Similar Fate, Different Experience

Krakow hosted a conference called Ukraine and Poland: Common Fate, Different Experience, organized by the Polish Pen Club and St. Volodymyr Foundation.

Several dozen intellectuals from both countries  - historians, sociologists, and literary critics  - discussed three topics: the historical consciousness of writers in Poland and Ukraine in the nineties; changes in Ukraine's and Poland's self-images during Independence; and on the evolution of literary and cultural institutions along with their impact on the overall cultural situation.

Both countries shed communist authoritarianism and dependence on Moscow comparatively recently. Their social, cultural, and intellectual processes have since followed courses similar in many respects; Ukrainian and Polish authors adopted a more objective attitude toward their own national histories, refusing to interpret it as a propaganda tool for social or national revival. Likewise, the intelligentsia has taken a more critical attitude toward ethnic stereotypes, specifically the populist, sham images of their peoples. Basic changes have taken place in both countries also in conjunction with the appearance of new and to varying degrees modified old, former communist cultural institutions.

Despite this similarity, the obvious fact remains that Russian-oriented (disoriented might be more exact) Ukraine is lagging farther and farther behind European-minded Poland. While Poland, jointly with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states, have succeeded in decisively changing their social order, removing the old nomenklatura from power, democratizing their countries, and carrying out effective market reforms, Ukraine, like Russia and Belarus, is sinking ever deeper into the swamp of nomenklatura-racket-controlled pseudocapitalism and a traditional Eurasian Time of Troubles.

Consequently, the cultural situation in Poland and Ukraine is different. Whereas the Poles have adequate reasons to discuss the "threat of capitalism," meaning the excessive commercialization and unification of ethnic cultures under the conditions of the global free market and integration, in Ukraine the main threat is its vestiges of Soviet Communism and colonialism; there is even the prospect of restoring the old regime and empire, something Poles simply cannot understand. And the degree of freedom in both cultures is different, considering the economic and political circumstances.

One of the Ukrainian participants in the conference noted, "Polish development is determined by the struggle between things good and better, but Ukraine's development is a struggle between things bad and those even worse."

Perhaps the most enigmatic aspect is that the Polish cultural and political elite is still keenly interested in a Ukraine which does not give the slightest indication of conscious positive growth and whose populace seems more comfortable in the traditional Eurasian swamp than on neat European asphalt roads. The logical thing to do for the Poles (and other Europeans) would seem to build a high wall between themselves and our irrational world, letting our CIS integrationists work hand in glove with Lukashenko, Yeltsin, Iliumzhinov, Nazarbayev, and our other Eurasian brethren. Just wash one's hands of Ukraine and its "iron-headed" people (to quote Vissarion Belinsky), the way George Soros and dozens of other investors have done and hundreds of Ukrainians do every day, leaving Ukraine for good, believing that any place will be better than this dangerous rat hole with no future.

Of course, one could suspect Poland of certain economic calculations, considering that the hard-working Ukrainian people more and more often rely on Polish food (the Poles are effectively compensating for their lack of chernozem by their lack of collective farms). But even if Poland makes profits in Ukraine, the latter cannot be significant, since the Polish economy is increasingly Western-oriented and its ties with Ukraine constitute a miserable percentage of the total Polish trade turnover.

However, I think that the reason for the persistence of Polish interest in Ukraine is essentially romantic, emotional rather than pragmatic. It is rooted deeply in the national mentality, mythology, joint historical-cultural development. Without doubt, Ukraine for centuries remained a major venue of Polish history and culture, the place where a certain national myth was created. Integrating toward the end of the century into a Europe of nations, not empires, the Poles can have no revanchist ambitions toward the "eastern territories," but they, of course, feel sentimental about them as a historical chance they could have used but never did, as a Rzeczpospolita consisting of two, three or even four peoples (considering Lithuanians and White Russians). In other words, these sentiments are addressed to the Poles themselves, the way they could have been but never will. There is also subconscious inquisitiveness. What did we lose historically, culturally, psychologically by losing Ukraine (Lithuania, Belarus)? What about these countries that used to be a part of us centuries ago and then decided to go their own way? How are they doing?

Whatever the reason for this interest in a country which most other nations consider totally uninteresting, the results are quite positive. In terms of meetings and contacts between Poles and Ukrainians active in the humanities, politics, and business, the number of Ukrainian research papers and literary works translated into Polish, and the amount (and quality) of information about Ukraine carried by the press, Poland seems to be ahead of all other countries (Russia included) put together.

Perhaps coincidentally, at the time of the conference the most influential Polish newspaper Gazeta wyborcza carried in two numbers an interview with Yaroslav Hrytsak, a noted Ukrainian historian, professor of Lviv University, titled characteristically "Ukrainian Brainteasers" and "Polish Success and Russian Nightmares." In Mr. Hrytsak's words, "Polls show that Poland is the third - other sources rank it fourth  - symbol of the West to Ukrainians, after the United States, Germany, and perhaps France. And all because you have managed to carry out positive changes, showing the direction in which it is worth moving; you have rid yourselves of the Soviet shackles quickly and effectively, and you did have them, albeit considerably lighter than we did."

Despite sharp criticism addressed to the Ukrainian elite in all spheres, the Ukrainian scholar voices cautious optimism about our country's future. He believes that Ukraine, even though as a snail's pace, is moving toward Europe and civilized life, away from the Soviet gloom and fatal dependence on Russia. He places especially great hopes in the younger generation. These people have no nostalgia for the "shining past." They will not put up with any crises but will forge ahead and see Ukraine as an integral part of Europe, according to the Polish standard and with Polish support. "When we have more such young people and when they start forming their own elite, maybe even several years from now, real changes will start happening in Ukraine."