Holiday for former premier, hangover for Ukraine
In a month, former Premier Viktor Yushchenko is to have his next birthday. Strangely enough, this event, unimportant for Ukraine, has left its mark on the overly calm reaction of Ukraine to the two-day visit to Warsaw by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and his successful talks with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski on the construction of a gas and oil pipeline bypassing Ukraine. The reaction was quite inconsistent with the easily predictable consequences of Putin’s visit.
As the Polish president said, Poland’s decision on the bypass pipeline will not jeopardize the relations of his country with Ukraine. “We will stand by Ukraine’s interests, but there are conclusive arguments in favor of this pipeline,” he said in an interview with the Zet commercial radio station. “It is worth mentioning that we have another very important project with Ukraine, to pump crude oil from Odesa via Brody to Gdansk... This is something we should concentrate on, and this project is really important to the Ukrainians,” he added, being well aware that there is no alternative for Ukraine.
For his part, Russia’s Ambassador in Kyiv Viktor Chernomyrdin did his best to quell public opinion in Ukraine. Interfax-Ukraine quotes him as saying that nothing new occurred in the cooperation of Russia and Poland on pumping natural gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine. The Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline construction project was not born yesterday and is being implemented, he said, adding, “No betrayal has taken place and no one can accuse Russia of creating problems for Ukraine, especially regarding the supply of gas.”
True, the Kinakh government succeeded in solving problems of natural gas imports with Russia, with recently signed agreements setting the amounts of transit Russian gas to be pumped via Ukraine until 2012. Russia will pay for the transit partly with gas and partly with cash, making it possible for Ukraine to buy Russian or Turkmenistan gas. Difficult talks between both governments on gas prices and transit tariffs is proof that, should the bypass pipeline enter service, future talks could be much more dramatic and there is a likelihood that, being stripped of its monopoly on the Russian gas transit, Ukraine will be forced to make considerable concessions. Such a scenario could have been projected at the time when the Polish government, seemingly touting its own interests, actively promoted the interests of Ukraine in the bypass pipeline issue. However, the then Ukrainian government headed by Viktor Yushchenko, who then claimed and still claims the status of a national prophet, somehow thought it better to entrust Poland with the task of protecting the interests of Ukraine, limiting itself to pointing an accusing finger at Russia and showing reluctance to hold talks with it. The whole thing reminds one of a joke when a young man entrusted his buddy to make a declaration of love to his ladylove. It is hard to say now what made Viktor Yushchenko adopt his it’s-not-my-business stand. Perhaps he was scared by Russia’s Gazprom threatening to take Ukraine to the international court for the illegal siphoning of 1.1 billion cubic meters of Russian transit gas. Incidentally, the Gazprom threat was short-lived. However, there could have been another reason for Yushchenko’s mugwumpery: he did not want to spend his birthday outside his family circle. Quite unexpectedly, the Gas For Europe forum initiated by Poland in Warsaw on February 23, 2001 was attended by the Ukrainian delegation that included merely deputy ministers not directly involved with the pipeline issue, with the head of one of the Naftohaz Ukrayiny departments acting as Ukraine’s keynote speaker.
The forum’s reaction quite matched the representative level of the Ukrainian delegation and Ukrainian declarations that the bypass via Poland to Europe was not needed because Ukraine could considerably increase the transit capacity of its pipelines in ten years, and a similar assurance by our Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Oleksiy Berezhnoi who told journalists in the aftermath of the forum that in twenty to thirty years Ukraine can strengthen its transit potential. On the other hand, such an attitude of Ukraine toward defending its national interests demonstrated to Poland the futility of its efforts to perform the Ukrainian government’s major duty. With the result that Poland might have thought better about offering its good offices to the Ukrainian government.
Coming on the heels of the triple holiday, the former Soviet Army Day, its new versions (the Day of Defenders of the Homeland in Ukraine and Russia), and Yushchenko’s birthday, was a minor intergovernmental scandal, with Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy Oleksandr Krut and First Deputy Head of the State Information Committee Stepan Pavliuk taking the fall for the low representative level of the Ukrainian delegation at the forum and the blackout by domestic media of the forum discussions. Both officials got away with a reprimand, and their bosses were instructed to rectify the situation. That The Day’s version of the scandal and the reason for flogging the officials were true was evidenced by the fact that The Day’s story on the issue published then was not dismissed by the government.
Thus, the final Russian-Polish accord regarding the construction of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline sidestepping Ukraine is the recent outcome of spurning by the former premier of his immediate duty to protect the country’s vital interests. With other likely negative consequences of the Russia-Poland deal for Ukraine to follow soon.
COMMENTARY
Anatoly HUTSOL, first deputy director, National Institute of International Security Problems:
“Of course, no tragedy should be made out of Russia’s efforts to create alternative routes for natural gas supplies to Europe. Understandably, the issue of the security of these supply routes cannot be more vital to Russia. In fact, there are technical and political aspects to the whole issue. Technically, there are no major problems from Ukraine. And Russia’s position is quite clear, with its experts evaluating the wear and tear on Ukraine’s gas pipelines, problems of modernization, etc. Meanwhile, it was the political aspect that influenced Russia’s decision, as the Russians could not ignore the political situation in the country. Incidentally, the issue of a bypass pipeline to beat Ukraine’s monopoly on gas transit has been discussed since 1991, fanned by unstable economic and political relations between Ukraine and Russia.
“While Russian leaders switched from talks to laying the bypass pipe to Europe, Viktor Yushchenko’s role as prime minister had the bottom line of seriously marring our relations with Russia. His verbal opposition to accepting Russian arguments was more than tough as was his obvious reluctance to reach any compromise. All this resulted in the decision to lay a pipeline bypassing Ukraine. The flywheel of government decisions, as international practice confirms, has great inertia. Spinning at its peak speed when Yushchenko was premier (recall that Russia’s toughest economic sanctions against Ukraine were imposed then), it could not be stopped either by the Russian president or anyone else even after Viktor Yushchenko left office: a huge machine, fueled by appropriate funding, had been activated. In this context, the Ukrainians should give more thought to what might happen politically if, unlikely as the prospect is, the Yushchenko-led Our Ukraine bloc strengthens its positions after the election. It seems likely that in this case the chances of integrating into Europe (now also Russia’s major bet) and continuing cooperation with our established partners will be greatly curtailed.”
