation of Polish society and its demonstrable progress. In Ukraine this option is practically nonexistent, all things considered.
PROSPECTS
Does this mean that we don’t stand a chance? I don’t think so. I still hope that both leading presidential candidates will have the presence of mind to agree that, if and when he makes it to the second round, the winner will become president but will appoint the other one premier; that they will know better than to follow their campaign coordinators’ recommendations; that they will prove themselves independent politicians; that they hold the national interests above everything. Why not invite Leonid Kuchma to join the dialogue? He is a wise man, he has done so much and we are all convinced that he will do even more for the good of our country. Why not make sure that every voter learns about such arrangements? Society and you personally would only benefit from this.
Another compulsory prerequisite: you must agree on political reform, which should ensure a real division of authority and counteractions in the activities of the three branches of power. This author recommends returning to the idea of a bicameral parliament and compulsory elections of governors. Leonid Kuchma’s political losses boil down to shouldering responsibility for what is happening in every Ukrainian city and town, after discarding the idea to hold gubernatorial elections. Given today’s decentralization of public life, this model is not only unviable but also hazardous. Whatever Vladimir Putin is trying to accomplish along these lines in Russia will end in disaster.
You must also tell the people that you have rejected guardianship from abroad (the kind you are receiving from the West and East). It is damaging to our national dignity and the image of our national state. Most emissaries visit Ukraine with biased outlooks, knowing little about our affairs; worse still, they do not adhere to the sacred principle of “do no harm.” In this sense, the “Last American Warning” that appeared recently in a weekly is the height of cynicism. This has to do with the honor and dignity of a sovereign country. Such things call for an official response.
Finally, you should tell this society that you will work on and carry out a long-term national policy aimed at gradually solving the complex interregional problems that have accumulated over the years. You must show your understanding of these problems. I know that people will believe you. Ukrainians are inherently tolerant. We need peace and quiet. The “eye for an eye” approach has nothing to do with the Ukrainian mentality. No one needs vengeance here. A free, independent, and united Ukrainian state remains the greatest value. Every politician must act so as to uphold and preserve these values — doing so consciously or otherwise does not really matter. Lypynsky wrote that, when the leaders of a nation struggle for that nation’s complete liberation and national independence, they must regard every national as their most precious ally, as a soldier in their army, without whose assistance achieving independence is impossible. I suggest that you adopt these words of our distinguished fellow countryman as a political motto, and that you follow it step by step, in which case our country will get on its feet.
