“As a Western citizen I expect a lot from the Ukrainian example”

Sadly enough, there are not so many European intellectuals who have managed to comprehend deeply and impartially the current situation in Ukraine. It turned out to be very tempting to bring the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the Russian aggression in the Donbas into line with the long-established ideological or geopolitical persuasions. Yet there are some exceptions. One of them is Philippe de Lara, a French philosopher and researcher of totalitarian regimes. This is not the first time he comes to Ukraine to deliver public lectures. In France, too, he tries to open the eyes of his compatriots to the events in our country via his articles and speeches. De Lara also admires the music of Valentyn Sylvestrov, and he managed to personally meet the composer during his latest sojourn in Ukraine.

In his publications, de Lara calls on the world and Ukraine to know a true Ukrainian history and find it a place in the overall history of Europe, criticizes the EU for ignoring the value-related dimension of politics and national and civilizational identities, and analyzes the sore points of European public opinion, which Russia manipulates and which make Europe vulnerable to antidemocratic ideologies. In the philosopher’s view, the destiny of Europe is now being decided in Ukraine, as it was in France in 1789, for such ideas of the Euromaidan as freedom, dignity, and truth will leave an indelible imprint on the further history democracy, as the ideas of the French Revolution once did. Philippe de Lara also researches Putinism as a new variety of totalitarianism in the era of the Internet and a new globalized world, in which Russia is trying to single itself out, still remaining an integral part thereof. Agreeing with Timothy Snyder, de Lara claims that this position of “strategic relativism” will allow Russia to weaken Europe until the latter can finally see who it is dealing with.

Mr. De Lara, please tell our readers, when and why did you become interested in Ukrainian topic for the first time?

“The first time occurred in January 2013 by chance I was invited at Franco-Ukrainian conference on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Vincent Descombes [modern French philosopher. – Author] here in Kyiv, organized by Valentyn Omelianchyk. To speak frankly, at that time I didn’t know Ukraine existed. Of course, I was aware of the name, of the Orange Revolution, of the independence, but it was very abstract and very thin knowledge. I discovered a city and a very interesting country. And here I am. Beside Wittgenstein studies my main field of work is totalitarianism and history of the 20th century. But it’s a little by chance that I discovered and understood that Ukraine was, so to speak, the core or the centre of this history.”

Few weeks ago in Kyiv there was a roundtable on the ways of promotion of Ukrainian culture abroad. Among other things, Prime Minister’s advisor Dmytro Lubkivsky said that the West never really tried to understand Ukraine, never tried to learn its culture and history. Do you agree with that statement? How can you explain this?

“Well, it’s unfortunately broadly true, although there are exceptions. For instance, in France at the famous school for so-called oriental languages INALCO (L’Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales) there is an excellent Ukrainian department led by Iryna Dmytrychyn. But on the whole Ukrainian culture was ignored, because it was either unknown or absorbed in Russian culture. So, there is one tenure for Ukrainian language at the INALCO and there are dozens of tenures for Russian studies, Russian history, Russian literature. Recently some of the most prominent academics in this field of the Russian language and Russian history studies made a kind of self-criticism. They said: ‘We are guilty to have forgotten Ukraine.’ But things are changing now and I am trying to help to change them.”

In your publications you claim that today Ukraine is the place where the future of Europe is being decided. Please, explain this statement for our readers. What do you mean?

“Until recently and for lot of people it’s still the case, Europe represents itself mostly as a big united market without real political existence, without any genuine relation with the rest of the world except trade. So, Europe is united market surrounded by trade partners and would-be members (like Turkey) and that’s it. And in fact Europe has never been only this. From the beginning after WWII, Europe has always been a political idea, a political organization devoted to prosperity and sovereignty of small or middle-range democratic states. This is a real nature of Europe. Unfortunately in a lot of minds and official documents  this idea, which is the core of Europe, is buried under the economic organization. And if you see Europe as a community of sovereign free little or not very big states, it is obvious that Ukraine belongs of this political scheme. What’s crucial with Ukraine today, it is not only one more country who naturally belongs to this group of nations, it is not only its border. Ukrainian revolution is the occasion where Europe is forced to become aware of its real predicament, of the fact that it has borders and, unfortunately for the time being, an enemy.”

Russian aggression against Ukraine showed that nobody in the world can guarantee the inviolability of international treaties. How do you think this will affect the international politics? What are the prospects of such organizations as the EU and NATO?

“It depends precisely and heavily on what will happen in Ukraine and what the EU and NATO will do or not do for Ukraine, because at the moment they are hesitating. I am convinced that Europe or NATO don’t need to declare war to Russia to stop the aggression. It would be enough to show, I would say, strength and anger, which means tougher sanctions and military support to Ukraine. This can stop Russia without open war with NATO. It’s very difficult for NATO and Europe to envisage a war with Russia, but it’s the same for the Russians, except they want to launch total nuclear war, which is very unlikely. I think that policy of strict containment would succeed, but unfortunately the Western governments are hesitating – there are sanctions, but they could be more effective. There is still no large-scale military support to Ukraine and I think it is a mistake from the Western point of view.”

And how do you think, can some alternative structures appear, for example, as a result of deeper integration between Eastern European countries?

“Maybe, but I really think that the main structure, the one that makes sense from a civilization point of view and the one who can be efficient in helping Ukraine or, I would say, in enforcing Ukraine for building modern democratic state, which doesn’t really exist now, is EU. Of course, there is already an informal solidarity, almost family gathering of Poland, Baltic countries, and Ukraine. Belarus if becoming democratic could join. So, of course, these countries are of specific interest, but I don’t like the idea of leaving them alone, apart from the rest of Europe. A lot of people including intellectuals, who know and love Mitteleuropa (Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), sometimes believe that the eastern border of Europe is this group of central European countries. Maybe Lviv would belong to it, but not Ukraine. And I think it’s completely unfair and untrue. Historically and through the values of the Maidan Revolution all Ukraine is part of the same culture. I would say that Ukraine has always had two windows open – one East and one West. But the Western one is bigger.”

One year ago a chief editor of our newspaper Larysa Ivshyna forecasted that new Berlin Wall may divide Ukraine in two parts in near future. How realistic is this vision today? What should we do to prevent this?

“It would be the tragedy, the catastrophe, because actually Ukraine can’t be divided, included by the language: even in the south-east where you have this big Russian-speaking cities. First, their citizens are Ukraine patriotic exactly like people in Kyiv or in Lviv or anywhere. Second, in the countryside Ukrainian is the main spoken language. So, there is no justified or legitimate place to build this wall. It would be a divide resulting from invasion and that’s it. And that I think is a great surprise for Putin. He expected that a lot of Russian-speaking Ukrainians would for that reason welcome Russia and be directed against Kyiv. And exactly the opposite happens, except a very few oblasts far-east. And even there separatist movement was manipulated, but yet there are pro-Russian people. But it’s a bunch of people. All the rest of the country after Maidan is more Ukrainian than ever. This was visible and obvious for any observer, if you consider the results of the elections. In all parts of Ukraine, where elections were free and could take place, the differences between the voters from different regions are much less striking than before. I would say that the revolution nationalized Ukraine. It was visible merely by looking at the figures of the both presidential and legislative elections.”

During last Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga European politicians were repeatedly claiming that Russia is not an enemy for Europe. It seems, that they are very frightened of Putin and at the same time they believe, that Russia will not attack other countries except Ukraine. But don’t you think that in such way European politicians encourage Russia to further aggression?

“I agree with you, but the guilt is shared by the Western governments and by the Ukrainian one. It’s a heavy mistake from the part of Western governments to think that ‘being nice,’ ‘not to provoke Putin’ is a good strategy. It’s exactly the opposite. But at the same time I think that Europe and mainly France and Germany will support more strongly Ukraine only if there is more confidence in Ukraine’s will and capacity to defend itself and remain sovereign. And here there was maybe something missing which is changing now with last weeks of warfare, but it’s understandable that Germany and France may have reasonable doubts on Ukraine’s will and capacity to defend its independence. I’m not saying that the Western governments have no responsibility – they have huge responsibility. And I found absurd that so little money was given to Ukraine and so much to Greece. But the first step belongs to Ukraine.”

In your publications you claim that Russia failed to conduct its trial over Communism, that Russia is sick as a result of no self-analysis of Communism. And that’s why Putin can use sickness of Russian society to implement his geopolitical plans. But is the Soviet legacy the only reason? How can you explain the phenomenon of soviet political dissidents, who at the same time were chauvinists (like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn)?

“Well, I think that Solzhenitsyn is a towering writer of the former century. Most of the dissidents were different from him for that matter. Even people like Navalny, who at first time couldn’t resist the annexation of Crimea, later on realized that there was no future for Russia in going on colonizing Ukraine. In an interview shortly after the annexation, Lyudmila Ulitskaya, perhaps the greatest living Russian writer, confessed her love for Crimea, she has many personal recollections of the area. She is aware that a lot of Russians have this love for Crimea, but she said: ‘We must resist nostalgia and remembrance, good recollections of some area in Crimea, and refuse this annexation. There are no legitimate reasons for Russia to grasp Crimea even if a lot of us like this place.’ So, to get back to your main question, I really think that the fact that Russia reacts as an aggressive empire come first from the lack of a clear discontinuation with the Soviet Union. And it’s much more important than the traditional chauvinist or imperialist Russian culture. This tendency exists of course like it exists in Germany. But one thing is the vision of itself a people and a culture have, and other thing is the way it’s implemented, it’s got concretely translated. The pan-Germanist culture, let’s say, to take this example, did not disappear after WWII, after ‘the German catastrophe,’ but it took a different meaning, because Germany said ’no’ to Nazism. Germany didn’t have to say ‘no’ to Germany itself. I think there are many Russias – the Russia of Solzhenitsyn, the Russia of Pushkin, the Russia of Ulitskaya, the Russia of Pasternak. This is Russia, and the current Putin ideological version of the empire is something different. It really comes from the Soviet Union, both Stalin Soviet Union for the brutality, the ability to lie and from the late Soviet Union, the Brezhnev era, where no one believed anymore in communism and where remained only the cult of Great Patriotic War and the pride of the conquest: ‘We won in Vietnam, in Angola, in Cuba, we are going to win in Afghanistan etc.’ Putin is the direct heir of this period. Self-examination and self criticism by the Russian people and the Russian state must happen. It’s both a matter of judicial recognition and also of every citizen’s personal recognition that communism was a criminal regime. Russia has a future only if it gets rid of this legacy instead of being proud of it.”

And how do you think, when will the Russian society be ready to conduct its trial over Communism?

“I have no idea at all, but I’m convinced that it must and will happen. And when it will happen, things could go very-very fast. Let’s remember South Africa, the speed of the shift of the country from apartheid regime to new South Africa through a compromise and a kind of judicial process, which was not genuine criminal process, but which was the so-called ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission.’ It symbolized the break between the old regime and the new country.”

In your publications you also claim that formula of Putin regime is “KGB plus television.” Has the information war, which Russia unleashed against Ukraine, had any effect on the attitude to information security in Europe?

“Of course, because people were not prepared to such information war. Still now a lot of journalists and media are not enough conscious of the Russian information war. They are trapped by so-called ‘experts,’ ‘news’ released by Russia Today etc. But there is growing awareness that there is an information war of unprecedented scale. Paradoxically it’s because we get aware of the incredible level of propaganda inside Russia, towards the Russian people, that we come to realize that they are doing the same thing with different contents towards Western countries. The force of this propaganda (what I called ‘Goebbels plus Berlusconi’) in Russia is something visible and shocking from the outside. In France, for instance, I have the feeling that people are beginning to understand the propaganda war led by Russia in France through the information we get from the situation of culture and media inside Russia.”

How often do you take part in discussions on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict with pro-Putin “experts” and “journalists” in the French media, on TV? What are your impressions?

“I’m not the good person to answer this question, because I’m not often invited to media in France (as I am in Ukraine!). Colleagues of mine do it more often. So, I have not a direct acquaintance with this, but what I want to say, that there are two categories of ‘pro-Russian speakers’ – the extreme ones and the moderate ones. The moderates are much more dangerous. For instance, the trolling activity of Kremlin in many circles it’s a matter of laugh. They insist very seriously that completely phony things are true, that there has never been any Russian soldier in Ukraine, and that Ukraine will collapse tomorrow, and that Russia is the most democratic country in Europe etc. So, everybody laughs. Yet it’s efficient, because nobody believes that, but it creates doubts and that’s enough for Putin. For instance, when MH17 case was discussed we had not a single Russian version of the event, but dozens more or less fantastic, more or less phony. The scope was not to make believe something to the Western opinion, but to make them sure of nothing, to make them skeptical. And yet there is an even more toxic line of propaganda, what I called the ‘moderate’ one, which is based on so-called ‘realistic’ geopolitical analysis of Europe. It says that Russia is the great power of Eastern Europe, and it’s good for Europe because it balances the Anglo-American hegemony etc. So, we don’t like Putin, it says, but a strong Russia is our best interest. And a strong Russia means it includes Ukraine directly or indirectly. This speech is much more prevailing and dangerous, than extreme propaganda. I hope that events in Russia, domestic policy of Russia, and the war in Ukraine will open the eyes of the people. Unfortunately, it’s still rather difficult to open the eyes on the war in Donbas, but things are much more obvious if you consider Russia’s inner policy – the repression against NGOs, the political murders, the homophobia. This is very clearly seen and very clearly understood by people in the West. And this is changing by side effect their vision of Ukraine. So, I think that Ukraine should be more self-confident facing the Western opinion, not to think that you are defeated from start by the overwhelming force of Russian propaganda, but to consider that you are the very good case.”

Many experts note that sense of Russian propaganda may be turned into the statement that moral and ethics are simply unrealizable conceptions. Russians say something like “Yes, we are not perfect, but look at other countries, at US, for example – they do the same things.” What should we answer to this?

“It’s simply not true, it’s a lie. I’m not naive and I know that force, betrayal, big money play role in international relations, but it’s not the whole of the world. Not as it should be, but as it is now. There are, of course, these forces acting, but also principles, rules, and accepted compromise from everyone. The idea that an order in Europe could be enforced only by the one who has the biggest missiles – or claims to have the biggest missiles – notwithstanding the opinion of state and people it is completely unrealistic.”

Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor claims that cultural and social crisis that the Western world ended up in, is accounted for by the fact that it rejects any positive values. That is, Western morality tells people what cannot be done (for example, they cannot infringe on the freedom of others, etc.), but it does not say what should be done, it does not say what is good, implying that each person should make a decision on this individually. Do you agree with this opinion?

“Absolutely! So, as Western citizen and democrat I am very grateful and I expect a lot from the Ukrainian example. I think that success of Ukrainian revolution will be good not only for Ukraine, but it would be good for the whole world, because it brings new fresh air for democracy. It gives living shape to the ideals of autonomy, which are very important in the democratic history and which are now weakened by individualism and negative liberty view in our countries (that is the idea that liberty is only a matter of laissez faire and not also a matter of empowerment).”