Candidate Resource

Time for making forecasts about presidential candidates for the October 31 elections is running short. Identifying the Red candidate was no problem three years ago, but the one agreed upon by the in-power forces took time taking shape. Although the name has not been officially announced, the fact remains that the Verkhovna Rada gave 239 ayes for Viktor Yanukovych’s cabinet action program last Tuesday, meaning that the prime minister stands an even better chance as a presidential hopeful in the coming race.

Actually, discussing the cabinet’s action program makes no sense at this stage. Almost every ex-premier is heard insisting that his cabinet program was the best — probably the reason why they were all shown the door. At present, the main point is not the action program but the powers vested in the current premier for the next seven month before the election date. No one has re-invented the wheel; the post-Soviet Ukrainian presidential seat is best challenged by the premier — and the premier’s seat may turn out occupied or left vacant. We all know the premiers running for president in Ukraine. Under the domestic tradition, the winner of the presidential race has only one post to occupy, besides premiership. The president’s. Since the current head of state seems resolved to step down, there is the strong likelihood of the present and former premiers competing.

Much has been said and written about the advantages of Viktor Yushchenko, including points scored by him as head of the National Bank of Ukraine, then as premier. These advantages have been capitalized upon [by his supporters] for over three years. The leader of Our Ukraine cannot apparently add anything to his kudos dating from the late 1990s. Mr. Yushchenko has become Comrade Symonenko’s alter ego, following in the latter’s footsteps, exploiting people’s lasting nostalgic feelings about those good old times. Except that for all those elderly men and women good old times are associated with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, while those supporting Yushchenko long for — guess what? Leonid Kuchma’s presidency. All attainments attributed to the current opposition were actually achieved under President Leonid Kuchma, hard as they try to prove the opposite.

Viktor Yanukovych has a task that seems outwardly quite easy. He must be viewed as a new Yushchenko by his electorate. To this end he must have his cabinet take a number of conspicuous steps in the nearest future, to impress the electorate, so they can add something to their voters’ family budgets. A task that does not seem totally impractical. In 1999, the Ukrainian economy was in a much worse condition than it is now, with back wages and pensions looking like an unavoidable hazard, like a sudden rain on a bright day.

Compared to Yushchenko’s ratings exceeding 20%, the current premier is backed by 20% of the electorate willing to support the existing political system, whatever it is. In other words, there are two candidates with practically the same starting opportunities. The fact that only 239 MPs voted for the cabinet action program last Tuesday (239 ayes being a symbolic number for the Ukrainian Parliament) is evidence of Viktor Yanukovych’s strength rather than weakness. Forces supporting that program are thus far different from the opposition in that they can make arrangements and then never go back on them, owing to conjuncture. As for the opposition’s “G-4” (maybe “G-3”), they mostly focus on keeping their allies under control, rather than fighting their opponents. At the same time, Group 239 has always proved outwardly solid and reliable, regardless of the colors unfurled. In- power forces, driven by the common desire to prevent the opposition winning the elections, are not likely to impede Yanukovych’s effort to win electorate support in his current premier seat.

It is true, however, that accomplishing all this is easier said than done. Potential supporters of the current premier are found among some 40% of the Ukrainian voters saying they are disillusioned by the current political course, and that they will not go to the polling stations. This huge human stratum is heterogeneous, but it can be altered if and when these people can see some changes for the better being actually made, and if they decide they can secure such changes by casting their ballots.

Does the cabinet action program contain provisos allowing most Ukrainians to believe in their better future under this government, under this premier if and when elected the next president? Most Ukrainians are not likely to believe that economic stability can be maintained at the current dramatically low living standard addressing most of the population, meaning that they will not vote for Yanukovych, come November. No canvassing can be effective without showing the electorate that positive changes can be made for the benefit of most people inhabiting this country.

The current premier is pressed for time; there is practically no time left. Every gesture made by the powers that be, meant to please the electorate, will be regarded as another stunt. Likewise, expecting the opposition to make mistakes or split would be naive, as the opposition has made every possible mistake, several times over, meaning there is no way it can get split up any further. Does Premier Viktor Yanukovych has anything up his sleeve, besides the resources that are known all too well?

The adopted cabinet action program, currently made public knowledge, has no answers to these questions, for the obvious reasons. Current problems, tending to gain scope and momentum, make all such campaign declarations and promises worth less than the paper they are printed on. In order to effectively run his cabinet and hope to become the next president, the current premier should be more than a figurehead at the head of government. There will be ample evidence shortly for all of us to see just how well today’s prime minister is equipped to cope with the task.