GROWING UP AMID MYTHS
The topic of Ukraine has been much in the focus of the world, including Russian, media in the past few weeks. In fact, not a single day has gone by without reports, articles, reviews, or comments. Everybody wondered if Ukraine would be expelled from the Council of Europe, if the Yushchenko cabinet would be voted out of office, and who will replace the current premier. On the one hand, the record number of publications shows there is something wrong in Ukraine, which in fact nobody has ever hidden. On the other hand, it became clear that foreign countries, even Russia, which is supposed to know Ukraine well, do not just understand what is going on in this country. Ukraine itself also sometimes seems to be unaware of this. Periods of growth are never easy.
All this means that we should soon forget what a “post-Soviet” Ukraine is, just as all claims that the Russian leadership is still being guided by the logic of the seventies become less and less relevant. As to the claims that the change of government in Ukraine signals an inevitable change of attitude and that therefore this country will come fully within Russia’s sphere of influence and be isolated from the West, each perhaps has the right to create myths. In fact, quite a lot has already been said and written about the myths that surround Viktor Yushchenko.
WESTERN DIMENSION
The Yushchenko government’s fall has revealed a very interesting point which will obviously come in handy for the future researchers of Ukrainian history. This situation caused the leaderships of both the European Union and the US to make simultaneous comments. It is the first time that statements made on behalf of the European Union in Brussels and on behalf of the EU Swedish chairmanship in Stockholm force us to conclude that life goes on. It is the first time that these statements did not fully follow in the wake of the Washington’s policies. It is the first time that we can draw a conclusion about Western Europe’s true friendliness toward Ukraine, for up to now we have heard only formal declarations about the need for partnership and great importance of Ukraine. Then everything went its own way. Some wanted to expand eastward, but their plans, even the most distant ones, never included Ukraine. They would also say that the Ukrainian-designed An-7X cargo plane joint project is, of course, a good and interesting thing but, still, they had their interests, aerospace industries, and friend-or-foe ideas of their own. Still, partnership is a very good and important thing. The constant pronouncements about Ukraine’s European choice were not always easy to believe for the simple reason that they were made too often. On the other hand, this state’s leadership has been really doing something for European integration to succeed: it has been drafting and enacting laws, conducting consultations, which have gradually, albeit too slowly and gingerly even from the most optimistic viewpoint, changed the overall atmosphere. Mr. Yushchenko was just the first Ukrainian prime minister relatively popular in the West (it would be wrong to claim that he always bowed to Western dictates), whom the West pinned certain hopes on and harbored illusions about. But if we switch from emotions to realities, we will see that this affection was quite seldom translated into real deeds. This country has lived without International Monetary Fund and European Bank for Development and Reconstruction loans since 1999. In the long run, we gradually became accustomed to this more and more habitual situation, and it became clear this is in fact the norm. Meanwhile, a survey conducted on the eve of the Ukrainian government’s fall by Germany’s Bertelsmann Stiftung directly shows that even in Belarus some standards are closer to the common European ones than are Ukraine’s. It is perhaps for this reason that the claims about Ukraine’s unique position as a transport corridor failed to stand the test of time: too many Westerners admit that even Russian and Belarusian border guards and customs officers are far easier to deal with than Ukrainian ones. US and Western European experts have been maintaining recently that Ukraine has a very poor investment climate, that the cabinet and parliament never managed to come to terms about deregulation, that there is no effective protection of the rights of private ownership, and that taxation still remains a nightmare for potential investors.
The current state of negotiations on Ukraine’s membership in the World Trade Organization, closer technical cooperation with the West, and the possibility of at least not tightening the existing visa treatment of Ukrainian citizens in Western countries reveals that the Yushchenko government has in any case made no breakthroughs here.
Simultaneously, we cannot help noting that Ukraine itself is gradually changing the tone of its States. There is no longer any question of dutifully fulfilling the strategic partner’s wishes as was the case when Ukraine “voluntarily” decided to hand over its Soviet period nuclear weapons to Russia, shut down the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, and bow out of the project to build a nuclear power plant in Iran.
That Ukraine is gradually identifying itself as a truly independent state cannot but create certain problems for both the West and the East, because this requires quite an essential modification of many well-established strategies. This, again, depends very little on who precisely will head the Ukrainian government, for in any case this government will have to pursue a policy oriented toward Ukrainian national interests.
The Western dimension of the new Ukrainian realities shows only that relations between Ukraine and the West cannot suddenly worsen or, the more so, suddenly improve just now, following the change of government. Yet, it is obvious that a certain pause will be observed pending the coming parliamentary elections in Ukraine, because only after this will it be clear who will hold power in Ukraine.
In any case, the existing level of relations has in fact been exhausted, while a new format is still to be found. Both sides have to prepare for a meaningful dialogue. The quality of a new format of relations now depends primarily on Ukraine itself and to a very large extent on its domestic policy, but it is not worth linking this problem with the name of Yushchenko. Moreover, it would be wrong to say he really headed a government that both East and West could call a radically new one.
EASTERN DIMENSION
A popular perception is that the change of government here could bring about a qualitative improvement in relations between Kyiv and Moscow. Another popular perception in Ukraine says that the change of government signals the approach of complete Russian domination. That Mr. Yushchenko was far from always accepted positively in Moscow does not yet mean that any other Ukrainian prime minister will be more to Russia’s liking.
The two gravest problems of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Ukraine’s natural gas debt and the trade war, have existed almost since the time when Ukraine and Russia became independent. It would be silly at least to reproach Russia for defending its own interests. Not a single Ukrainian party, even the Communists, which intends to make its way to the new parliament has ever expressed a desire that Ukraine should hand over to Russia everything that enables it to pursue an independent policy.
Moreover, Moscow feels (perhaps even more keenly than Kyiv does) that Ukraine is really being created as a state and that this can be foiled only by extreme methods which could backfire on Russia itself. Rather, it is a question of normal attempts to get the best deal possible, which is what the theory and practice of politics basically come down to. Today, this is being implemented by means of privatization projects, and the history of Ukrainian privatization in the past year clearly shows that the no significant success in trying to stall this process. It is only natural that Russian capital is trying to privatize Ukrainian enterprises, because it is stronger than its Ukrainian counterpart and knows (it thinks) the rules of the game that now scare off potential Western investors. One can fear the Russian owner but one can also consider that the latter is in fact paving the way to full-fledged big transnational capital. It will be obvious very soon which of the two was right. What really matters in the epoch of globalization is not who invested the money but what results it will have. If this means creating jobs, new markets, budget revenues, and step-by-step integration in the global mechanisms of development, then why not? But if this amounts to taking orders and de facto loss of independence, then the state must draft measures to avoid it.
The former government failed to win the Russian markets of pipes and confectionery for Ukrainian companies. On the one hand, one could conclude that such a dramatic dependence on one market would hardly do credit to the owners and managers of these enterprises. On the other hand, the government failed to show any overt desire to work hard as a closely knit team to the effect that relations with Russia would indeed reflect the much-touted strategic partnership. We can hardly claim there was any clear coordination of actions within the executive and between the executive and the legislative branches as far as relations with Russia and other post-Soviet countries are concerned. Past visits and negotiations have left the impression that they were prepared haphazardly. It would be a good idea to learn from the Russians how to conduct an integrated policy. Incidentally, Russia has done a good job of diversifying markets as a result of which the European Union, not Ukraine, has become its biggest trade partner.
A Belarus-style Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement is impossible for the simple reason that Ukraine’s emerging elites do not identify themselves with Russia and will hardly be ready to share their powers with Moscow but will still favor normal mutually advantageous relations. Any new Ukrainian government will inevitably defend the interests of these elites and above all in specific relations with Russia. It is possible that mutual non-acceptance will be even greater at a certain stage than it was at the end of last year, when the prime ministers of Ukraine and Russia were unable to put the final touches on gas deals without pressure from their presidents. There could be more examples like this in the future. Moreover, experience shows that changes of government in both Ukraine and Russia have no dramatic impact on the overall trends in the development of bilateral relations.
For this reason the fall of the current Ukrainian government cannot itself cause such dramatic changes in Ukraine’s environment as might be expected judging by numerous statements and publications. Life goes on, and Ukraine will in any case have to prove again that it deserves an adult dialogue and overcome some problems it created with its own hands.
