Or was there a Left opposition in Parliament?

The stormy events in Verkhovna Rada have caused a degree of confusion for the Left, now disguised by revolutionary slogans and, partially by the use of force verging on criminality. They must increasingly often ask themselves why, What have they done to the President and current regime to make them initiate the majority’s current tactic and proceed to look on calmly as the Left is dealt such a shattering blow?

Indeed, few others did as much for Leonid Kuchma’s victory during the last campaign as the Left. The Communists went strictly by the scenario and faithfully played their role of leading a Red revenge. At the same time, their nominee did not even attempt to convince his electorate that he really wanted to become President. Instead, he did his best to prevent the protesting electorate from finding a single center of gravity and rallying round a candidate actually capable of getting the better of the incumbent. Lest Comrade Symonenko happen to be that capable candidate, another Left crack revolutionary stepped in, campaigning against Symonenko while actually doing the same, scattering the faithful electorate. Even Oleksandr Moroz, obviously an irreconcilable Kuchma opponent, fell prey to own ambitions, acting (begging Mr. Moroz’s pardon) as that gun which the audience sees among the stage props, meaning that it will be fired sooner or later during the play. It did fire in the last round of the presidential campaign, shattering the Kaniv Four.

A closer look at the history of this convocation of the Ukrainian Parliament reveals quite enough examples where loud slogans of struggle against the “anti-people regime” were used by the Left opposition (at least that’s how they called themselves) in a manner that helped the powers that be reach their own goals. Thus, on October 13, 1998, when Verkhovna Rada deliberated a vote of no confidence in Valery Pustovoitenko’s government and when everything depended on literally a vote or two, several Left opposition members supported the government just in case, and seeing that this would not change the outcome anyway, issued statements requesting their votes be considered ones of no confidence and blaming the Rada vote calculator. Also, in July 1998, the presidentially nominated candidate was confirmed as Prosecutor General precisely because he was actively supported by the Left, since the National Democrats voiced doubts about him. True, this did not help the Left when, in the heat of Parliamentary confrontation, they turned to the Prosecutor’s Office for help. Add here the actual inactivity (despite much flag-waving) of all those “defenders of the downtrodden” as the Cabinet sequestered the budget in 1998 and 1999, passing resolutions blatantly at variance with the law. And the latest actions of the Left regarding the referendum make one wonder. Rather than bringing the issue before the Constitutional Court (considering that the questions to be determined by the referendum actually mean changes in the Constitution), the Left seemed content with talk about an alternative referendum, being fully aware that it would be held only after the first one. I am certain that every reader will ponder and add several other examples, all boiling down to one question: Was there really a Left opposition in Parliament? Or was just a group of people staging a huge play called Opposition, while in reality it was playing ball with the regime, fully aware how the game would turn out? An analysis of the Left verbiage on the one hand and actual deeds on the other makes one aware that the opposition was in words only.

The experience of the past couple of years shows that the regime found opposition useful in a way; Parliament’s ineffectiveness could always be blamed on the Left. By and large, however, if Verkhovna Rada passed resolutions other than those desired by the executive blaming the Left would look naive at best. Yes, they were in the legislative leadership and headed quite a few committees, yet the current parliamentary crisis clearly shows the number of those in opposition, so it is perfectly obvious that they could not have blocked bills with only their own votes; there were not enough. In other words, there had to be other forces opposing reforms for selfish reasons or those of certain circles they represented. The Left sided with them not for ideological reasons or to protect their electorate, but because they had other common interests — political, business, and personal. Thus bills that could significantly damage such common interests were voted down and openly pie-in-the-sky ones passed, because everybody knew that they would never be implemented. And so they did nothing to make such bills work, saying that this called for changing the regime. In a word, the Left acted like the young lady who wanted to cash in on her charms while remaining a virgin; it served their own interests while staging a big show of opposition while never spoiling its relationship with the regime.

Playing opposition offers a good opportunity to sit back and wait for the right moment to act, taking advantage of the sociopolitical (i.e., revolutionary) situation, seizing power, taking revenge (no, not the Red revenge, of course) on one’s former comrades. For some time this game seemed to satisfy both sides, but any game eventually comes to an end. What is happening now is the logical endgame. However, the Left — primarily the Communists — seemed to have forgotten that while they played others wrote the rules. And those imposing the rules determined precisely when the opposite player was no longer interesting to play with — in his current capacity anyway.

Thus it was only natural that the President, after being elected to a second term, should want to end this political slapstick and place parliamentary relationships on a civilized footing. The more so that an effective Parliament is vital for getting Ukraine out of its deep crisis, and restructuring is one way to produce such Parliament. Nor is it surprising that the President, who in his inaugural address promised to become a “new” Chief Executive, should initiate measures in that direction. The actions of the parliamentary majority and their consequences, along with possible hidden agendas, could be debated in terms of legality (leave this to the jurists), but one must agree that they were the only option under the circumstances. This had to happen sooner or later.

Now that the Left camp as the “scapegoat” and “enemy of reform” is gone, the time has come for assuming trilateral President- Verkhovna Rada-Cabinet responsibility for all subsequent acts and their results in both the political and socioeconomic domains. Here the will alone is not enough. It also takes confidence in one’s own strength and being prepared to assume this responsibility not in words but in deeds. In this sense, The Day ’s February 1 interview with People’s Deputy Oleksandr Volkov is quite disturbing, particularly his statement about the President being the one to proclaim the course set on reform, with the Premier assuming full responsibility for its implementation. This make one wonder: could the majority be securing its line of retreat?

With all the negative aspects of today’s rift in Parliament, there is a positive factor. The Left is faced with a choice: either stop playing political games, switching to a constructive cooperation with the majority and finally becoming a genuine parliamentary opposition acting within and under the protection of law, or continue the confrontation, being thus placed outside Parliament and facing its eventual dissolution and subsequent elections. If this be the case, the Left will once again have to prove that it is the “sole defender of the toilers,” which won’t be easy in view of everything stated here. Much to its chagrin, the Left will have to make this choice. The majority can step up the process by urging the Left to become a civilized parliamentary minority. Those of the Left failing to realize the need for this will eventually have to pull out. The time of grand spectacles is over, and this one’s denouement is coming closer and closer.